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ABSTRACT
Current information and communications technology is only now starting to be used in the world of
social and employment policy and analysis. The full use of that technology will transform policymaking, social research and analysis, the design of social programming and the way in which it is
governed. On all fronts, the changes will be deep and highly beneficial – including for individual wellbeing and government treasuries.
Today’s welfare state policies came to maturity some fifty years ago in the pre-computer age and are
reaching the end of their useful lives. The transformed system which will replace it is referred to as the
enabling society. A series of push and pull factors make the transition to the enabling society inevitable
over the long run. However, the transition could be bumpy in the absence of a conscious
implementation strategy. The paper proposes such a strategy, one that builds on areas of common
interest, which provides a satisfying long-term narrative about future directions that will encourage
consensus, and that will provide demonstrable payoffs in the short- as well as the long-term.
Key characteristics of the enabling society include a citizen-centred focus, evidence-driven
programming, a shift to asset-based and lifecourse perspectives, shifting to partnership-based
horizontal dealings within the social policy world, and a radical improvement in efficiency, openness,
accountability and systematic learning within government. In the enabling society individuals will be
more responsible, within their families and communities, for determining the course of their own lives
– but with increased support for those who are most vulnerable, who face the greatest obstacles in
developing their capabilities and making life choices.
Central to these reforms is a radically improved base of ‘what works best’ knowledge. This is produced
by new ‘big statistics’ techniques that, for example, can calculate tailor-made estimates for job-seekers
of the expected success of specific options that are available, such as applying for specific jobs,
retraining alternatives or moving to another city – available on line, at the time the decision is being
made. This same ‘what works best’ evidence will also result in transformative improvements in
program design and delivery, in governance and in partnership arrangements.
Key words: social policy, labour market policy, longitudinal analysis, lifecourse, social statistics, welfare
state, future studies, public administration
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1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
This paper argues that a radical change in social and employment policies is on the reasonably near
time horizon. Deep changes will take place in the instruments of social policy and in their governance.
We refer to this as a shift to the ‘enabling society’, a phrase that is used in the paper as a shorthand
reference to the new social and employment policies that will replace traditional welfare state policies2.

1.1. What remains the same? What will change?
To better understand what is meant by the ‘enabling society’, this introductory chapter presents a brief
description of traditional welfare state social policy and then shows what will be the same and what
will be different when we move to the enabling society.
The scope of the paper
The enabling society concepts apply to all social policies: education, health, income taxes and transfers, social services,
transitional employment services, social housing, neighbourhood development and many others. This paper, however,
will concentrate its discussion on taxes and transfers such as pensions, social assistance, employment insurance and
transitional social and employment services such as training.
This limited scope was chosen in order to highlight those areas where we are likely to see the deepest transformation
over the coming decade. As well, the author’s own direct policy experience has been mainly in these areas and the
paper draws on that experience as well as on the broader literature. That said, a sensible next step would be to extend
the analysis to other areas of social policy, particular those dealing with education, health and public safety.
All developed countries are in process of shifting to the enabling society. However, the focus of this paper is Canada
where social policy is based on the dominance of markets and private provision, an approach that Canada shares, for
example, with the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia.

Welfare state policies
The paper uses the phrase ‘welfare state’ policies to refer to the dominant feature of the social policies
that came into maturity in developed countries mainly in the 1960s and 70s3. In welfare state
conceptions of social policy, the emphasis is on government programs that provide income support to
people who need additional resources at different points in their life and on transitional service such as
training to help them through difficult transitions in life such as becoming unemployed. The purpose is
to get people back to work, to reduce poverty, to help maintain living standards over the course of life
and to achieve a range of collective goals such as economic prosperity and public safety.

2

The phrase ‘enabling society’ was used by the present author in internal Government of Canada documents in the
early 1990s. The phrase was used in published documents only in recent years (Hicks 2012b, 2013a, and 2013b). It
would be more symmetrical to use the phrase ‘enabling state’ in making the contrast with welfare state. However, the
term ‘enabling state’ has already been used in the literature to refer to a shift within the welfare state towards somewhat
greater use of private, as opposed to public, provision of services (OECD 2005). The enabling society concept used
here is much broader and refers to deep changes in the instruments of social policy and in the relationship between
individual and state – as well as governance issues.
3
That is, we are not using the phrase as a way of describing the countries themselves as in Esping-Andersen’s famous
categorization of welfare states. (Esping-Andersen 1990).
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Income and transitional services are, of course, not the only resources that people need to lead a full,
productive life in a fair and equitable society. In traditional welfare state thinking, these other resources
are not neglected but tend to be addressed on separate policy tracks (e.g., the education system, public
housing, the health care system, or the justice system).
In much welfare state thinking, monetary income is often thought to be a reasonable proxy for these
other resources. With a decent income, people can buy many needed services. Indeed, in more extreme
versions, income is seen as almost the only social program, for example by providing vouchers so that
people themselves can purchase a wide range of health and educational services.

High level goals remain unchanged
When looking at ultimate objectives, there are no differences between the welfare state and the
enabling society. Both are trying to do the same thing, but using different methods.
The pre-computer technology that was available when the welfare state was put in place only allowed
social and employment policy goals to be efficiently met by programs that made a difference in
people’s lives at particular points in their life. Their effectiveness was assessed by looking at changes in
the average characteristics of large population groups – for example, whether point-in-time readings of
youth unemployment fell from last month, or poverty among older women was lower than in the
previous year. The relations between individuals and government were captured by words like
beneficiary or client.
In the enabling society, the technology that is now available allows the same high level goals to be met
by programming that is tailored to the circumstances of specific individuals and that is assessed in
terms of subsequent changes in the life of that individual. Individuals, of course, have prime
responsibility for determining the course of their own lives, and the role of social programming is
therefore citizen-centred and defined in terms of partnership and enabling support, not in terms of
client or beneficiary relationships. Success is assessed through micro level, longitudinal analysis rather
than through the aggregate, cross-sectional analysis of the welfare state.
This citizen-centred, individual focus of the enabling society is, however, not at odds with the
collective aspirations associated with the welfare state. Both systems encompass diverse views on
matters of values, priorities and principles. Within the welfare state tradition, there has always been a
range of views on the relative importance of, for example, equity and individual choice – the familiar
left-right debates about the extent to which a society’s resources should be allocated collectively or
privately. These debates are not greatly affected by the shift to the enabling society. Each left-right
debate on these topics within the welfare state view of social policy has an exact counterpart within the
enabling society view. There are two big differences however. First, the enabling society sees
individuals in the broader context of their lives in the family, in the community, in work and school as
opposed to the narrower individual-state dichotomy of the welfare state. Second, people at all points
on the political/values spectrum will find it significantly easier to meet their aspirations in the enabling
society than in the welfare state.

Radical changes in the design of program instruments and in governance
While they share the same values and high level goals, the enabling society programming will look very
different from traditional welfare state programming. The adoption of current information and
5

communications technology will change the design of policy instruments in the enabling society in at
least eight interrelated ways.

First, a focus on individual citizens. Welfare state policy thinking centres on the individual-state
relationship and welfare state programming is assessed in terms of its effects on the average
characteristics of larger population groups. In the enabling society, policy thinking centres on the
individual and his or her relationships with family, community, work, schools and governments.
Enabling society programming is assessed in terms of its role, as one aspect of the whole range of
supports that are provided by all these actors, in assisting specific citizens in making their own life
choices.

Second, a shift to evidence-driven programming. Reliable, continually-improving evidence of

expected outcomes – knowledge of ‘what is likely to work best’ – will lie at the heart of program
design, delivery, assessment and governance. As well, such information will be a powerful new policy
instrument in its own right. ‘What will work best’ information will be made available to citizens in real
time via the internet when they are making key life choices, without the need for direct government
services or supports. This information will be tailor-made to the circumstances of particular
individuals, based on evidence of what has worked best in similar situations in the past.

Third, a shift to a lifecourse perspective. Most welfare state programming was designed to

supplement people’s income at specific points in their life, or to provide assistance for specific
transitions such as that from unemployment to employment. These programs will continue to be used
in the enabling society in areas where they make sense. However they will be joined by programming
that is intended to make a difference in the subsequent lives of individuals and that is designed to work
in harmony with the events and activities that take place in family, work and community. Policy
analysis in the enabling society will examine issues such as equity, poverty and exclusion over longer
stretches of life as well as at single points in time.

Fourth, a shift to asset-based policies. The point-in-time perspectives of the welfare state placed

heavy weight on monetary flows to individuals as tools of social policy. The shift to a lifecourse
approach is associated with a greater emphasis on the role of assets (financial, human and social
capital) in meeting social objectives and on the social investment role of government in supporting the
creation of these assets.

Fifth, more focus on those facing the greatest obstacles in developing their capacities and in

making life choices, including people with mental and physical disabilities and people facing multiple
obstacles, often arising in several domains of life. The instruments in the welfare state tool kit are
ineffective in reaching those with greatest need. The lifecourse, evidence-driven tool kit of the enabling
society will be far richer and will support more effective partnerships in working with those who are
now the most excluded.

Sixth, generational and sustainability issues will become integrated into current policy thinking,

including program design. In the welfare state, intergenerational fairness and sustainable were largely
seen as external concerns, the side-effects of the welfare state to be dealt with by separate instruments,
if at all. The tools for generational analysis were largely missing. The enabling society places the
individual citizen in a broader social context, one that incorporates the widespread goal of leaving a
better world for one’s children and for succeeding generations. Big statistics will provide the tools for
understanding generational issues and doing something about them.

Seventh, horizontal integration. The technology used in the design of welfare state programming
meant that efficiency and accountability required the creation of a series of separate program silos,
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with resulting difficulties in coordinated action across programs, jurisdictions and in supporting
analytic disciplines. In the enabling society, common ‘what works best’ knowledge will greatly facilitate
coordinated action and partnership among an even more extended network, including citizens
themselves, a range of non-governmental bodies and government bodies in all jurisdictions.

Eighth, vertical integration. The new knowledge will also result in a radical improvement in

efficiency, openness, accountability and systematic learning within programs. Finely-grained
information on what is working and what is not working will be simultaneously available in real time to
program administrators, designers and evaluators, as well as to citizens and interested groups.
Openness and accountability will increase. Programs will constantly improve based on feedback loops
of up dated information on what is working best. Fewer government employees will be needed,
especially in administrative functions.

1.2. The argument in summary form
The first part of the paper describes the content of the enabling society from different perspectives.
Chapter 2 compares a simplified version of today’s welfare state programs with the instruments that
will be used to deliver policy in a mature enabling society. Chapter 3 examines the pressures that are
driving the transition to the enabling society. Chapter 4 shows why the shift to the enabling society is
not just a matter of making use of the new Information and Communications Technology (ICT) to do
existing things better – more efficiently and effectively. It will also allow us to do better things. Chapter
5 deals with the governance of social policy, where radical improvement can also be expected.

Policy instruments in the enabling society
Of the four main instruments for delivering social policy, the biggest transformation will be in
information products. Service products will also be radically improved. Income support products will
see perhaps less immediate change, since the ICT revolution has already had a bigger impact here – but
major changes are also likely in the longer term. The least change is likely to be in regulatory
instruments.

Information instruments
Information products, such as social marketing (e.g., promoting safe working conditions) and the
production of self-help information (e.g., information on future skills shortages) play a relatively small
independent role in achieving social policy goals in today’s welfare state. They are mainly used to
support other kinds of programming.
A radical shift is ahead, with information products becoming the central, defining feature of the new
citizen-centric social policy. National social statistics will be transformed from its present primary role
of supporting government and academic researchers and analysts to becoming a powerful tool that will
provide ordinary citizens with information on what is likely to work best for them in making decisions
in the labour market and social domains of life. This knowledge will be available to citizens
instantaneously over the internet (or whatever comes after the internet) at the time decisions are made.
For example, an unemployed job seeker would be able to compare the likely outcomes of various
options that were open to him or her – such as applying for specific jobs, training, counselling or
moving elsewhere – based on calculations that were tailor-made to the particular situation of the
individual.
7

Much of the paper is an elaboration on the how such ‘what works best’ information can be readily
constructed using today’s ICT technology and existing data sources, on the multiple uses of this kind
of information in other areas of social policy and how it will transform the roles of governments,
citizens and the actors in the social policy world.

Service instruments
Service instruments such as the education and health care system will be transformed over the longer
term by the use of ‘what works best’ information. The paper, however, concentrates on the more
immediate changes that can be anticipated in transitional support services such as training and other
forms of active labour market programming.
The use of ‘what is likely to work best’ evidence in the design and management of transitional services,
together with the use of that evidence in referring people to specific services, will result in a major
improvement in the success rates of these services. As well the system will get better over time as the
result of information feedback loops that are built into the system. Progress in implementing such
programming could be reasonably quick since rich, but currently untapped, sources of information are
available and the needed technology is already widely used elsewhere.
When the direct use of ‘what work best’ information by citizens is combined with the use of that
information in transitional employment and social services, the result will be major improvements in
the operation of labour markets, in shortened durations of unemployment and exclusion and in
reduced social assistance and employment insurance costs.
Another effect will be the greater targeting of services on the most vulnerable – citizens who face the
greatest obstacles. The paper outlines the reasons for this.

Income security instruments
Income is provided to people on the assumption that, in most cases, people will know best on how
that money should be spent to meet their particular needs and preferences. This is a standard tenet in
economics which is based on the assumption that individuals themselves have the best information on
what is most likely to work best for them. Yet information on what is likely to work best when making
big life choices is often missing at present, particularly the medium- and longer-term effects of
decisions made today. With the new enabling society information, individuals will have a much clearer
understanding of the likely outcomes of different choices and expenditures they make, increasing the
effectiveness of income transfer programming.
Income support instruments such as tax credits, employment insurance, pensions and social assistance
have already benefited from the use of the new technology. However deeper changes are on the
longer-term horizon here as well. The paper explores how asset-based and lifecourse initiatives are
beginning to supplement the point-in-time income flow perspectives of welfare state programming.
Under welfare state programing, income security programming has been edging towards a guaranteed
annual income (GAI) – a negative income tax version of a GAI in the case of Canada. Something like
a point-in-time GAI is likely to remain as one dimension of the end state of the enabling society, but it
will be supplemented by arrangements that take the whole lifecourse into account. The characteristics
of such a ‘Guaranteed Lifetime Account’ are described.

Regulatory instruments
Current trends towards ever-greater reliance on regulatory instruments will likely continue as we move
towards the enabling society, although with some shifts in emphasis. The new enabling society
8

technology will, by itself, have mixed consequences for the regulatory system. Better information will
be available for use in monitoring adherence to rules. That might ultimately result in reduced levels of
distrust in government and it is that distrust which has been partly responsible for the increasing use of
regulations. However it might also disclose previously unseen problems of inconsistency or noncompliance that could create pressures for an even stronger regulatory role. The enabling society will
also see many more applications that draw on the programming of different jurisdictions. That is likely
to lead to strong pressures for greater harmonization of the rules governing those different programs.

The combined effects of instrument change
Social and employment policies will become far more effective and evidence-driven. The use of ‘what
works best’ information means that social policy will reach more people, at relatively less cost (since
information is relatively inexpensive to produce), and with less intrusion on people’s lives (since
information products are less intrusive than traditional services and income support). Services such as
education will continue to increase in importance, as will remedial services for those in greatest need.
Income support programming, especially pension spending, will fall in relative size, as will employment
insurance and social assistance.
Today’s social and labour market objectives will be met to a greater degree and with less cost.
Depending on the priorities of the day, these cost savings could be used for other purposes, or
retained in the social envelope to take on additional problems that are not currently addressed.

The enabling society: a response to current pressures
A rich literature exists on the pressures that drive social policy. Demographic pressures, especially the
fiscal and macro-economic effects of population aging typically rank high on the list, as does the
importance of investments in skills and human development to meet the economic pressures
associated with maintaining and increasing prosperity in a globalized knowledge economy. Growing
income inequalities, and the persistence of pockets of poverty, are also high on the list of pressures for
change – with much attention paid to need to remove the gender inequality that still exists in the
workforce.

The push factors
Fiscal concerns are a major factor pushing away from the costly welfare state and towards the relative
efficiency of the enabling society. While important, the push factor is sometimes seen as almost the
only important pressure. In reality, pull factors will be at least as important over the long run. Fiscal
pressures are large now, but their long term effect is somewhat cyclical, reflecting the business cycle
and the size of government debts. As well, much of the current fiscal concern reflects a
misunderstanding of the effects of population aging which, for reasons discussed in the paper, is
unlikely to have large fiscal and macroeconomic consequences, at least in Canada.
In the early years of the welfare state, fiscally-driven reforms included reducing government spending
by improving efficiency or reducing existing benefits. However, there is now little remaining room for,
or interest in, further reforms of this sort. In recent decades, much the largest reforms have been to
shift the burden of funding to individuals and other parties, with the emphasis on reducing the
anticipated future growth in spending. There are many examples, most notably in the area of pension
finance. By increasing individual responsibility for financing, it is possible to meet fiscal goals in ways
that also make sense for substantive reasons, such as increasing individual choice over major lifecourse
decisions.
9

The pull factors
Existing pressures towards promoting skills and human development, and towards tackling pockets of
exclusion and growing inequality, will be much easier to handle in the enabling society and are
therefore treated as pull factors. A risk is that some solutions that promote a more skilled and
competitive work force also work in the direction of increasing inequality. In order to simultaneously
address economic, demographic and social pressures, policies must take a generational and a lifecourse
perspective.
From a generational perspective, the most effective policy response would be heavy investment in
early childhood learning and development. That will only succeed, however, if there is also policy
emphasis on gender equality in the workplace and in family caregiving responsibilities. Both strands – a
strong early learning infrastructure and greater gender equality – must be there if either goal is to be
met.
From a lifecourse perspective, the most effective policy response would be programming that allows
individuals to gain greater control over the course of their own lives, including their lifetime pathways
through the worlds of work, family and learning – and the pathways from work to retirement. It would
be particularly important to remove existing policy-supported incentives to spend less of life in work
and to have fewer children than people would prefer. Lifecourse policy responses will also place
stronger emphasis on addressing the needs of people with greatest difficult in navigating life’s
pathways, including those with physical and mental disabilities.
In other words, the push and pull factors both point to a policy emphasis on supporting greater
lifetime choice – which is what the enabling society is all about.

The enabling society: a better social policy
The shift to the enabling society is not only a response to external pressures. The enabling society will
be a better society. But what does it mean to be better? The paper explores three kinds of answer. First
is an examination of what influential thinkers have to say about better directions for social policy.
Second is an examination of the views of governments, the representatives of the people, on desirable
future directions. Finally, the paper explores what citizens themselves think when asked about their
values and opinions.
Perhaps the main message coming from thinkers in the academic community is the need to see social
policy from a human development perspective, particularly in supporting people in developing their
capacities. Another theme is the need to better address persistent exclusion. A third stream of thinking
focuses on inequality, particularly gender equality and growing income inequality. The new emphasis is
on well-being at the level of specific individuals and on individual choice. This is not necessarily in
conflict with more collective, aggregate orientation of welfare state policies, but it does place more
importance on setting objectives, and measuring success, in terms of individual lifecourses and
respecting individual diversity.
Governments of developed countries, when acting in a collective think-tank mode through the OECD
and similar bodies, have views about desired future directions that are similar to the academic thinkers.
Lifecourse, human development, social investment and gender equality issues prevail. The trend is
towards seeing social policy not only in terms of the workforce and education, but also in terms of
family – including issues of caregiving and the early childhood development.
10

In terms of the views of people themselves, the World Values survey has shown an international trend
towards self-expression values. These shift the policy emphasis away from constraint-based programs
and towards supporting choice at the individual level. Public opinion surveys do not show any
rejection of the large government social spending associated with the welfare state, but they do suggest
support for different kinds of active policy instruments, particularly ones that involve effective support
for social and economic integration, with less support for income support taken in isolation.
The paper reviews how these general trends play out with respect to the four main goals of social
policy: a) supporting those in need; b) supporting the allocation of resources over the lifecourses of
individuals; c) learning, human capital and prosperity; and d) addressing inequality. One aspect of
inequality, centring on issues of generational fairness and sustainability, is given extended treatment. It
is an area where, today, there is a strong sense that real issues may exist but where it is virtually
impossible to take action, or even understand what action is needed, given the constraints of existing
evidence and existing welfare state programming.
In all cases, the directions are compatible with the enabling society themes described at the outset of
this chapter, except that the literature does not deal explicitly with the transformative potential of ICT
to produce ‘what works best’ information. Rather, the literature implicitly assumes an extended period
of incremental changes mainly based around existing government-centric policy instruments. There is
no suggestion that these are preferred to the new citizen-centric instruments of the enabling society; it
is rather that the possibility of such instruments has simply not been foreseen in mainstream social
policy thinking.

Transformed governance in the enabling society
Much of the literature on governance is quite harsh in its diagnosis of the existing ways in which social
policies are managed. Although not always put so bluntly, the following terms characterize much of
the diagnosis: top-heavy, unaccountable, stuck in existing silos, not joined-up, demoralized,
unresponsive, dysfunctional, and bloated. In dealing with prescriptions, the literature typically calls for
quite different approaches – either a return to some golden age in the past or, more constructively, a
call for new approaches. These new approaches often centre on better ways of working in partnership,
with the role of public institutions being seen as one of enhancing the capacity of the society as a
whole to achieve better results, as well as delivering the government’s direct programming efficiently
and effectively. Shifting to these new ways of doing business is typically seen as being a difficult task
that will require additional governmental sub-systems and functions – addressing increasingly complex
problems through increasingly complex governance arrangements.
This paper suggests that such diagnoses and prescriptions are based on the assumption of the
continuation of existing, but slowly dying, welfare state programming. In contrast, the paper argues
that, in the enabling society, the world of governance will become much simpler and more effective.
Once the ‘what works best’ information that will reshape the instruments of social policy starts to be
used in governance of social policy, there will be a new harmony between what is done and how it is
done. Horizontal and vertical issues will be managed an evidence-driven manner, efficiency and
effectiveness will increase, overhead functions will be slashed, accountability will increase and
motivation and trust will grow.
Inside government, service delivery and managerial incentives, as well as accountability regimes, will be
based on current estimates of expected outcomes. This will ensure that lower order measures of inputs
and outputs, which are needed to ensure efficiency within the different subsystems of a program, are
11

working in harmony towards higher order objectives and not diverting attention away from the real
outcomes, as is often the case at present. Similarly, the same ‘what works best’ information will also
support evidence-driven partnership arrangements through a hierarchy of output and outcome
measures that can support the varying, but overlapping, objectives of the various partners.
The paper provides a practical example of why evidence-based governance along these lines was
simply not possible with welfare-state social programming, particularly in the provision of services.
The data were simply not there to do it well, and reliance on the information that did exist made things
worse – distorting incentives and too often resulting in a demoralized system, mired in red tape. The
paper uses the same practical example to show how this will change radically in the enabling society,
where a system of big statistics will allow the creation of micro-level evidence that is tailor-made to the
real objectives of the many actors who play a wide range of quite different roles in the system.
As well, the enabling society would see deep changes in the roles of the main social policy actors. The
same base of comprehensive ‘what is likely to work best’ information will be available to all actors,
including citizens, government agencies in all orders of government, voluntary organizations, service
providers like schools and colleges, and private companies. That will enable the whole system to
operate on the basis of partnership. Partnership relationships between government and citizens will
replace beneficiary, or client or customer relationships. New partnership arrangements between
governments and other institutions will supplement, although not replace, traditional contracts and
contribution agreements.
The evolution towards new forms public-private partnership has already begun. The paper reviews
some successes and failures.

Smoothing the transition to the enabling society
The second part of the paper discusses ways of smoothing the transition to the enabling society.
Chapter 6 outlines a four-part strategy for a low-key initiative that will help speed the transition.
Chapter 7 describes one element of that strategy in some depth. This is the development of the system
on big statistics that will transform the content and governance of social policy. Chapter 8 elaborates
on a second element of the strategy – the development of a conceptual framework that will provide a
common view of the end state, of the ultimate goal that we would like to accomplish through
countless incremental and independent initiatives.

An incremental strategy
Current ICT technologies will eventually be used in social policy, whether or not there is a conscious
implementation strategy. The benefits in terms of improved outcomes, reduced costs and improved
governance will be too large to ignore. However, the transitional period could be bumpy. There would
be large payoffs from smoothing and shortening that transition period.
What is needed is a gradual implementation strategy that will build on those shared interests that do
exist. That strategy would set out a new narrative about what should happen in the future, a kind of
vision of the enabling society that will gain support and consensus. It would also set out a plan for
gradually moving us towards that vision in a non-threatening, consensus-building manner that resulted
in measurable payoffs in the short- as well as the longer-term.
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The paper proposes a four part implementation strategy that builds on existing strengths and by-passes
obvious pitfalls.
The first element of the strategy would be to accelerate the development of the system of big statistics
which will, in turn, provide the ‘what works best’ information that powers the entire transformed
approach to social and employment policies.
The second element would be the further development of a conceptual framework that describes the
desired end state both of the policies themselves and of the supporting system of big statistics. In
doing so, it will also provide a common language that can be used by all actors in the social policy
world. A common language, and the existence of an agreed end state, does not mean that the
independent initiatives of many different actors will always work in a consistent, coordinated manner.
However, it would be a major step in the right direction.
The third element would be the modest funding of series of practical experiments, demonstration
projects, and research initiatives that would both have payoffs in the short term and that would foster
the development of the enabling society programs and policies. Experimental development of ‘what
works best’ information both directly by citizens and in active labour market programming could have
especially high payoffs.
The fourth element would be to make use of the language of the framework in a series of consultative
exercises related to the development of big statistics and the experimental initiative, along with
consultations that would be taking place in any event in conjunction with current social and
employment policy initiatives. These would help build understanding and support for the new
directions and would provide an opportunity to further develop the conceptual framework.
Leadership will be needed for these four elements to work in harmony. There will be a need for a
senior voice that advocates, and helps shape, the shift to the enabling society. The paper explores some
possibilities that could work in Canada, particularly building on the considerable opportunities that are
made possible by existing federal-provincial-territorial arrangements.

Big statistics
Big statistics are the next stage beyond the ‘big data’ techniques that are currently much in the news.
Big data provides interesting new information by using powerful tools for extracting meaning from a
multitude of basically unstructured, disparate data sources. Big statistics use similar tools but add an
integrating conceptual structure to the multiple data sources. The result is information that has the
power to transform social policy and, more fundamentally, make life much better for all citizens.
On the surface it seems odd, even perverse, to propose that the statistical system be used as a tool to
speed the evolution of substantive policies and a better quality of life. Ordinarily, the social statistical
system responds to the changing needs of policy and does not lead them. They are important for
researchers and provide media with interesting tidbits, but are hardly life-changing. As well, at least in
Canada, the central statistical agency has been under attack and there is concern that governments have
little interest in statistics and research.
This paper explains that existing statistics are used, although in ways that are not always visible.
However, national social statistics are becoming increasingly less relevant. They were designed and
structured using pre-computer technologies and increasingly tell stories that are becoming stale. The
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paper provides a long list of unmet statistical needs that are of critical importance to policy making and
effective programs.
The situation will, however, dramatically improve when the statistical system catches up and begins
using current ICT technology. The result will be an explosion of new, relevant information, with less
cost and less response burden than at present. The real-time tailor-made calculations of ‘what will
work best’ are one example. The sources of data will change, with much greater use of administrative
files. The structure of data will change to a data warehouse model, no longer organized according to
the sources of the data such as surveys, census or administrative files. The tools of statistical analysis
will change and will be based on micro, lifecourse data as opposed to aggregated cross-sectional data.
As well, the users and uses of the national statistical system will change – towards practical, individuallevel decision-making information by citizens and organizations, as well as even stronger support for
today’s prime users in academia and government.
There is very little recognition in either the social policy literature or the social research literature of the
transformative power of the new system of big statistics. It is far more powerful, for example, than the
‘big data’ transformation that is already underway in many other areas. The paper therefore takes a step
back and explains in laymen’s terms the seeming miracle that is on the quite near time horizon.

Olivia: an integrating framework for the enabling society
The system of national accounts provides a powerful integrating framework for economic policy and
economic statistics. At the time when the welfare state was becoming mature, there was an attempt to
create a framework that would have played a similar integrating role for social statistics. It failed, but
the need for an integrating framework is even more important in smoothing the transition to the
enabling society. Among other functions, it will provide a needed map to the emerging warehouse of
big statistics. It provides the integrative tool that allows ‘big data’ to be transformed into the far more
powerful ‘big statistics’. It will provide a common language that can be used by people in all of the
various policy and research silos to communicate their needs to statistical planners. It could eventually
become a common language that will improve all forms of communication that touch on social and
employment issues, both narrative and numeric.
Canada has taken a lead in developing such a framework. The present state of development of the socalled Olivia framework is described. Examples are provided of how it fully supports both the crosssectional economic analysis that has been dominant in the welfare state and the asset-based and
lifecourse perspectives of the enabling society. As well, it can support all types of analytic techniques,
quantitative and qualitative, values-based or descriptive. It has been designed to provide links to
macroeconomic and historical analysis. It sheds light on sustainable development. It can be readily
extended to virtually any field of social policy: learning, health, crime and justice and housing –
including both spending and regulatory instruments.
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PART ONE.

WHY LIFE IN THE ENABLING SOCIETY
WILL BE BETTER
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2. THE INSTRUMENTS OF THE ENABLING SOCIETY
VERSUS THOSE OF THE WELFARE STATE
This chapter compares the social policy instruments of the incoming enabling society, once they
become mature, with those of the outgoing welfare state.
Section 2.1 describes information products, including ‘what works best’ data, which is the cornerstone
of the enabling society.
Section 2.2 describes the new content and design of programs that provide services.
Section 2.3 describes the changes that will take place in income security programming, including
taxation.
Section 0 turns briefly to the final type of policy instrument, the regulatory system.
Section 2.5 examines changes in the relative size and importance of the new enabling society social
policy instruments.

2.1. Information products
Information products will never be a big budget item but they will nevertheless play a central, defining
role in the enabling society. Four types of information products are at play: national social statistics,
social marketing, referral and self-help information, and, by far the most important, the new addition
in the enabling society – individually-targeted ‘what works best’ information.

National social and labour market statistics
The system of national social statistics will be profoundly affected by the arrival of the enabling
society. There will be deep shifts in the sources of data, in the way in which the data are stored,
analysed and accessed – and, indeed, in the very purposes of, and audience for, national statistics. This
transformation is sufficiently important that we have made it the subject of a separate chapter, Chapter
7, which argues that the structure of today’s statistical system is a product of pre-computer technology
and is overdue for a catch-up period that will result in: a) an explosion in the amount of useful data
that is produced, with less cost and response burden; b) vastly more powerful tools of analysis; and c) a
shift to individual citizens as the prime users of statistics, rather than governments and academics who
are today’s main clients.

Social marketing
Social marketing is the use of information to discourage behaviour that has undesirable consequences
(e.g., unsafe work environments, discrimination, eating junk food) and to encourage behaviour that is
in line with society’s social goals (e.g., training for occupations that are in demand, active living, and
adequate personal retirement savings).
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Currently social marketing4 is mainly used in the health area and is less developed in the employment
and social services areas. In part this reflects the state of empirical knowledge, both about the extent
and characteristics of the undesirable and desirable states in question and about the extent to which
behaviours can be modified by these social marketing tools. That is, it is a little easier to find
quantitative evidence of this sort in the health area than in the area of employment or social exclusion
– although in no area is the evidence all that good.
In the social and employment areas there has been recent interest in ‘nudge’ policies5. These can be
seen as initiatives to incorporate social marketing tools, and lessons that are being learned from
behavioural economics, into mainstream program design and delivery. The goal is to use small levers
that influence behaviour in ways that result in better social outcomes. For example, suppose a
retirement savings program allows people to make a choice among, say, different investment strategies
or contribution rates. If an individual does not make a specific choice, then social marketing
considerations would lead to making the default choice that would be set to be the one that experts
think will get the best results for most people.
Information about the nature of social problems and their solution will be much stronger in the
enabling society. This might suggest a larger role for social marketing since promotional activities
would be grounded on better evidence. However, in a mature enabling society, ‘what works best’
information will also be directly available to individuals in an intuitive, easy-to-use form. The result
might be a reduced need for intermediary marketing products.
On balance, in the coming decades while the new system is becoming mature, it would seem
reasonable to anticipate at least a modest growth in the importance of social marketing, particularly in
the employment and learning area, driven by our growing knowledge of what actually works best and
of the effects of nudge initiatives.

Referral and self-help information
Access to bulletin board and self-help information is already increasing rapidly with the growth of
internet sites that, for example, refer job-seekers to specific job openings. This kind of information
product will doubtless grow even more rapidly in the coming years and will be more closely tied with
the other information products such as self-help occupational counselling and lists of available courses
at local training institutions. Most important, there will be an integration of this kind of information
with the individually tailored ‘what works best’ information described below.

What works best information
Individually-tailored ‘what works best’ information is the critical new feature of information
instruments and lies at the heart of the entire enabling society transformation.
Figure 1 describes the kind of information that would be available to a citizen who wished to change
his or her present employment status. For example, he or she might be unemployed, or trying to get a
better job, or considering a move to a different part of the country. Figure 1 shows how that person
4

There is also much marketing associated with promoting the use of existing government products (e.g., encouraging
use of tax incentives for retirement savings, promoting the awareness of mental health interventions, or using existing
government sponsored training).
5

Which became popular with the publication of Thaler and Sunstein (2008).
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Figure 1. 'What works best' information to support an individual's employment and training decisions
How it would work
The case of an adult interested in improving his or her
employment prospects provides an example. The individual
in question would be interested in finding out what
opportunities are available, such as taking a training course,
going back to school or changing jobs. He or she would also
want to know the likely success in the labour market of
choosing one of these options – with that knowledge being
available at the time that the choice is being made.
… information on the expected outcomes of different
courses of action
The individual would access a web site developed for this
purpose. He or she would provide information to the site
about his or her skills, employment history and employment
aspirations. Based on this information and on an underlying
data base, the site would calculate the expected success
rates attached to different alternative actions.
There could be standard ways of calculating success rates,
including the probability of finding a job and a range of
measures of the likelihood of future job stability and
earnings. These calculations would be based on:


The subsequent labour market experience of people
with similar characteristics and in similar circumstances
who had made comparable choices in the past.



Projections of future labour market trends and
information.



Increasingly, information on the success rates of those
who used the system in the past.

…information on the options that are actually open
As well as projecting the likelihood of success associated
with different choices, the site would refer people to
information (typically on related, but separate sites, both
public and private) on the practical options that were open
including:

Sites that provide students, and those contemplating
major career shifts, with occupational counselling
information.

Many such sites are currently available; the required
innovation will be to allow them to be accessed in an
integrated manner.
… Information when decisions are being made
The information would be provided to individuals in real
time – similar to the kind of instant feedback received from
Amazon.ca or Expedia.ca or their competitors when
choosing a book or a vacation trip. The calculations involved
would be more complex than those used in these examples,
taking far more variables into account. However, similarly
complex calculations are routinely used in existing big data
and web mining applications. Indeed, pilot work in
calculating expected success rates for active labour market
programs was successfully carried out over 15 years ago, as
described in Figure 2.
The underlying data base for ‘what works best’ calculations
The underlying data base would contain anonymous
formulas that were derived from information about all
Canadians who had, in the past, undertaken specified kinds
of training, or who had returned to school or who had
changed jobs or occupations. It would also contain
information about their employment and learning history
before and after the training or job change. Such
information is currently available from income tax and
administrative files related to Employment Insurance and
Active Labour Market Programs. The administrative data
would be supplemented by in-depth information based on
follow-up surveys of past participants.
Success will improve over time
And, of course, the calculations of expected success would
become more accurate and useful over time:


The underlying data base will track the subsequent
experience of current users (where the information
collected is even richer).

Job matching sites.



Sites that assist people in understanding their present
levels of occupational competence and that guide them
in job searches, etc.

Descriptions of the content of interventions will become
fuller and more standardized.



Training and other interventions provided will also get
better outcomes as they, too, will be improved by the
‘what works best’ data, as explained in Figure 2.



The results of surveys of user satisfaction will be
incorporated.



Descriptions of the training options open in the city in
question, including from colleges and private trainers.








Sites providing information on shortage occupations
including those in other parts of the country.
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would have access to information that would allow him or her to make more effective choices on what
to do next.
There are two reasons why we chose the example of a labour market application. First, and most
important, the underlying data on what happened to people subsequent to labour market interventions
is much better than in other social and employment areas. Combinations of income tax records,
employment insurance records and information about actual Active Labour Market Program (ALMP)
interventions are available for use in this type of application. Second, as discussed in Section 2.2,
critical aspects of this application have actually been developed, pilot tested and found to be
successful.
However, many other applications are possible. Some, particularly those related to improving
individual lifecourse decisions, could be introduced over the medium term. Examples include
applications directed to students wishing to learn the probable success of different educational choices,
or applications related to retirement planning or to decisions on whether to move to other cities or
provinces. Still other applications, such as tackling social exclusion or community economic
development could be gradually introduced as data are improved.
Two points in Figure 1 warrant elaboration: those dealing with privacy and with the increasing
effectiveness of outcomes over time.

Privacy
The use of micro (individual level) data about the past success in the labour market of people with
similar characteristics in similar circumstances will sound alarm bells about privacy. In fact there is no
substantive privacy issue, although it will be important to make this clear at the outset. Before it is used
in ‘what works best’ calculations, information about specific individuals is transformed into
anonymous equations within a secure environment such as that which is now provided by Statistics
Canada6. The process is sometimes cumbersome but effective.

Continuous improvements in effectiveness
The assertion in Figure 1 that the outcomes of what works best information will improve over time
also deserves some further explanation. This will happen because the underlying data base will grow
and become more powerful over time, particularly as additional administrative files are cleaned and
become part of the whole system. As well, detailed information can be collected from individuals at
the time of their original usage, while information about their subsequent experience will be collected
in follow-up surveys as well as obtained from administrative records.
Solving the ‘black box’ problem will also improve the quality of the data. Currently there is very little
quantitative information about what actually happens inside the black boxes of programs such as
training or any other kind of intervention. Yet we act on the assumption that things like curricula, class
size, and mixes of formal training with practical experience make a difference to outcomes. Placing a
priority on gathering this kind of process information should result in a significant improvement in
understanding what elements of interventions are actually working best – information that is likely to
be crucial in making incremental design improvements.

6

There is also a potential privacy issue with the respect to the personal data that the individual users provide to the
system during the intervention and in follow-up surveys. However, this is easily resolved by seeking informed consent
for subsequent, anonymized uses of the data.
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The improvement in the quality of ‘what works best’ data goes far beyond this simple increase in the
amount of data captured. For example, an element of random assignment can be built into referral
recommendations. The subsequent employment experience of individuals who participated in
particular interventions would be compared with those who were in control groups – providing finelygrained, experimental evidence of what is working best for whom – information that can be used to
improve the calculations used in the future.
In addition, large gains in the relevance of the underlying data will result from improvements in service
interventions themselves, including the collection of more information about what actually happens
inside the operation of service interventions. This is the subject of the next section.

2.2. Service programming
Service programming includes initial education, adult retraining, health care, family services such as
adoption, food banks, child care, immigrant settlement, rehabilitation and counselling programs, parole
programs and many more7. The paper concentrates on transitional services such as ALMPs where the
transformation will occur earliest. The final section of the paper indicates that extensions in the areas
of health and education would logical next steps.
The paper refers to this kind of programming as ‘transitional’ because it is intended to help people in
making, for example, the transition from unemployment to employment, from dependence on
institutional support to independent living, from homelessness to having decent housing, or the
transition from social assistance, employment insurance and disability benefits to earnings. In the
welfare state, some of this kind of programming was referred to as ‘remedial’, reflecting the intention
to remedy problems caused by past societal dysfunction. This could include a heavy reliance on passive
income support in some cases or other measures that would make exclusion less intolerable. In the
enabling society the emphasis in ‘transitional’ programming is even more clearly focussed on making
the transition out of these situations.
Three big changes will occur in the provision of transitional services in the enabling society. First,
services will be transformed by the same kinds of ‘what works best’ data that were discussed above.
Figure 2 provides an example of an application of this technology that was developed in the mid1990s. Second, these services will be more concentrated on complex, difficult cases, with a wider range
of instruments that can be applied. This applies mainly to services to individuals, but parallel
considerations apply in initiatives related to community economic development or to industry sector
or occupational initiatives. Third, government funding to create additional service capacity will be
treated as ‘social investment’ not ‘social expenditure’.

7

The examples are programs intended to promote social and economic inclusion. While the paper will not discuss the
minority of services that are designed to exclude people from society (such as prisons), these too can be well supported
by the ‘what works best’ data that marks the enabling society. The examples in the text are mainly services that are
funded by governments. However the same ‘what works best’ techniques apply to services provided by the not-forprofit and private sectors.
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Figure 2. Experience with 'what works best’ information to support service programs: the example of ALMPs
The new ‘what works best’ information provided to
individuals, as discussed in Figure 1, would also be available
to service providers.

Why that leadership could not be sustained

Pilot testing in Canada in the 90s



There were perceived privacy concerns (largely unfounded).



Operational problems occurred because the system was
expected to support administrative functions for which it was
not designed.



Front line staff feared that it would be used to cut jobs.



Program review in the 90s eroded the internal capacity,
including in the area of evaluation.



The department struggled with its broad mandate and was in a
crisis mode by the early 2000s – with little appetite for
exploring new approaches.



Knowledge management was no longer explicitly and
separately represented at senior management tables.



Responsibilities for ALMPs were increasingly shifted to the
provinces, where technical capacity was not nearly as
developed in areas such as this.



The accountability regimes of the time placed greater
emphasis on matters related to service delivery and on
efficient process – with less attention paid to measuring the
subsequent outcomes of the programs.

In the 90s, the predecessor department to Employment and
Social Development Canada (ESDC) played a world-leading
role in developing and piloting this ‘what works best’
technology for use in its ALMPs – very much along the lines
described in Figure 1 except that the information was
directed to front line employment counsellors who referred
people to a variety of ALMPs instruments that were open.
(The internet did not then exist and there was no thought
of direct access by the clients themselves.) In addition to
providing data to assist in the referral process, the system
was designed to provide business information to assist
analysts and managers in determining the best
employment and/or training strategies for speciﬁc client
groups.
The actual econometric equations used were crude by
today’s standards, but they were still capable of providing
better results than referrals that were unsupported by this
technology.

The system was however not implemented:

How did it work?
The initial pilot study created a 9 year longitudinal file
drawn from some 19 administrative data silos (federal and
provincial) which were cleansed in order to produce some
2000 variables. Of these, 250 of the most important, from
over 10 million clients, were captured in the final data
warehouse which was used to make ‘what will work best’
referrals to the 25 ALMP interventions that were available
in local areas.
The techniques that were used underwent a number of
iterations based on lessons learned (Colpitts 2002) but, by
the turn of the century, they were working sufficiently well
that full-scale implementation was possible.
Why did it happen in ESDC?


It was developed by an evaluation staff which had
world-leading expertise in ‘what works’ methodology.



It was developed as part of an explicit knowledge
strategy which had senior leadership.



Affordable data warehousing technology was just
becoming available.



Compared with other countries, there was
unprecedented access to needed administrative data.

Costs and benefits
The project was abandoned before the costs and benefits of full
scale implementation could be calculated. However, a subsequent
experiment in Switzerland gives some sense of the order of
benefits that are likely. The Swiss used a controlled experiment to
compare the results obtained from ‘what works best’ calculations
to the results achieved by experienced case workers. (Lechner and
Smith 2007).


The case workers got about the same results in referring
clients to interventions as did random assignment. That is,
they added no value but did no harm.



However, interventions based on techniques similar to those
that were piloted in Canada resulted in significant gains in
post-intervention employment rates – of between 7% and 15%
depending on assumptions that were made.

This was a very large return when considered in the context of the
relatively small costs of developing such ‘intelligent’ referral tools
and in light of the fact that results will improve over time based on
lessons learned from feedback about past successes and failures.
Where things stand now
The costs of computing have fallen dramatically since then. The
econometric methodologies have been quietly improved, and the
technology could be resurrected with a modest investment.
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Learning organizations: a step beyond evidence-driven programming
There is much current interest in evidence-driven programming, with attention focussed on evidence
derived from formal experiments with random assignment. Clinical trials in the health care area are the
main current example. The ‘what works best’ information described in this paper shares some of the
features of this kind of evidence, but will be far more powerful8 because of the addition of feedback
loops built into the design of these interventions. Enabling society programming will learn, and
automatically improve, over time – based on evidence of what has worked best in similar
circumstances in the past. Take the example of ALMPs for the unemployed people:


Those who design the ALMP intervention will know the mix of training, job experience and
counselling that has worked best for different categories of jobless people in different labour
markets in the past. They can incorporate this knowledge in their current designs.



Front line teachers and counsellors will learn about subsequent experience of their clients, as well
as direct feedback from current participants about their perceptions of the quality of the
intervention and of any problems that were encountered.



Those who market the program will have much more detailed information about the
characteristics of those who might gain the most benefit from that training.



Those case workers or counsellors who refer people to the intervention will have good data on
likely success rates – the same ‘what works best’ data that were described in Figure 1. This is an
area that has been pilot tested in the past, as described in Figure 2.



Those who monitor, assess and evaluate the program will have excellent information about costs
and success rates both historically and in comparison with similar interventions.



Those who fund the ALMP interventions will have good cost-benefit data on which to base their
decisions.



And, most important, the individual participants will have a good sense of the expected results of
that training, including comparisons with alternative types of interventions or actions, and will
have the opportunity to provide feedback.

Taken as a whole, this information will result in the ALMP question becoming part of a self-adjusting,
learning system. The traditional conception of a program that consists of static rules and procedures
will gradually become obsolete, to be replaced by that of a system which is continuously evolving in
response to changing needs and circumstances. The transition to the new approach may be bumpy in

8

Unfortunately, terminology in this area is confusing. Often ‘evidence driven’ is used in a much looser sense, simply
to mean any policy application that uses evidence drawn for any sort of research, such as most current economic
analysis which is typically based on analysis and models that show relationships but not causality. Even more
confusing, the phrase ‘what works’ is used in at least three senses: a) to mean information that results from the more
loosely-defined research just described; b) more tightly – to refer to data from random assignment techniques that
allow analysis of causality to assess the effectiveness of programs taken as a whole; and c) in the newer sense used in
this paper where ‘what works best’ information refers to evidence about the expected outcomes of specific decisions.
For example, the UK has recently set up of a series of ‘What Works evidence centres for social policy’, that appear to
use the first, loose definition. American groups, such as the Coalition For Evidence-Driven Policy tend to use ‘what
works’ in the middle sense of referring to evidence based on random assignment. In an attempt to avoid this confusion,
I once used the phrase ‘smart transactions’ to refer to the third application – that is, to refer not to the ‘what works best’
information itself, but rather to describe the decision-making processes that make use of this information. However this
was not well understood and may even have added to the confusion.
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places but, once mature, we will see less of the large funding shifts and sudden changes in direction
that now characterise many ALMP systems.

Greater targeting of transitional services
Evaluations have shown that untargeted service programs run a high risk of simply subsidizing
activities that would take place in any event as a result of market incentives9. Most transitional service
programs are therefore focussed on the approximately 20% of the population where they are likely to
make the most actual difference. Often the programs are addressed to people with low incomes, low
skill levels, difficulties in carrying out the daily activities of life or some combination of these.
In the welfare state, transitional services such as ALMPs for the unemployed are mainly directed to
those nearer the upper end of this 20%. In the enabling society the focus will shift towards those who
are nearer the bottom end of the tail, especially those who are most at risk of remaining in need for
long periods of time or who are at transition points in their lives where interventions are most likely to
make a difference. There are three reasons for this shift in emphasis.
First, some of those with lesser needs will be better served by directly accessing new ‘what works best’
information products discussed in the preceding section. However, many of those in this bottom 20%
will still benefit from personal dealings with a counsellor or case manager.
Second, and more important, the diagnostic tools available to serve those nearer the bottom will be
greatly improved in the enabling society. The new tools will be able to calculate what is likely to work
best from a longitudinal, lifecourse perspective – particularly important for assisting the large number
of those who face multiple problems such as having some combination of low skills, poor housing,
addiction problems, disabilities, or having few sources of caregiving.
Third, a larger and more varied tool kit of potential interventions will be available, including greater
choice in mixing and matching those interventions to meet the particular needs. Today’s reality is often
that the case worker or counsellor who is restricted to referring people to a limited range of
interventions, often those that are funded by the agency that has hired the counsellor. As discussed in
greater length in Chapter 5, in the enabling society there will be much more opportunity for horizontal
initiatives that cut across rule-bound silos – in allowing more choice in tailor-making packages using a
wider variety of interventions that will be better suited to the needs of particular users.

Parallel trends in community and sector initiatives
The discussion to this point has been on how services in the enabling society will be more closely
tailored to the needs of individuals. Parallel improvements will be possible in geographic or sector
initiatives. Part Two of the paper will explore how big statistics will provide the finely-grained,
longitudinal information that is needed to understand what will work best in neighbourhood renewal,
in community economic development, or in human resources planning for an industry sector. Further
there will be a parallel increase in the ability to mix and match programs and initiatives in light of this
new evidence.

9

Indeed, untargeted programming can actually make things worse. ALMP evaluations have shown that many people in
such interventions would have been better off if, for example, they had simply spent their time looking for work
instead of taking training courses.
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There have been major gains recently in the power of geographic information systems to inform policy
in small area applications; we are starting to make far better use of existing data. On the other hand, it
will take some time to develop the base of big statistics that will be needed to fully support sectoral
initiatives with real-time ‘what works best’ data. Longitudinal information is far more developed for
individuals than for firms.

Social investment versus social expenditure
A traditional role of government is to create the capacity to deliver services. This includes building and
maintaining schools and funding the training of teachers, as well as funding the actual delivery of
training, social services and employment counselling. It also includes funding similar capacity in the
non-government sector, either directly or indirectly through means such as tax relief for voluntary
organizations. Today, this kind of funding is nearly always a current expenditure, reflecting the pointin-time perspectives of current welfare state policies. That is, the funding comes from current revenues
and is accounted for as part of the annual budget cycle, without any specific relationship between the
size and timing of the funding to the timing and size of future gains or losses that might result from
that expenditure.
In the enabling society, with its lifecourse, asset-building perspectives, most of this capacity-building
activity will be treated as a social investment. When the system becomes mature, and when the system
of big statistics can provide the needed data, the amount of some forms of social spending will be
based on actual calculations of the amount and timing of expected future benefits from those
investments. These investments would not show up in government accounts as current expenditures
taken from general revenues, but in separate ear-marked accounts. Accountability would be based on
cost-benefit calculations that cover many years but that would be updated annually based on current
estimates of expected outcomes.
Some forms of social spending are already referred to as social investments. However this usage is
metaphoric – a rhetorical device to signal the intention that current expenditure is meant to get future
payoffs. Currently available data are seldom strong enough to allow decisions on current spending to
be solely based on calculations of outcomes that will often be realized only after many years have
passed.
Real social investment will only come with the introduction of ‘what works best’ data and the system
of big statistics, described later in the paper. The shift could come quite quickly in areas such as
ALMPs where expected benefits can be readily measured by examining the subsequent effects of the
program on earnings, employment stability or reduced use of employment insurance. Other kinds of
learning or social services have objectives that are much more difficult to measure and some may never
be fully suitable for funding using social investment techniques.
Indeed, it would be a major mistake to shift to social investment financing and accountability
principles before the needed data on intended outcomes was in place. There would be a real risk that a
premature shift would drive a program seriously off-course by relying only on partial measures that
could be calculated (e.g., numbers of participants, satisfaction with service delivery, or immediate
outputs). These are important, but they are often misleading proxies for the main objectives which are
usually related to the consequences of the program on the future lives of participants.
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2.3. The income security system
The first, and perhaps obvious, point to make is that income support programming will become more
effective in the enabling society, as was the case for service programming. This is the result of the
addition of the new ‘what is likely to work best’ business line. Income is provided to people on the
assumption that, in most cases, they will know best on how that money should be spent to meet their
particular needs and preferences. This is a standard tenet in economics which is based on the
assumption that individuals themselves have the best information on what is most likely to work best
for them. Yet information on what is likely to work best when making big life choices is often weak at
present, particularly the medium- and longer-term effects of decisions made today. With the new
enabling society information, individuals will have a much clearer understanding of the likely outcomes
of different choices and expenditures they make, increasing the effectiveness of income transfer
programming.
The transition to the enabling society is more advanced in income security programming than it is for
information products or services. New information processing technology has already played a large
role in such areas as the targeting of income tax credits and the introduction of lifecourse savings
plans. Figure 3 provides examples of recent changes in income security programming that are moving
in the directions of the enabling society characteristics that were outlined in Chapter 1.
The initiatives in Figure 3 are a mixed bag. Some are large established programs. Some are little more
than demonstrations and experiments. Some are successful, others failed. That is, despite the relatively
greater progress in this area, we should anticipate large changes ahead in income support programming
as we move to a mature enabling society. In many areas we are still at the initial stages of testing and
piloting different approaches.

The income support system that may eventually emerge
To better understand the large changes that might eventually result, it is useful to compare an ‘ideal’
system of income support policies in the welfare state and in the enabling society. By ideal we are
referring a hypothetical model, or ideal type, that illustrates the main features of the end state towards
which a system is evolving, and not to any specific program. For example, the ideal or end state for
income support in the traditional welfare state 10 would be a guaranteed annual income (GAI).

10

A GAI is only seen as the ‘ideal’ end state in the liberal welfare states such as Canada which rely primarily on
market mechanisms to provide social well-being as opposed, for example, to the social insurance regimes of Germany
or France where a ‘social wage’ might be seen as the ideal.
In practice, a traditional goal of a GAI will almost certainly be achieved during the course of the transformation to the
enabling society, and at considerably less cost than under traditional GAI schemes. However no one, apart from
historians, will notice or applaud. The criteria for setting an ideal will have shifted dramatically:


Away from what happens to people at a single point in time (a year or less, in the case of the GAI) – and toward
what happens throughout the course of life.



Away from emphasis on income flows taken in isolation – and towards the fuller range of resources that
individuals can call on, including financial assets, human capital and social capital.



Away from the notion of casting policy goals in terms of adherence to common standards based on statistical
averages and distributions – and towards the goal of increased individual choice in the allocation of time and
resources over the course of life, and in the individual’s capacity to make those choices. (A GAI in essence is
designed to make sure no one falls beneath a very specific poverty line that is determined, at the end of the day,
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Figure 3. Examples of income support programs that are moving in enabling society directions
Canada has a tax-advantaged Registered Educational Savings
Plan to support individual savings for children’s education. It
is topped up annually by the government from birth to age
17, with a supplemental learning bond for lower income
families. If unused, individual contributions to the fund can
be transferred to a Registered Retirement Savings Plan
(RRSP).
The tax-supported RRSP (an individual pension savings
account) also can be used to support home ownership and
lifelong learning initiatives (i.e., converting financial assets to
physical assets and human capital).
Tax assisted savings accounts are available for adults with
severe disabilities. These are topped up with grants and
bonds for families with low income. As well, the income tax
system provides a credit for people with disabilities and
there are also supplementary benefits for families raising
children with disabilities.
At the other extreme of the targeted/open-ended spectrum,
Canada also has a tax-free savings account that all individuals
can use to save for any purpose they choose.
Most of the machinery is in place for a full negative income
tax version of a guaranteed annual income. The Canada Child
Tax Benefit is a tax-free monthly payment made to lowincome people with dependent children. Its goal is help
cover the cost of raising children and to reduce child poverty.
A Guaranteed Income Supplement exists as part of the
pension system which brings the income of all people age 65
and over up to a set minimum. As well the income tax
11
system provides cash payments to low income individuals
who are working in order to provide work incentives that are
missing from programs such as social assistance. Low-income
people also receive a similarly refundable tax credit to
compensate them for having to pay sales taxes.
In calculating benefits, the Canada Pension Plan, a
mandatory employee-based pension, does not count years
of low or no earnings during the time spent raising

pre-school children, after the age of 65 or when they have
12
disabilities .
Employment Insurance also provides maternity and parental
leave benefits, as well as benefits related to time off for
sickness and compassionate care.
A major Canadian experiment in 2000s, Learn$ave, confirmed
that, by matching savings, governments can encourage lowincome adults to save for, and enrol in, post-secondary
education and training, if at a higher cost than proved
necessary.
The United Kingdom took a major step towards asset-based life
time accounts with the Child Trust Fund introduced in 2003.
The government created a fund for each child that would grow
over time so that every individual would begin adulthood with
significant savings. The fund could be topped up by parents and
grandparents. The CTF provides interesting lessons that are
explored further in Figure 14, including the need for research
on the behavioural consequences of lifecourse programming.
The program ended in 2010, having failed to change savings
behaviour greatly among low-income groups – a key objective.
The Dutch introduced a tax-supported, voluntary individual
lifecourse savings scheme in 2006. It allowed employees to take
time off work for purposes of child care, elder care, educational
leave, travelling, sabbaticals or part-time work when nearing
retirement. By increasing working time flexibility, it was
expected that female employment rates would rise and people
would work longer in life, if not necessarily full time. It was not
as popular as expected and ended in 2012.
Around the world, but especially in the United States, there
have been many recent initiatives, known as individual
development accounts, that subsidize savings, usually among
lower-income people, to support further education, start a
business or purchase a first home. They are part of a
movement, often referred to as asset-based egalitarianism,
that attempts to overcome the flaws of income-based support,
such as the work and savings disincentives built into many
income support models.

With a GAI everyone is assured of a minimal standard of life, with the state topping up other income
sources, using calculations made on an annual or more frequent basis. Income security in Canada has
been evolving in the direction of, and is close to achieving, what is known as the negative income tax
version of a GAI as shown in Figure 3.
by statistics which describe the way in which income is distributed across the whole population; it has no direct
link to the capacities or expressed preferences of the particular individuals concerned.)
11
A refundable tax credit known as the Working Income Tax Benefit.
12

Defined as being eligible for a disability pension.
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The enabling society counterpart to a GAI end state might consist of two components:


A highly targeted system of social insurance and tax benefits that is designed to share risks and to
redistribute income in order to prevent or ease poverty. It would be similar to the system that
currently exists although smaller in size since some of the current functions of this kind of
programming would shift to the GLA below13.



A Guaranteed Lifetime Account (GLA) designed to increase an individual’s choice in how to
allocate time and resources over the whole course of life, including the capability of shifting
financial capital to physical capital and human capital.

Figure 4 sketches out the possible features of a GLA, lists its advantages, and provides a reminder that
it is only an abstract model of an end state – what a system consisting of multiple programs might
eventually approximate.

A gradual transition is inevitable and needed
In order to set the stage of Part Two of this paper which deals with implementation issues, it is
important to underline that the transition towards a comprehensive GLA will be gradual. As set out in
the last two bullets of Figure 4, both individuals and institutions may need a lengthy period of
adjustment to a radical increase in life choice options.
Lifecourse choices, such as the timing of the transition from school to work, or work to retirement, or
decisions about raising a family and childcare, are deeply influenced by social norms and opportunities,
often entrenched through government policies. Governments effectively constrain lifecourse patterns
by means such as mandatory ages for school attendance, standard durations for publicly-supported
parental leave, and fixed normal ages for receipt of public pensions.
The goal of the GLA would be to reduce these constraints, leaving individuals with greater choice
about, for example, when to retire or even to retire at all – or when to take further education or how
long to take off work to look after young children. Government would have a greater role in
supporting these individual choices and, when compared with the situation today, a lesser role in
creating the standards, and reinforcing the norms, that constrain these choices.
However, it may take many years to build up an adequate knowledge base about the consequences that
will occur later in life of making quite different lifecourse choices. The evidence base is not yet there to
design efficient and effective GLA programming that could be applied universally. As one example
only, we do not know nearly enough about such fundamental things as the extent to which programs
will actually effect behaviour in these areas, let alone the subsequent consequences for society of that
changed behaviour14.
13

A GLA could be defined broadly to include insurance functions such as unemployment insurance. However,
insurance might properly be considered as part of a GAI as opposed to a GLA, since it is not dependent on the past
contributions of the particular individual who is being insured against becoming unemployed. In Canada, employment
insurance fills multiple objectives some of which could become part of narrowly-defined GLA. Parental benefits are an
example.
14

Living standards adult life are likely affected by earlier activities and events such as of dropping out of school for
extended periods when young. Living standards in retirement are likely affected by decisions to drop out of work for
varying periods – whether for parental leave, sabbaticals or further post-secondary education, and by decisions related
to work-retirement pathways. Yet we have very little information on the magnitude of these effects and of the
consequences of the policy decisions that influence them.
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Figure 4. Guaranteed Lifetime Accounts: the end state of income support in the enabling society?
What is a GLA?
Income support programs and taxes in Canada, when taken in
combination, have been evolving towards a Guaranteed Annual
Income (GAI). The equivalent end state in the enabling society
might be a modest GAI plus a Guaranteed Lifetime Account
(GLA). The GLA would be an individual account, a fund that
would be created at an individual’s birth.

to be reimbursed to the fund based on subsequent
earnings levels. Such vouchers could be large and act a
substitute for direct funding of educational institutions –
or smaller, to help increase individual choice.


… contributions to the fund
The state would almost certainly make an initial, if only
symbolic, payment into the fund to honour the birth of each
new citizen. Parents or grandparents would make contributions
until adulthood. Over the course of adulthood:


The individual would make tax-advantaged contributions,
perhaps with an additional government subsidy for those
with low incomes.



Contributions could come from payroll taxes, such as those
related to pensions or, possibly, employment insurance.



Government contributions could help cover periods of
further schooling, long-term joblessness, educational
leave, periods where disabilities prevent employment, and
caregiving leave.

…withdrawals from the fund
Individuals could use the fund to cover the costs of periods
where employment, family supports or insurance did not
provide enough income – including periods of extended
unemployment, caregiving, post-secondary schooling, sickness,
sabbaticals and retirement.
Financial assets in the account could also be converted into
other assets such as human capital (e.g., going back to school
or retraining) or physical capital (e.g., buying a first house).
… almost complete flexibility in design
A GLA could be designed to reflect virtually any point on the
political and value spectrum.


The size the fund, and the relative size of contributions
from families, individuals and the state, could vary
considerably depending on the values of the day.



The fund could be large enough to replace many existing
social transfers (e.g., aspects of employment insurance,
social assistance, and pensions) and various tax credits and
deductions or it could be seen as a tool for topping up
these other programs.



The acceptable uses of the fund could be tightly restricted
or left largely to individual choice.



Conversion to human capital could be in the form of
vouchers to cover the costs of further education, possibly

A wide variety of options could be used to resolve difficult
design problems: for example, what to do if the funds were
used up too early in life, or what would happened to
unspent funds when people died, or how to include
immigrants and their children.

Why a GLA is good, in principle
As with a GAI, a GLA could be a simple, understandable,
system, replacing many confusing tax and transfer programs, at
least in some design options.
It could eliminate poverty at considerably less cost than a full
GAI, again depending on the particular design option. Existing
GAI models automatically compensate for low current incomes,
regardless of the fact that many spells of low income are
relatively short, some of which could be managed within
families and by using past savings.
It would support individual choice in allocating time and
resources over the course of life.
It could provide a strong coherent signal of the importance that
society places on the development of human capital over the
entire course of people’s lives.
It is an ideal type only, not a program design
The GLA as described here is an end state only, not the design
of a comprehensive new program. It would likely consist of
many autonomous components working in harmony and
developed gradually over the years. Many difficult problems
would arise if it were conceived of as a single actual program to
be introduced all at once:


We lack the `what works best’ knowledge to guide design
in key areas, such as ensuring that savings subsidies do not
simply replace savings that would take place in any event,
or finding optimum subsidies to encourage expected
savings and learning behaviours.



Especially in Canada, jurisdictional problems would loom
large. Some GLA designs could create deep tensions in
federal, provincial and territorial relations.



A single, comprehensive GLA would need to assume high,
perhaps unrealistically high, levels of understanding on the
part of individuals about the consequences of making
different choice in allocating time over life to learning,
working, caring and leisure.



It would also assume that institutions can keep pace with
changes in individual preferences for distributing of time
and resources over life. This may be unrealistic, with
resulting frustration and distrust in the system.
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As well it may take some time to develop the institutional capacity to support any changes in lifecourse
patterns that might result from policy changes. Suppose, for example, that greater flexibility in life
choices were to result in a sharp increase in the demand for quality early childhood learning and care,
or for quality home care to support frailty in old age, or for more extended absences from work to
allow more time for caregiving and learning. Could the education system or employers or long-term
care institutions meet that demand? A lengthy period of adjustment would be needed in some cases.
For example, it would take many years to develop the staff who could respond to a strong increase in
demand for quality early childhood education.

2.4. The regulatory system
Making and enforcing rules is a key instrument of social policy. In principle this includes a wide range
of activities related to human rights, legislation, and codes of conduct. In this paper we focus on laws
and regulations as they apply in the employment and social areas. Typical examples are rules related to
minimum wages, workplace health and safety, procedures for contracting out of social services, and
defining discriminatory actions.
Current rhetoric about the importance of de-regulation notwithstanding, recent decades have seen a
large growth in the role of regulation in developed countries. The literature15 suggests that this growth
is likely to continue in directions that are already established. Levi-Faur summarizes as follows:
“… the welfare state relies on an extensive system of regulation both in order to regulate its own
processes and to govern the economic and social pillars of welfare-provision. Regulation, rule-making,
rule-monitoring and rule-enforcement, is the administrative infrastructure of welfare governance …
[and, following its growing role in the 90s,] will continue to stand at the centre of government
attention. The politics of austerity will only re-enforce this trend since austerity implies that the costs
of governance will continue to fall on the regulatees rather than on the public budget. …To the extent
that the regulatory state is a response to globalization and privatization and outsourcing on the one
hand, and cultural, political and social developments such as [neo-] liberalism, distrust and
democratization on the other, there is no clear reason at the moment to expect its stagnation or
transformation16.”
Of course the literature does not explicitly take account of the shift to enabling society social policies.
The question then is whether the shift to enabling society policies will accelerate or decelerate the
growth of regulation that is likely to occur in any event as a result of the forces of globalization, new
public management agendas, neo-liberalism, distrust and accountability. The answer is not clear at this
time since the shift will have effects that work in different directions.
For example, far more detailed, accessible statistical information will be available to those interested in
the accountability for the funding, design and delivery of social programs. That should help reduce the
15

See Levi-Faur (2011), Mabbet (2011), and McConkey (2006). In some of the literature, regulations are treated in a
separate category, where the ‘regulatory state’ is contrasted with what that literature defines as the ‘welfare state’ –
with the latter consisting of the more active, politicized tools of fiscal intervention such as funding the provision of
services, taxation and income transfers. This separation is useful for some types of analysis since there are clear
differences between setting the rules of the game and spending interventions within that game. However, when looking
to the future, it is essential that we treat regulation as one of the instruments in the social policy toolkit, where it can be
assessed in similar manner as other alternative instruments.
16

Levi-Faur (2011), pp. 28 and 29.
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climate of distrust in government that has been one of the factors leading towards greater regulation.
However, the more detailed information that will be available is also likely to expose many new
accountability issues that will require new rules and procedures.
Likely the main effect on regulatory instruments of the shift to the enabling society will be adjustments
in the balance among the various functions that comprise the regulatory system, i.e., rule setting, rule
monitoring and rule enforcement. Monitoring will be hugely improved as the transformed statistical
system will automatically generate a vast amount of detailed information about programs that can be
used in monitoring. That new information, other things equal, is likely to result in the uncovering of
many new instances of non-compliance with rules, especially in areas where front-line staff or third
parties have greater freedom to adapt programs to meet the particular needs of citizens or local
initiatives. This, in turn, will almost certainly create pressures on rule-formulating functions – mainly in
the direction of consistency and coherence across wider systems, but it may also create pressure to
strengthen the rule enforcement functions, particularly rule enforcement in areas that cross traditional
jurisdictional boundaries.

2.5. Changes in the relative size of program instruments
Information products will play a larger role
The biggest single change in the tool kit of programming interventions in the enabling society will be
the addition of ‘what works best’ information and the provision of the information directly to citizens
via the internet or similar means. That will result in what seems on the surface to be a paradox: in the
enabling society more people will be directly and quite personally affected by social programs yet,
when taken as whole, social programs will become more targeted, less costly and less intrusive!
The paradox is, of course, easily explained. The new information programming will be small in a
budgetary sense, but will have broad coverage. Many people who currently are not directly touched by
government transitional services will benefit from using ‘what works best’ information to make better
life choices.
As well, while information programming is intrusive in the sense that people will have to provide
information about themselves, even if it is only anonymized information, to directly benefit from ‘what
works best’ data, that intrusion is far less than that which exists under current service provision or
income support programming.
Wide use of new information products will also reduce the relative size of other types of programming.
In some cases the new information products will be all that is needed, shrinking the demand for more
intensive interventions with counsellors, teachers and other service providers. To the extent that the
new information programming is effective, more people will find jobs and otherwise become less
excluded from society and from the economy – shrinking the future demand for transitional services
and income supports such as employment insurance and social assistance. As well, services (and, to a
lesser extent, income transfers) will themselves use the same kind of ‘what works best’ information in
their internal management which will, over time, make them more effective, again resulting in reduced
overall demand in the future for remedial services as a result of reduced repeat business.
Working in a partially offsetting direction, the new information will identify the existence of services or
income transfers that were previously unknown to the individual. However, on balance, information
products are likely to become a much larger and more important part of the social policy toolkit.
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Service programming will grow relative to income support programming
The original welfare state policies were based on the stereotype of a family with single male
breadwinner, with his wife looking after most caregiving duties related to children and the elderly.
Children entered the labour market and became self-supporting at much earlier ages than is the case
today. In this situation, income support was the key social policy need – to cover periods of
unemployment, sickness and retirement of the husband (particularly since there were no other earners
in the household), sometimes supported by family allowances for the mother. Since the introduction of
the mature welfare state in the 1960s and 70s, most OECD countries have seen a large growth in
public expenditures on services (health, education and social services) but an even larger growth in
income transfers to individuals (e.g., pensions, employment insurance)17.
That trend will likely be reversed during the transition to the enabling society as result of pressures
towards more spending on services and less spending on income support.
The increased demand for services will not occur in transitional programming which, as just discussed,
may shrink relatively in the future. Rather the increase will be in the demand for caregiving and
education. With both parents in the labour market, the pressure for services related to child care and
elder care will continue to grow, while economic pressures related to prosperity and competiveness will
result in ever-increasing demand for educational services, including at the post-secondary level, in adult
literacy services and early childhood learning.
The reduced demand for income support programs will result, as already discussed, from the new
‘what works best’ information that, over the long run, is likely to reduce extent of joblessness and
hence the for unemployment insurance and social assistance. However, the effects here are likely to be
swamped by the much larger decrease in the demand for pension income. This, in turn, is a
consequence of a trend towards later retirement – a topic that will be addressed in the next chapter.

The absolute size of social programming remains a political decision
In summary, the enabling society policies will touch many more people than traditional welfare state
policies, particularly as the result of the addition of new, non-intrusive information products. The
relative size of information products programming will increase, as will much services programming –
with income support programming playing a relatively smaller role.
‘Relative size’ refers to size of one type of instrument relative to the size of the others. Of much
greater interest is the level of total social spending and that will continue to be a matter of political
choice in the enabling society, as it is in the welfare state. For example, the greater effectiveness of
enabling society programming, together with the low cost of information products, means that the
social and labour market outcomes achieved by programs today could be achieved at less total cost
tomorrow. That means that social budgets might fall as a percentage of GDP. On the other hand,
depending on the political choices of the day, the result could be the same, or an increased, budget –
but using that budget to take on additional social problems that are currently not addressed.

17

Atkinson, P. and P. van den Noord., 2001.
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3. THE ENABLING SOCIETY: A RESPONSE TO CURRENT
PRESSURES
The last chapter used the artificial device of comparing simplified versions of the old welfare state
policy instruments with the new enabling society instruments, once they become mature. This chapter
takes a more realistic historical approach by examining the actual trends and pressures that are shaping
the transition to the enabling society.
Technological trends are the main external driver of change, as social programming begins to be based
on contemporary ICT technology with the radical results that were discussed in the last chapter. Part 2
of the paper explores the underlying technical reasons why ICT will enable social programming to be
improved on so many fronts.
However, a series of social and economic trends and pressures are also influencing future directions in
social policy. These are the subject of this chapter. Unlike the technological changes, this is familiar
territory, well covered in the literature18. Typical analyses concentrate on:


Demographic change, especially population aging – with resulting pressures to strengthen long
term care and to reform pensions in the direction of fiscal sustainability and encouraging later
retirement.



Globalization and the shift to the knowledge economy – with the resulting emphasis on the
importance of competitiveness, innovation and productivity. This in turn results in calls for
reduced government debts and deficits, reducing work disincentives in social programs and,
especially, for greater emphasis on human development policies that raise skill levels and work
attachment.



Growing income inequality and persistent pockets of poverty and exclusion – again with skills
and human development being seen as the best social policy response, with the emphasis on atrisk populations, particularly those where the disadvantage in question has a potentially long
duration and on solutions that address underlying causes as well as point-in-time symptoms.



Gender shifts with major gains in female participation in postsecondary education and in many
areas of the workplace, with consequent policy implications for labour supply, for the growth of
relative poverty in single-earner families, for the increased demand for family caregiving and for
reducing gender inequalities in that caregiving.

This chapter will discuss how these trends are pushing us away from the welfare state and pulling us
towards the enabling society.
Section 3.1 discusses the fiscal pressures associated with population aging and competitiveness that are
pushing us away from costly welfare state social policies.
Economic pressures related to skills development are also pulling social policy in new directions19, as
are trends in economic and gender inequality. These ‘Esping-Andersen’ factors are discussed in Section
3.2.
18

Including documents written by the present author (Hicks 2002, Hicks 2008b).
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Enabling society programming will not only respond to existing pressures but also provide
opportunities to meet social goals in new kinds of ways. These so-called ‘lifecourse opportunities’ are
the subject of Section 3.3.

3.1. The fiscal push factors
Fiscal pressures are not new. The mature welfare state of the 60s and 70s created expectations about
the scale of social interventions that many governments subsequently found to be too costly. Early
concerns mainly focussed on the work disincentives that were felt to be associated with overlygenerous benefit levels. Since the recession of the early 1990s there has been strong government-wide
emphasis on fiscal restraint, a concern that was reinforced by growing concern about the fiscal
sustainability of the social programs then in place in light of an aging population.
There will always be pressures to reduce government spending, but the extent of that pressure is
somewhat cyclical in character reflecting business cycles and the state of government debts. It is often
argued that the population aging will result in strong fiscal pressures for many decades but, as will be
seen, this claim is not based on evidence – at least in Canada. In other words, while the fiscal push
factor is important, its role is often exaggerated. Over the long run, pull factors will be at least as
important.
There are four ways of reducing, or constraining the future growth of government social expenditures:
a) sharing those costs with other actors; b) keeping benefits the same but reducing the costs through
efficiency measures; c) reducing benefits that were higher than needed and/or that had large negative
side effects; and d) reducing benefits, or curtailing the growth of future benefits, simply for fiscal
reasons.

Sharing costs
Sharing of costs has been the main direction of fiscally-related reform. Reduced government spending
has, however, not always been the reason for introducing many of these cost-sharing reforms. At least
as important has been a sense that the roles of the main players need to be rebalanced for substantive
policy reasons. Accordingly, the main discussion of this pressure is found in Chapter 5 which deals
with transformed governance in the enabling society. This section will, however, discuss pension
reform where fiscal factors have driven reform throughout most of the developed world.
Starting in the mid-90s there has been growing concern in the developed world about the need to
reform the pension arrangements that were put in place during the introduction of the mature welfare
state. The worry was that, when the baby boom generation would eventually retire, those original
pension designs would be fiscally unsustainable.20
19

Of course, in reality, the distinction between push and pull factors is not sharp. All the factors discussed contain a bit
of both elements, but all work in the same directions of encouraging the evolution away from the welfare state to the
enabling society.
20

The concern has been driven by the anticipated retirement of the baby boomers, with fewer working-age tax payers
and savers to cover the pension benefits of a larger number of retirees. In the mid-90s the World Bank published a
book with balanced contents, but an alarmist title, Averting the Old Age Crisis (World Bank 1994). The notion of a
crisis results from exaggerating the potential negative impacts of population aging by artificially ignoring the routine
adjustments that people make in response to changing circumstances. The OECD rectified the analysis a few years later
in Maintaining Prosperity in an Aging Society (OECD 1998), document which took account of the fact that working
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Figure 5 sets out the main features of international pension reforms in recent decades. The combined
effect of these reforms has been to tighten the link between an individual’s pension contributions and
the benefits that he or she receives. This, together with reforms that have brought the age of
entitlement to pension benefits more in line with growing longevity and people’s actual behaviour,
have resulted in greater individual choice both in the size of the pension to be received and in
retirement ages.
In Canada, where public pensions are less costly than in many other OECD countries and where the
Canada and Quebec Pension Plans were reformed early to make them sustainable at current
contribution rates, fiscal sustainability has not been a major pension issue for some time. As well,
recent evidence suggests that later retirement trends are likely to offset nearly all the negative effects of
population aging on costs of the retirement income system21. Consequently, relatively more attention
has been paid to concerns about the effects of population aging on the financing of health and longterm care22 and, in pensions, recent emphasis has been more on increasing the coverage of private
pensions, better management of private pension funds, and concerns about PayG pensions as a large
obstacle to adjustment that involves downsizing23.

Same benefits, with reduced cost
Reforms to increase the efficiency of welfare state social policies have had mixed success. The use of
new computing technology in the 80s and later was originally expected to produce cost savings. For
the most part that has not happened. The new technology was highly useful in speeding up benefit
later, which is a normal way of making adjustments to changes in pension benefits, would ameliorate many of the
negative effects of population aging. However the crisis language stuck. Even today much media commentary implies
a coming catastrophe, the so-called silver tsunami, with boomers cast as the ‘greedy generation’ that takes the good
pensions and robs the next generation of their jobs. Responses in the form of pension reform are often cast in similarly
catastrophic terms as the ‘third rail’ of politics which governments cannot openly address. The reality, as it turned out,
was very different. Nearly all OECD countries have reformed their support of pensions (often both public pensions and
tax-supported private pensions) over the past 20 years, often deep reforms and often in several waves.
21

Hicks (2012). Despite that lack of any major fiscal problem associated with pensions, Canada has maintained much
of the rhetoric about fiscal sustainability and generational imbalances that characterizes the international dialogue. This
appears to have affected policy-making. For example, the models and analysis used in pension and labour market
planning do not take account of the trend towards much later retirement ages and, in consequence, exaggerate fiscal
problems and future labour shortages. One consequence is that the case for basing new pension coverage exclusively
on advance funding principles has been overstated. For example, nearly all recent proposals for rectifying the uneven
coverage of private pensions have automatically assumed that advance-funded, rather than PayG financing
arrangements are needed. Little attention has been paid to the reality that, given such funding, it will take decades to
solve the problem that has been identified or that PayG financing, with its immediate results, will cause few fiscal or
generational imbalances when taken in the context of the trends to much later retirement. (Wolfson 2013).
22

Although the sustainability of health care financing creates even more difficult issues in some countries, a discussion
of fiscal pressure in health would be outside the scope of this paper. Health care costs are driven by the use of
expensive new technology as much as by demographic changes; it is in long-term care where the largest demographic
effects will be felt, particularly in the 2020s when the baby boomers begin to reach the ages where long-term care
needs become common.
23

At the time of writing, there was considerable media discussion about the implications of large pension obligations
on employers in times of downsizing or, in the case of public institutions such as the postal service, of privatizating an
existing function with a view to reducing costs, including labour costs. With fewer contributors, paying defined
benefits to large numbers of retirees puts some pension plans in danger of bankruptcy, or reducing promised benefits,
or placing an extra burden on taxpayers.
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Figure 5. Pension financing: a shift towards funding by individual users and increased lifecourse choice
Shift towards advance funding
Reforms to retirement income systems in most countries
have changed the balance of funding with relatively more
being paid by individuals who are the potential beneficiaries
and relative less coming from general revenues provided by
all tax payers. Increasingly, pension financing is seen as a way
of individual lifecourse reallocation where individuals save for
retirement in their working years and get back what they put
in during their retirement years.






Pay-as-you-go financing (PayG) is the ordinary way of
financing most government programs, including
pensions. Current expenditures are simply covered by
current revenues. Today’s tax payers pay the cost of
today’s programming, regardless of who benefits from
those programs. This is still the normal way of financing
public pensions, but many reforms have reduced the
relative size of this component of the retirement income
system and have tightened the link between the amount
of benefits that an individual receives and the amount
that he or she contributes.
Advanced funding has increased in recent years. Here a
fund is built up through individual contributions and, in
the case of occupational plans, employers may also
contribute. Current benefits are paid out of that fund.
Many occupational pensions and tax-assisted retirement
savings accounts are examples.
Mixed financing has also increased in size. PayG and
funded schemes can be combined, as in the Canada
Pension Plan where funded elements have been added
to a traditional pay-as-you-go scheme. This was done by
imposing higher contribution rates than would be strictly
needed under PayG principles in order to build up a fund
within the program. Moneys in this fund are invested in
the market. Benefits are still determined by PayG, DB
principles, but the fund has added size and stability since
it is based on returns from both labour markets
(contributions) and capital markets.

A related shift from defined-benefits (DB) to definedcontributions (DC).
A pension scheme can provide a fixed benefit throughout
retirement. Many government pensions are of this sort, as
are some company pensions, especially in the public sector.
These are known as DB plans. These are in contrast to DC
plans where a regular fixed contribution is made to the plan,
typically during a person’s working years. The size of the
pension is equal to the amount saved plus interest earned
and on the market situation in the year the savings were
converted into an annuity or tax-assisted retirement income
fund.

An increasing number of company plans are DC. There has
been growth in tax-supported individual retirement savings
accounts which are, by definition, DC. And, as noted, DB
schemes are becoming more similar to DCs by tying benefit
levels more closely to contributions made over the course of
life.
Most DC plans are advance funded, of course. However,
Sweden introduced a notional DC scheme in 1994 that
mimics funded individual accounts but is financed on a pay-as
you-go basis. For example, individuals can choose the
investment strategy that applies to their own fund. This is a
way of shifting to DC plans while minimizing some of the
resulting risks that would otherwise be transferred to
individuals.
Increased age of entitlement to pensions
Reforms in many countries have also increased the age of
pension eligibility and eliminated early retirement schemes.
Healthy lifespans have been increasing steadily in most
developed countries. Fixed standard ages of eligibility for
pension benefits therefore provide unintended incentives for
increasing the duration of time spent in retirement relative to
the duration of life spent in the workforce.
A neutral pension eligibility age would either reflect increases
in longevity (as is now the case in Sweden and a growing
number of other countries) or increases in the actual ages at
which people choose to retire. In Canada, for example, the
employment rates of older people have been increasing
rapidly since the mid-90s, a trend that is likely to accelerate
as the highly skilled baby boom generation moves into
traditional retirement ages. It has been estimated ( Hicks
2012) that pension eligibility ages would have to increase by
perhaps five years by 2031 just to keep up with trends in
actual behaviour.
In other words, increasing the standard ages of pension
eligibility works in the direction of greater individual choice
by removing artificial incentives that work towards
lengthening the duration of retirement and shortening the
duration of work. This is particularly so when taken in
conjunction with pension plans such as CPP and QPP in
Canada that allow actuarial adjusted pensions for those who
choose to retire earlier or later than the standard age of
eligibility.
Bringing pension ages more in line with actual behaviour will
have many side benefits as well, including smaller pension
contributions during a person’s working years and preventing
the misallocation of resources that occurs when pensions are
paid to people who are still working full time.
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delivery and offering new services. It has, for example, allowed the income tax system to take on many
new functions at minimal additional cost. However, it has not resulted in lower costs. Indeed,
bureaucratic costs have increased over the decades.

Lower benefits, in order to get better results
There was early success in this area, especially where original welfare state programming of the 60’s
and 70s proved to be not sufficiently targeted or provided more generous benefits than were needed,
particularly where these benefits created unnecessary work disincentives. Examples included cutbacks
to unemployment insurance in Canada, and international reforms that cut back on insufficiently
targeted disability programs and early-retirement programs. In transitional services, such as ALMPs,
one-size-fits all training and job creation subsidies were cut back based on evidence that they were
ineffective. This evidence came from evaluations and experiments that took place mainly in the 60s,
70s and 80s. Cut-backs in areas such as long-term care institutions have occurred in the name of
shifting to a more effective system of home-base caregiving.
In more recent years, there have been relatively few reforms aimed at removing work disincentives or
improving effectiveness. In income support programming, there is little room for further gains in
effectiveness without moving away from the ‘income at a point in time’ characteristic that typifies
traditional welfare state programming. In programming that provides services, the evidence base has
not been strong enough to allow significant reforms in effectiveness since the 80s24.

Reducing benefits for fiscal reasons alone
Benefit reductions, taken in isolation, have not been common. Cutting back on human capital
investments such as education and training has had little appeal for economic reasons. In income
support programming, these have been temporary cuts such as periods where benefits were not fully
indexed to inflation or have not kept up with increasing low-income cut-off lines. However, there has
been little appetite for reforms that cut back on existing benefits in a major or permanent way, at least
for those who are at real risk. The main pressure has been in the other direction, to provide all citizens
with the social security and opportunities provided by welfare state programs.

3.2. The ‘Esping-Andersen’ pull factors
If fiscal factor are pushing us away from costly welfare state solutions, then an inter-related set of
economic and social factors is pulling us towards the enabling society. That is, the issues that are raised
can be best met through a deep transformation of social policy.
Gosta Esping-Andersen25 provides an elegant account of most of these pull factors. He weaves the
familiar themes referred at the outset of this chapter into a powerful story that centres on the
importance of high quality, universal early childhood learning and development. All policy pressures,
24

The evidence that does exist suggests that ALPMs are still only marginally effective and much potential exists for
making big cost-benefit improvements. These gains can only be realized however, by shifting to the ‘what works best’
programming described in the last chapter.
25

Esping-Andersen 2009.

36

whether economic, social or demographic lead to this conclusion. As will be seen in the next chapter,
the development of a better system of early childhood learning is now a common theme in discussions
of social policy priorities. However, Esping-Andersen pushes the argument to its logical next step: the
completion of the gender revolution, with increased equality of men and women in the family,
especially in raising children.
Figure 6 attempts to provide a short summary of his argument.
The elegance of the Esping-Andersen argument does come at some cost. His argument is similar to
that of James Heckman, the American Nobel winner, who shows huge payoffs from investments in
early learning. This is an important insight for policy-making. Nevertheless the research and data in
this area are still quite incomplete; it would seem premature to place such an exclusive focus on early
learning until we have a fuller understanding of what practical interventions are likely to work best. In
particular, it would be useful to take account of the potential transformative effects of the ICT
revolution, including ‘what-works-best’ information, on many policy fronts – including, but not
limited, to early childhood learning.
To supplement the powerful lifecourse analysis of Esping-Andersen, this paper would add several pull
factors that are not as easily linked to early childhood learning, including long-term care and some
more country-specific pressures such as uneven private pension coverage in Canada. It would also pay
more attention to the potential role of later retirement ages, another lifecourse shift that is already
underway. Behavioural changes in the work-retirement transition are likely to offset the negative fiscal,
macro-economic and labour market consequences of population aging and to have a range of other
positive effects in terms of individual and collective well-being26.

Responses that work in harmony
A big risk is that some solutions that promote a more skilled and competitive work force also work in
the direction of increasing inequality. In order to simultaneously address economic, demographic and
social pressures, policies must take a generational and a lifecourse perspective.
The most effective generational policy response is heavy investment in early childhood learning and
development. That will only succeed, however, if there is also policy emphasis on gender equality in
the workplace and in family caregiving responsibilities.
The most effective lifecourse policy response will be to support individuals in gaining greater control
over the course of their own lives, including their lifetime pathways through the worlds of work and
learning and the pathways from work to retirement. It is particularly important to remove existing
policy-supported social and economic pressures to spend less of life in work and to have fewer
children than people would prefer27.

26

Hicks (2012). The Esping-Andersen argument against later retirement as a big solution is that it would be unfair to
people at the bottom because they presumably would find it harder to work longer and, once retired, die at a younger
age – with less time to make use of pension benefits. This is a real concern, but one that can be readily addressed by
other means. For example, pensions could be adjusted to be more progressive, providing a higher base pension for
those with lower incomes. This would allow them to take an actuarially-reduced, but still adequate, pension at a
younger age, if they so choose. See Wolfson 2013.
27

Women generally have fewer children than they desire, especially in countries with low fertility rates. As well, the
gaps between desired and actual fertility rates have increased over the past ten to twenty years. (OECD 2007b)
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Figure 6. The social policy drivers identified by Esping-Andersen
Economic prosperity in a competitive global economy requires
heavy investments in human capital. The knowledge revolution
requires high levels of human capital throughout the economy.
Higher human capital is created by formal and informal
education and by experience. Growing evidence suggests that
early childhood learning remains a major gap in the system.
Income inequality is growing because of mutually-re-enforcing
trends that could lead to polarization, undermining the central
value of equality of opportunity:


Changes in the labour market. Human capital growth has
not kept up with the demands of the knowledge economy,
creating inequality. Those who have the needed skills are
paid a premium; those without those skills face labour
market difficulties.
Young workers are most disadvantaged since they have
less experience, especially those with lower educational
attainment; this disadvantage occurs during the period of
life when people are most likely to have children.



Changes in family formation re-enforce market-based
inequality. This is the result of increased employment by
women, high female educational levels and marital
homogamy (where marital unions tend to consist of men
and women with similar educational levels). At the top are
well-off couples both with high education, good jobs and
earnings. At the bottom, are couples with lower education
and greater job vulnerability and resulting low-incomes.

These vulnerabilities of people at the bottom are further
increased by the growth in divorce and single parenthood,
which occur more often among those with lower education.
Educational achievement scores are particularly low for the
children of single parents.
Incomplete gender equality has reinforcing effects. There has
been progress in gender equality in the education system, in
some areas of the work force and, to a lesser extent in the
allocation of time to household work and caregiving. Gender
inequalities are greatest among those with less education and
lower income. For those near the top, gender equality is
becoming the norm.
In better educated families, the father plays a larger role in
child-raising, reflecting in part the greater use of external,
often costly child care. (The intensity of involvement increases
as the duration of caregiving decreases.) In lower-income
families, adherence to traditional gender roles is also strongest.
The mother raises the child with less help, and is consequently
more likely to take more time off work – lowering income and,
some evidence suggests, with lower wage rates (since
employers are likely to pay lower wages in occupations where

many people leave work to look after children).
Low investment in the human capital of young children. Past
investments in human capital have improved prosperity, but
not equality of opportunity. Most investment has gone to the
formal education system, which is not designed to increase
equality. People in most countries still have about the same
relative educational status as their grandparents (although
durations of schooling have grown). The needed skills and
capabilities to increase life chances and equality are mainly
formed in the pre-school years, where there has been underinvestment in most countries.
There is strong evidence that good early learning leads to
children’s subsequent success in school and in adulthood.
Inequality of access to early learning therefore results in a
perpetuation of low income status across generations. The
spiral becomes even more entrenched if, as seems likely,
homogamy in marital unions continues in the next generation.
Fertility is also affected by the above trends in ways that run
counter to people’s preferences and could affect economic
well-being. Fertility, gender equality, and early childhood
learning are related:


Women in advanced countries have a preference for two
child families, but actual fertility has fallen in part because
of delayed birth of first children which, in turn, reflects
difficulties in reconciling work and non-work activities and
women’s wish for men to do domestic tasks.



While once negative, fertility in Scandinavia is now higher
among women with higher educational attainment and
who are employed. What is needed is the opportunity for
the mother to leave work for a period of about a year to
care for the baby, and then return to work, being able to
rely on quality child-care and pre-school education, as well
as a larger role of the father in child-care.

Population aging. Lower fertility results in a population with
many older people relative to younger people. This reinforces
the need for more investment in the human capital of young
people both to support the economic well-being of a relatively
larger number of older people in retirement and frailty, and to
maintain prosperity in a competitive knowledge economy. Yet
continued investment along existing lines will result in a
polarized economy and society, for the reasons given.
Later retirement can only be a partial solution since life
expectancy is also linked to income and education; delayed
pension benefits would therefore disproportionately hurt
those with lower incomes. The only effective longer-run
solution to retirement income problems therefore consists in
investments in human capital in early childhood!

This summary of Esping-Andersen (2007) was made by the present author, not by Esping-Andersen himself.
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In other words, the push and pull factors both point to a policy emphasis on supporting greater
lifetime choice – which is what the enabling society is all about.

3.3. New lifecourse opportunities
The shift to the enabling society is not only a reaction to push and pull pressures. The ICT revolution
also provides us with opportunities to make progress in areas that were simply not feasible until now.
It allows us to do things that we always would have liked to do, but never had the capacity to
implement.
A full discussion of those ‘things that we would have liked to do’ is the subject of Chapters 4 and 5.
Following are a few examples to set the tone for these chapters:


It has always been a goal to have transitional services that were efficient and that made a big
difference in people’s lives. However existing arrangements are about as efficient and effective as
possible, given today’s pre-computer technology. The ICT revolution will allow huge gains here.



No one has argued against providing citizens, and organizations, with information about what is
likely to work best for them in social and labour market settings. However, until recently, we
have had no way of creating that kind of information.



It has always been considered desirable if policies were to lead to greater individual lifecourse
choice in areas such as lifelong learning, work and caregiving. However, with pre-computer
technologies, the only practical option was the use of program designs based on point-in-time
transactions.



Leaving the next generation at least as well off as the current generation is a deep-seated
aspiration. However, with existing evidence, it is virtually impossible to measure the net effect of
transfers from government and intra-family transfers on different generations, let alone take
practical policy action.



We have always wanted to have had programming that was open and accountable and that was
also joined up, allowing us to act in partnership as opposed to in territorial silos. The technology
to do that has simply not existed until now. Programs were designed in silos for very good
reasons; that has been the most effective way of organizing ourselves to get things done –
indeed, the only sensible way of doing things given the tools that were at our disposal.

39

4. THE ENABLING SOCIETY: A BETTER SOCIAL POLICY
The shift to the enabling society is not only a response to the external pressures discussed in the last
chapter. This chapter will explain why the shift is desirable in its own right – how it corresponds to
evolving values, the goals and principles.
Section 4.1 examines recent thinking about the general purposes of social policy that is taking place in
academia and government.
Section 4.2 shows that public opinion and public values are consistent with this ‘elite’ thinking.
Section 4.3 examines the evolution in thinking about more specific social goals: social inclusion, the
allocation of resources over the course of life, human development, inequality and generational
fairness.
Section 4.4 concludes by arguing that the enabling society described in this paper is in the mainstream
of contemporary thinking about the future purposes of social policy, but is perhaps ahead of the curve
in taking account of the dramatic possibilities opened by ICT technology.

4.1. Recent thinking about the purposes of social policy
At the highest level of generality, the goal of social policy in the democratic market economies that
typify the OECD world is to support markets and families in the pursuit of a society where citizens
have the resources to live a full and independent life in society and in the economy, typically associated
with respect for human rights, equality, individual freedom of choice – with living standards that are
consistent across the course of life and that are at least adequate for all.
When cast at this high level of generality, the purposes of social policy are reasonably timeless.
However, at a somewhat more policy-oriented level of generality we do see shifts in emphasis. Themes
related to human development have dominated international thinking for some decades. The
capabilities approach of the welfare economist, Amartya Sen, has perhaps had the greatest influence.
Gender perspectives, also arising in part from the academic world, have also been growing in influence
and are consistent with, and extend, the human development literature. In governmental circles,
OECD28 documents have been particularly influential. They also echo human development and gender
themes.
The purpose of this section is to show how the transition from welfare state to the enabling society, as
outlined in this paper, is consistent with these high level trends in thinking about the objectives and
purposes of social policy.
Highlights of the capabilities and gender themes are illustrated in Figure 7 while Figure 8 summarizes
the conclusions reached in two recent meetings of OECD Social Ministers. The messages of Figure 7
and Figure 8 are re-enforcing:

28

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development is the leading international think tank representing
countries with developed market economies. Its reports tend to be forward-looking, but carefully balanced – reflecting
a consensus view on trends and priorities for the future.
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Figure 7. Welfare economics and gender perspectives on social policy goals
The goals of social policy have always been defined
broadly, usually cast in terms of the adequacy and
allocation of financial resources and human capital.
However, when operationalized, these typically have had
to be defined quite narrowly, for example with annual
income being used as a proxy for goals associated with
financial resources and educational attainment being the
proxy for human capital.
The work on capabilities by the contemporary welfare
economist, the Nobel winner, Amartya Sen, is usually
identified with the current broadening of the goals that
29
are used in policy applications .
Sen put the focus on what individuals are able to do –
their functional capacities, their substantive freedom to
develop and make use of their skills, material resources
and health in ways that are of value to them. Poverty and
exclusion are defined as the lack of these functional
capacities or freedoms.
For example, the UN’s human development index, which
was influenced by Sen’s thinking, puts equal emphasis on
income, health and education. However, Sen’s thinking
stresses human diversity and is certainly not limited to
three capabilities. For example, Martha Nussbaum
(2000), an associate of Sen, and adding a strand of
feminist thinking, developed a longer list of capabilities
that democratic governments should support. In
condensed form* these are:
1.

Life. Being able to live to the end of a human life of
normal length; not dying prematurely, or before
one's life is so reduced as to be not worth living.

2.

Bodily health. Being able to have good health,
including reproductive health; to be adequately
nourished; to have adequate shelter.

3.

Bodily integrity. Being able to move freely from place
to place; to be secure against violent assault,
including sexual assault and domestic violence;
having opportunities for sexual satisfaction and for
choice in matters of reproduction.

4.

Senses, imagination and thought. Being able to use
the senses, to imagine, think, and reason.

5.

Emotions. Being able to have attachments to things
and people outside ourselves.

6.

Practical reason. Being able to form a conception of
the good and to engage in critical reflection about
the planning of one's life.

7.

Affiliation. Being able to live with and toward others,
to recognize and show concern for other humans, to
engage in various forms of social interaction. Having
the social bases of self-respect and non-humiliation;
being able to be treated as a dignified being whose
worth is equal to that of others.

8.

Other species. Being able to live with concern for and
in relation to animals, plants, and the world of
nature.

9.

Play. Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy
recreational activities.

10. Control over one's environment, both the political
environment (being able to participate effectively in
political choices that govern one's life; having the
right of political participation, protections of free
speech and association) and material environment
(being able to hold property and having property
rights on an equal basis with others; having the right
to seek employment on an equal basis with others;
having the freedom from unwarranted search and
seizure).
The list is illustrative, not definitive. Indeed, any list such
as this has been criticized as going against the generality
of the capabilities approach, which is holistic (as opposed
to list-making) in spirit, and which emphasises the
political values and decisions of the day as opposed to
pre-set values.
Despite these criticisms, the list provides a useful insight
into the broader but more finely-grained approach to
social issues that is emerging – and the kinds of things
that will need to be measured in the enabling society.
The list also reflects both capabilities and gender-based
streams of theoretical thinking, and is entirely compatible
with the lifecourse approaches that have emerged from
different streams of academic thought.

*The present author arbitrarily shortened the descriptions in the list.

29

The material in the Wikipedia article on ‘Capability Approach’ (accessed May 13, 2013) provided a useful starting
point for the material in this figure.
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Figure 8. A government perspective on social policy goals: the final communiqués of OECD Social Affairs Ministers
in 2005 and 2011
Social policies must be pro-active, stressing investment in
people's capabilities and the realisation of their potential, not
merely insuring against misfortune. [2005]
Families, gender, generations, caregiving
1.

The importance of both mothers and fathers to the longterm development of children should be recognized, and
both should be encouraged to play a full and active role
in family life. [2005]

2.

Working-time flexibility, part-time work and appropriate
parental leave schemes should be promoted to help
parents maintain labour market attachment and provide
children with the care they need. [2005]

3.

Childcare should be widely available, offer quality and
choice based on appropriate information, be affordable
and offer flexibility [2005]

4.

OECD countries should analyse the intergenerational
distribution of public and private spending, and its
impact over time on the distribution of incomes and
assets. [2005]

5.

Family-friendly policies and accessible, affordable quality
childcare services should be promoted more. [2011]

Unemployment and exclusion
6.

We should end the unjustified assumption that some
groups such as lone parents, older workers, people with
disabilities and people on social assistance for a long
time cannot or should not work. [2005]

7.

Policies should be tailored to individual needs and
intervention should be early. [2005]

8.

If the government provides the resources to overcome
barriers to work and participation in society, then
individuals have a responsibility to take advantage of this
opportunity. [2005]

9.

Work must pay for benefit recipients. This can be
achieved by redesign of tax and benefit systems, through
measures to provide adequate wages, and by making the
non-financial aspects of work more attractive. [2005]

10. Disability benefits should also be designed to encourage

employment, not prevent it. Helping people with
disabilities to work will require additional commitment,
and investment. [2005]
11. Most countries are strengthening their formal long-term

care systems. Policies supporting informal care should be
considered as complements to formal systems but
should not perpetuate gender inequalities in unpaid

work nor encourage carers’ withdrawal from the labour
force. [2011]
12. We welcome the OECD’s initiative to undertake more

analysis of the drivers and measurement of poverty and
social exclusion … [including for] single parents, recent
immigrants, aboriginal populations, persons with
disabilities, vulnerable youth and the working poor,
including from gender and geographical perspectives.
[2011]
13. We call on the OECD to start new work to assess the

effectiveness and efficiency of different approaches to
social housing, including the impact of housing policies
on labour market mobility and the integration and colocation of service delivery combining housing and other
social policy supports [2011]
Learning and work over the lifecourse
14. Social policies should promote active aging and

independence in later life. [2005]
15. Longer working lives that reflect gains in life expectancy

contribute to maintaining living standards and may
prevent intergenerational conflicts from arising. [2005]
16. Pension systems need to be adapted to demographic

trends; longer working lives, higher employment rates
and effective retirement ages would improve their
adequacy and sustainability. [2011]
17. The OECD should identify how social and economic goals

can be best achieved, for example by policy interventions
at certain critical 'transition points' or by redistribution of
income from one point in the lifecourse to another.
[2005]
18. The OECD should identify which interventions alleviate

and will contribute to the eventual eradication of child
poverty, break the cycle of inter-generational
deprivation, and develop the capacity of children to
make successful transitions through the lifecourse.
[2005]
19. Investing in children’s well-being, rights and

development, including early childhood education and
care, should start as early as possible and the costs
should be shared fairly among all actors in society,
including all levels of governments, employers and
individuals. … Vulnerable children should be identified
promptly and supported throughout childhood and into
adulthood [2011]

*Note. The selected passages are not in their original order and the numbering of the items has been added by the present author. At the
end of each item there is an identification of the year of the relevant final communique.
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A human development, capacities approach is central to both. Note how the overview statement
of Ministers (opening paragraph in Figure 8) mirrors the capacities approach described in Figure
7.



The lifecourse perspectives of the human development framework (to fully develop over the
course of life, capacities must be nourished early in life) are spelled out quite specifically in the
OECD documents (items 14 to 17 in Figure 8) where heavy weight is place on early childhood
learning30.



In both cases, a broad view is taken in defining social goals and purposes. The capacities
approach encompasses a multitude of individual capacities as is well illustrated by the list of
detailed capacities in Figure 7. A similarly broad scope is implicit in the Ministers’ conclusions in
Figure 8, especially in the 2011 communiqué.



That broadening of scope does not, however, translate into greater generality with respect to
needed action. The opposite is true: the diversity of potential recipients, and the variety of their
needs, is highlighted. The Sen approach is about capacities at the level of particular individuals.
The Ministers are explicit about tailoring program responses to individual needs and a citizenbased policy focus is implicit in their emphasis on lifecourse perspectives and on mutual
obligations.



In all cases, emphasis is placed on the role of gender and the importance of equality in the roles
of both men and women in child care and early childhood learning.

These themes represent a big shift in thinking about the purposes of social policy from those that were
associated with development of the traditional welfare state in the 60s and 70s. Then the emphasis
would have been on the wellbeing of the population taken as a whole or on selected disadvantage
groups, not on citizens taken individually. In those days, there would have been no, or only passing,
reference early childhood learning and the supporting need for gender equality in both work and
caregiving, to citizen-tailored interventions or the central role of developing individual capacities over
the course of life.
It is not that the older welfare state objectives have become unimportant. Rather they are not
prominent on current policy agendas because they are largely being met by existing policies. The older
objectives will continue to be met in the enabling society, along with the newer goals.

Other streams of thought
The ideas presented above about how social policy ought to be formulated are, of course, highly
selective. However, they represent trends that are now commonplace. Various UN agencies, the WHO
and the EU have all issued documents that are similar in theme to the OECD documents referred to
above – often under the heading of active aging, or a society for all ages. Sen’s thinking about
30

Note that the reference to active aging in item 14 is a reference to lifecourse perspectives. Indeed, the phrase ‘active
aging’ was used in 1995 by the present author when he worked for the OECD as a reference to policies that support
lifecourse perspectives – as opposed to traditional life stage policies which implicitly assumed, for example, that
people learned when they were young, worked until age 65 and then retired. The World Health Organization
subsequently used the phrase to much greater effect as a slogan where it came to mean the importance of physical
activity and engagement over life in promoting health among older people. Still later, I was told in an informal
discussion that it became an advertising slogan for a Japanese cosmetic company where I suspect it referred to
disguising wrinkles. The enabling society may eventually be a slogan for marketing erectile dysfunction aids.
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capacities has been particularly influential in UN thinking. The literature on social gerontology and on
human development has long echoed themes similar to the gender and welfare economics perspectives
discussed above.
Of particular interest to this paper is the lifecourse literature that has arisen mainly in sociology and
related disciplines and that is discussed at greater length in Part Two. While much of that literature is
concerned with social analysis as opposed to social policy per se, it has proved to be an invaluable tool
for presenting the more theoretical thinking about human development, capacities, assets and early
childhood into operational policy terms. As far back as the mid-90s, lifecourse analysis was used to
excellent effect in showing the institutional and biographic factors that shaped poverty over the course
of life in Germany31. In the early-2000s, Canada took a lead in exploring the potential of lifecourse
analysis for policy through the work of the Policy Research Initiative32.

4.2. Enabling society directions are supported by public values and
opinions
The preceding section examined high level academic and government perspectives on the way in
which social policy directions and goals should be cast in the future. This runs the risk of providing an
elite perspective, out of touch with popular opinion. This, happily, proves not to be the case.
Figure 9 shows that there is symmetry between public opinion and the ‘elite’ literature. The figure
provides examples drawn from Canadian opinion research companies as well from the international
World Values Survey.
The figure illustrates general trends in public opinion and values that are consistent with the shift to
the enabling society:


A world-wide trend towards valuing self-expression and human choice over authority and
human constraint. This corresponds to Sen’s focus on human capabilities and to the citizencentric focus of the enabling society – with governments increasing being seen as facilitating
individual lifecourse choices, not constraining those choices as is often now the case.



The increasing value attached to individual choice does not diminish support for a basic safety
net or, perhaps surprisingly given much current rhetoric, for a larger governmental role in social
policy. The shift is towards valuing an active but effective, citizen-centred role.



People place higher value on services, including transitional services such as ALMPs over
incomes support in isolation such as social assistance or employment insurance – again a trend
that is consistent with the changes in program instruments that were identified in Chapter 2.

31

Leisering and Leibfried, (2001). The European strand of lifecourse thinking has been particularly relevant for policy
purposes as described in Marshall (2009).
32

The Olivia framework discussed in Part Two originated in this PRI exercise. The present author directed much of
this work while working at the PRI. For a more recent Canadian review of lifecourse tools for policy purposes, see
McDaniel and Bernard (2011).
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Figure 9. Public values and transition to the enabling society
A world-wide shift in values: from constraint to choice
33

Analysis based on the World Values Survey shows a long-run
international trend towards secular-rational values and
towards self-expression values. The weak poles of the two
dimensions overlap on a common emphasis on human
constraint; the two strong poles overlap on a common
emphasis on human choice.
Consistent with human capabilities and human development
thinking, moving from constraint to choice (i.e., becoming
unchained from survival communities) makes people mentally
free, motivating them to develop, unfold, and actualize their
inner human potentials.
On average, all the countries, developed and undeveloped,
moved towards self-expression values between 1981 and
2006, with a less pronouced shift toward stronger secularrational values. This has been particularly the case in the
Anglosaxon countries such as Canada and in protestant
Europe, countries where self-expession values are highest.
Strong support for active social services and somewhat less
support for passive income transfers
34

Analysis of data from Environics , a Canadian opinion research
company, shows continued support for some kind of social
safety net. From 1993 to 2006, in response to the question
“The government should: (a) see to it that everyone has a
decent standard of living, or (b) leave people to get ahead on
their own,” roughly 65 percent of Canadians agreed with the
former.
Preferences for government spending reveal widespread
support across a number of social assistance policy domains.
However, welfare and employment insurance receive less
support than do employment programing, services for the
poor, homelessness and child poverty.

Services – whether they are directed at the poor or at
specific segments of the population – are viewed as a
positive incentive to reintegrate. Services benefit those who
“deserve” to be helped – that is, those who are actively
trying to use those services to join the main stream
workforce and society. Highest support for cash transfers is
directed to those whose poverty is clearly not their fault
(such as children).
New , more effective, directions are supported
35

Analysis of data from Ekos , another Canadian research
firm, reinforces the theme the continued public support for
big social spending by governments. However, that does not
represent support for existing welfare state programming.
When given clear choices about their preferences for future
trajectories, the responses almost entirely involve profound
shifts away from the status quo.
When asked about choices that would lead to a better
future, 70% answered ‘more active government’ and only
26% answered ‘less active government’. This was a call, not
for big government or more spending but for more effective,
government. There is a clear conviction that the state should
have a bigger, not smaller, a role in designing and delivering
a better future.
One notable finding, which mirrors recent European
research, is that the youngest citizenry are more muted in
their support for active government. The newest cohorts
may be the most progressive ever in terms of social values,
but they are more individualistic and less receptive to the
notion that the state can solve their problems. (Present
author’s note: this is consistent with the transition to the
enabling society with its greater focus on the citizen and
individual choice.)

The wording above closely follows the wording of the three documents in question, quoting directly where possible.

4.3. A closer look at the particular goals of social policy
The last section looked at trends in thinking about the goals of social policy at a high level of
generality. This section examines the trends in thinking about the more particular goals that social
policy seeks to achieve:


Supporting those in need.

33

Welzel 2011.
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Harrell et al 2008.

35

Ekos Politics 2013.
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Helping all individuals allocate resources over the course of their lives.



Helping all individuals build their skills and human capital for both social and economic ends.



Fighting inequality, including generational fairness and sustainability.

The main purpose of the section is to briefly note how the general thinking of the previous section
applies to these sub-goals. A second purpose is to provide some historical context to the discussion in
Chapter 2 of enabling society program instruments.

Supporting those in need
Recent years have seen both a broadening of the definition of those who need to be supported by
social programming and a greater recognition of the diversity of those who need support. As described
earlier, in the mature welfare state the emphasis was on supplementing low incomes, with low income
seen as a proxy for a range of other deficits. In the decades since the maturation of the welfare state,
the concept has broadened to encompass a wider range of deficits. The broader term ‘poverty’, or
more recently, ‘exclusion’ has been used to signal this broadening of the concept.
Similarly, exclusion is now understood to arise from multiple sources (lack of income, lack of skills,
lack of jobs, lack of health, lack of housing, disability, addiction, family break up, lack of social
networks or, often, from a combination of these). One-size-fits all programming makes no sense given
this diversity.
The broadening involves a shift from a point-in-time perspective to a lifecourse perspective, including
recognition that, in some cases, exclusion is short-term and in others it is persistent. It is consistent
with Sen’s capacities approach, with exclusion being defined in terms of asset deprivation (lack of
financial, human and social capital) as well as in terms of income flows.
Taken together, these factors have resulted in a shift towards:


Active programming. Ever-increasing attention is being paid to ALMPs and a variety of welfare-towork initiatives, and less attention to income support used in isolation. The shift is reflected in
slogans such as ‘a hand up, not a handout’, ‘workfare’ and ‘mutual obligations’.



Independent living and deinstitutionalization. Much more so than in the past, efforts are made to
provide more people with disabilities with the tools needed use to live in their own dwellings and
participate in community and in the labour market.



Efforts to cut across the silos. There have been many attempts to cut across the silos of individual
programs and agencies in order to provide co-ordinated services aimed at the real needs of
people, often local initiatives. This can be seen in growth of actors with titles such as coordinators or case managers. The effort is real, but success rates are not high for reasons
described in the next chapter.

Supporting the allocation of resources over the lifecourse
Another goal of social policy is to help people allocate resources over the course of life – not only for
people in greatest need, but for everyone. A main stream of this kind of programming is built around
insurance principles and a collective sharing of risks. Such programming provides support to
individuals during periods of life when they are unemployed or unable to work. Unemployment
insurance, workers compensation, disability pensions and survivors benefits are examples. There are
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also generational transfers at the collective level that promote lifecourse reallocation. For example,
people pay taxes when they are in the labour market to support the development of human capital
when people are young and going to school. These two streams involve inter-individual redistribution
– from workers to students, from people with middle and high incomes to the poor, from the majority
to those who incur a specific, insurable problem. Still another stream of programming relates to intraindividual redistribution where the same individual is supported by policy in allocating his or her
resources from one stage of life to another. Tax supported private pension savings are an example.
Recent decades have seen three shifts in thinking and analysis related to lifecourse allocation goals.
First, at the level of policy analysis, there have been efforts to disentangle the effects of social
programs on intra-individual and inter-individual. In the past, and even today, these effects have been
muddled together, making it difficult to draw sensible conclusions about the redistributive effects of
social policies. For example, many people might assume that, in a country such as Sweden with high
taxes and high social benefits, there would be much inter-individual income redistribution. And there
is. However, a recent study36 found that in countries with large, universal social spending programs
such as the Nordic countries, most social spending (over 80% in Sweden) was directed to intraindividual allocations. In countries with more targeted programming a greater share goes, obviously, to
inter-individual allocations. However, even in these countries, the amount directed to intra-individual
transfers is still very large (in the 40% - 50% range in Australia, 55% in Ireland and in the 60% - 70%
range in the UK).
While rare today, this kind of deeper analysis of the redistributive effects of social policy will almost
certainly become commonplace in the coming decades as a result of the arrival of big statistics – as will
be described in Part 2.
Second, and far more important, has been a shift towards the individualization of social programs
themselves. This refers to programming where there is a direct link between the contributions an
individual makes at one stage of life to the benefits received at another stage. Such a shift is an
essential part of the overall movement towards a social policy that places the individual at the center of
social policy, with government role seen as supporting the individual in making lifecourse choices
along with the roles played by the family, community, school and workplace. Figure 5 in the last
chapter described the major changes that have already made pensions more individualized. Figure 14
in the next chapter provides a range of other examples.
Third, and parallel to the shift in transitional programs discussed above, policies directed to lifecourse
reallocation increasingly have the goal of shortening periods of joblessness, as opposed to simply
providing income support during those periods. For example, recent decades have seen unemployment
insurance benefits tightened up to remove work disincentives, early retirement benefits reduced or
eliminated, and pension rules adjusted to encourage people to work longer in life. More recently, child
care and parental leave programming has been expanded in countries such as Canada, partly to
encourage mothers to return to work after a period of caring for their babies at home. As well, ALMPs
are becoming common (with some calling for them to be mandatory, as seen Figure 10 below) in
regular unemployment insurance programming, and not restricted only to those in greatest need.
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Ståhlberg 2007.
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Learning, human capital and prosperity
High skill levels result in increased self-sufficiency, more real choices open to individuals, good jobs
and material well-being and, collectively, to a competitive, prosperous economy. Learning and skills
development have therefore always been key purposes of social and labour market policies. Figures 7
and 8 illustrate recent thinking about this objective:


A steady growth in the importance attached to learning and skills over the entire course of life,
including in early childhood and during adulthood, particularly ALMPs that are tailor-made to
individual circumstances. This follows the huge growth in the length of initial education that was
associated with the expansion of the system of post-secondary education during the maturation
of the welfare state. In Canada the percent of the population with a post-secondary education is
still increasing, but the rate of growth has tapered off quite sharply since the mid 90’s, particularly
for people aged 25 to 44.



Emphasis on generic skills – the ‘learning to learn’ skills that help individuals navigate the full
course of life, not only for their next job.



Making full use of the human capital of the whole population in the economy, including
previously under-represented groups such as women, people with disabilities, those who
previously would have lost skills as a result of prolonged periods of joblessness, and older people
who in the past would have retired earlier.



The shift from social expenditure to social investment that was discussed in Chapter 2 is implicit
in the calls for effectiveness and making a difference in the subsequent lives of people.

OECD thinking has been particularly influential in human development topics that cross the
boundaries of social, educational37 and economic policy. The title of a series of studies on early
childhood policies, Babies and Bosses38, gives a good signal of current thinking that crosses these
boundaries. It refers not only to the main theme of the document (working time arrangements that are
consistent with good early childhood care and learning) but it also suggests that good early learning
today will have high employment payoffs for the next generation – when the babies join the labour
market.
A particularly important initiative that drew on both social and economic thinking took place in the
mid 90’s when the OECD set out its influential Jobs Strategy to provide a comprehensive framework
for job growth and a healthy labour market. The strategy was reviewed a decade later and the revised
version (OECD 2006) still dominates thinking in this area. Critical actions identified in the revised Job
Strategy are listed in Figure 10. Note that, even in this government-wide, economically-oriented
agenda, a high priority has been assigned to lifecourse perspectives such as interspersing schooling
with working, later retirement, and family policies that support a full role of women in the labour
market. Note also the importance that is attached to effective ALMPs, ones that have been
demonstrated to work – consistent with the ‘what works best’ theme of the enabling society. ALMPs
are now considered to be mandatory: governments must offer them to all who need them and, once
offered, there is an obligation on the part of beneficiaries of social programs to make use of them.
37

The OECD Education Ministers have also played a strong role over the years in advocating a strong system of
lifelong learning. They have taken a world lead in promoting the importance of acquiring foundational or generic
skills, including literacy and numeracy throughout the course of life, in early childhood, in school, and in adult life.
The OECD has also been a key player in developing internationally comparable measures of these generic skills.
38

OECD 2007.
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Figure 10. Selected actions called for by the updated (2006) OECD Jobs Strategy
The Job Strategy called for detailed government-wide action
on many fronts. The selected items below are those that
relate most directly to the subject matter of this paper. Other
topics include macro-economic policy (which has become
even more central in recent years) and the promotion of
healthy product markets.

reform and the provision of targeted in-work benefits to
make work pay, without creating excessive tax distortions
or compromising public finances.

Remove work disincentives in social benefit programs and
stress effective ALMPs.

Promote high-quality initial education and … set
conditions likely to improve labour force skills to support
the key role of human capital accumulation for the
b
achievement of economic growth and social objectives ,
by:





Establishing a system of recognition of new
competencies gained by adults through training and
work experience, including foreign credential
recognition of new immigrants.



Ensuring that training is more demand-driven and
responds effectively to firms’ changing skill
requirements, and encouraging greater quality of
training provision, including through performance
monitoring of providers.



Supporting training programmes – e.g. training
vouchers, training leave or schemes that help workers
alternate between work and training – which include
co-financing from private agents and address existing
training inequalities by providing effective learning
opportunities for disadvantaged groups, notably the
low-educated.



Ensuring that some employment programmes are
targeted to the specific needs of disadvantaged
people, including through second-chance schools.



Reducing early exits from education and ensuring that
young people acquire skills relevant to labour-market
requirements, including by broadening vocational
programmes, strengthening links between general and
vocational education and improving career guidance.



Combining education with work, notably through
improved apprenticeship systems or more informal
channels.

Unemployment insurance … and social assistance, should
be set at levels that do not discourage job search
excessively and, especially where they are relatively
generous, be made conditional on strictly enforced workavailability criteria as part of well-designed ‘activation’
measures.



Participation in effective ALMPs should be compulsory
after a certain length of joblessness that may differ across
groups (e.g. immigrants facing integration difficulties,
disadvantaged youth and older jobseekers).



ALMPs should be regularly assessed in a rigorous way to
ensure that inefficient programmes are terminated, and
that the mix of programmes is adjusted to suit the needs
of jobseekers and the labour market.



Public early retirement schemes should be gradually
a
phased out , and public and private pensions as well as
other welfare systems reformed so as to remove
incentives for early labour market exit.

Implement family-friendly policies, including childcare
support, as well as working-time arrangements which help
reconcile work and family life, so as to remove barriers to
employment for those with family commitments.




Tax and social security provisions should not discriminate
against part-time work or other flexible arrangements
which help reconcile work and family life and promote
gradual work-to-retirement transitions.
Employment should be made financially attractive vis-àvis benefit receipt, notably through tax-benefit

a

Early retirement programs have not played a major role in Canada, although earlier versions of older worker adjustment programming once
did provide income support for older displaced workers.
b
The revised job strategy did not highlight issues related to older worker adjustment. However at about the same time, the OECD published
a series of country reports entitled Live Longer, Work Longer, with the Canadian study that indicated that Canada was in comparatively
good shape here and calling mainly for the inclusion of more older workers in ALMP type programming.

The lifecourse and social investment perspectives of the enabling society described in this paper of
course reflects these human development and labour market objectives, and its use of ‘what works
best’ tools, promises transformative improvements in the way they can be translated into action.
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Addressing inequality
It can be argued that a concern for equality lies at the heart of social policy and, with the rising income
inequality in recent years, it is now receiving even more attention. Four themes emerge in recent policy
thinking about desirable future direction in fighting inequality.
The first, related to generational equity, is discussed separately below.
The second relates to a broadening of those characteristics that should be considered when social
policy examines equality, including both equality of opportunity and equality of outcomes or status.
Most welfare state thinking about equality has been cast in terms of income. Paralleling the trends
described earlier, ‘equality of what’ discussions have expanded to encompass assets and wider range of
resources. However this broadening of scope is still largely a shift in intentions. Actual measures of
equality continue to be largely based on income data.
Third, the importance attached to gender equality has increased. The current priority in gender issues
comes out very clearly in the OECD statements in Figure 7, including greater gender equality in
caregiving to enable the full participation of women in the work place – particularly important since
women are becoming more educated than men.
Fourth, in very recent years, increasing attention is being paid to equality of outcomes. This reflects a
concern that growing income inequality, especially between the very rich and those in the middle, may
result in a polarization in society, including the worry that large inequalities in income will be passed on
across generations, undermining equality of opportunity – creating self-perpetuating downward
generational spiral39. There is also a concern that such large inequalities cannot be justified on the
ethical grounds. The high incomes of those at the very top do not appear to result in any economic
benefits for society as a whole, and certainly do not seem to result in any obvious gain to those at the
bottom40.
There has always been a balance in social policy between equality of outcomes (e.g., equality with
respect to actual incomes or resources) and equality of opportunity (i.e., where everyone starts life with
a fair and equal opportunity, for example with educational opportunities being the same for the
children and of rich and poor parents). The balance between the two varies by country and by political
values, but the dominant emphasis in the welfare state has been on equality of opportunity. Equality of
opportunity remains central in the enabling society – with an even greater emphasis on equality of
opportunity over the course of life, including in school and work. For example, in capacities thinking,
the goal is not equality of outcomes per se, since people, by their very nature are unequal in their
capacities; what is needed is the equal chance to develop and use those capacities in ways that each
individual finds important.
When translating the concern about unequal outcomes in practical policy responses, there have been
calls in some countries to reform the tax system so that it can take account of the entire incomes and
assets of the very richest, whose real tax rates are now relatively low. Perhaps the main response,
39

Corak 2013.

40

Perhaps the most influential social theories today are based on the work of the late John Rawls who, among many
other contributions, argued that, in a just society, inequality could be justified only to the extent it resulted in gains to
those at that bottom. For example, the income gap between the rich and poor can be justified to the extent that higher
incomes for those at the top result in a more productive and prosperous society that improves the living standards of
everyone, including those at the bottom.
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however, have been calls for action that simultaneously addresses both equality of outcomes and
equality of opportunity through policies directed to young children. Child poverty represents a failure
of the existing system of resource allocation and reduces opportunities for all children to start life on
an equal footing. In terms of income equality, many countries have had policies addressed to ending
child poverty. While some have been more successful than others, the goal is feasible in operational
terms by using means such as refundable child tax credits. In terms of equality of human capital and
the development of individual capacities, the emphasis has been on the importance of universal, high
quality early childhood education – as has been discussed earlier.

Generational and sustainability issues
The idea that people ought to leave their descendants at least the equivalent of what they received
from the previous generation is certainly not new. In more recent years, two dimensions of this
broader topic of intergenerational fairness and sustainability have received particular attention.
The first relates to the extent to which a combination of demographic factors (population aging that
arises as a result of reduced fertility) and the introduction of collectively-funded welfare state
programming have resulted in gains to the babyboom generation at the expense of succeeding
generations. Are the baby boomers leaving fiscal debts that will impoverish succeeding generations?
Are current investments in the next generation large enough, considering the huge investments that
were made when the baby boomers were young, for example in the form of massive increases in the
size of the postsecondary education system? Or more generally, will the next generation face lower
standards of health, security and economic well-being compared with their parent’s generation?
The second relates to the increased attention being paid to sustainability more generally, particularly
the sustainability of natural resources and global warming. Can existing social and labour market
programs and policies, especially pensions, be sustained by coming generations? Are we providing the
next generation with the financial, human and social capital , as well as the climate and natural
resources, that will be needed so that they will be at least as well off as their parent’s generation and
will also have the capacity to leave their children’s generation an equally strong heritage.
The issues are difficult and, in welfare state policy thinking, they are mainly treated exogenously. That
is, they are usually not incorporated directly into current thinking about the immediate design of social
programs, but rather are considerations or concerns about the indirect or external effect of those
designs. The empirical evidence is simply not there for generational concerns to be integrated into
routine policy debate and program design. Yet in principle they should be taken directly into account
in program designs and assessments – not only for the immediate reasons mentioned above, but also
because generational issues make a big difference in addressing the full range of social issues. For
example, if the next generation had fewer resources in total than did the current generation, they
would have less capacity to make social investments directed to improving equality of opportunity or
building human capital.
A number of thorny conceptual issues exist41. For example, to what extent should generation fairness
issues go backwards in time as well as forward? If present generations should not harm the rights and
41

Another difficult issue relates to the way in which generational fairness discussions take account of large one-time
shifts in terms of such as the second demographic transition, i.e., the effects of lower fertility and sometimes belowreplacement fertility, postponed and non-marital childbearing, when combined with continuing growth in longevity.
These shifts can have large generational effects. Should negative effects be compensated for in some respect?
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resources of future generations, should they not also provide compensation to people in the present
generation for harms that arose in previous generations? In Canada this has taken the form, for
example, of compensating those who were harmed by the Indian Residential Schools programs. And,
how far back should one go in making such compensations, and how many generations in the future
should be taken into account when looking to future sustainability? In terms of measurement, this
becomes a question of how one calculates time discounts – a problem whose solution requires that
value judgements be made.
On a more practical level, there are issues about the areas of life that should be taken into account
when considering generational fairness and sustainability. In recent decades, for example, there has
been much discussion about the generational fairness of programs, pensions especially, taken one at
time. This however, makes little sense. It is the net effect on future generations of all programs that is
of real interest42. More important, the proper measure is not just the effect of government
programming on future generations, but the effect of all resource flows in society, including both
inside families and through government transfers and services.
Inside families, there has been a huge increase in transfers from the baby boomers to their children as
a result of much longer periods of schooling and living in the parental home. A full picture would also
need to take account of transfers to children later in life though gifts, including from grandparents,
help in home buying and inheritances. Recall that reduced fertility has meant that the current
generation of young people have far more sources of support from parents and grandparents, when
compared with baby boom generation who had to share those resources with more siblings. On
balance, it seems reasonable to think that the generation following the baby boomers are the
beneficiaries of large generational transfers within families, partially compensated for by reduced
market income and social benefits from government – a shift, which if true, is probably one of the
least satisfying outcomes from the perspectives of all parties.
However, the real issue is that we do not have the evidence to actually measure these generational
transfers in a satisfactory manner.
The big statistics of the enabling society will allow an evidence-based approach to generational issues.
As will be explored in Part Two of the paper, big statistics will allow integrated analysis of:


Resource flows from government and within families.



Assets, which are critical to discussions of sustainability, as well as of these resource flows.



Inter-individual and intra-individual effects, as discussed above, which will allow us to
understand the distributive effects of social policy a) within the lives of the same individual, b)
from one generation to another in the same family, c) and across different people of different
generations -- such as the taxes paid by the people of one generation to pay for the schooling of
the next, or succeeding, generations.

42

Some decades ago, there was much interest in generational accounting that looked at the net effects of government
programming on future generations. However it suffered a huge flaw in that it had to make its calculations based on the
assumption that existing program financing and existing behavioural patterns would remain unchanged for decades
into the future, when the reality is that financing arrangements and human behaviour are continually changing and
adapting. As noted earlier, most fiscal projections in Canada out to 2031 are implicitly based on no change in existing
retirement patterns; they are wildly wrong when one takes account of recent and likely future trends to later retirement.
If expressed as generational accounts, the results would be even more misleading.
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Different dimensions of sustainability such as environmental sustainability, the sustainability of
the urban infrastructure as well as sustainability in the generational sense being discussed here.

Such statistics will not resolve value issues such as what constitutes an appropriate level of generational
equality, but they will show what is actually happening and they will show how different program
design options are likely to impact on different generations – and to monitor the generational impacts
of existing programs in the context of all the generational flows that are taking place in families and in
society at large.
It is not only a matter of statistics and analysis. The actual shift in program content towards
individualization, towards use of assets and toward the guaranteed lifetime accounts will make it far
easier to adjust policy to take account of generational issues, to the extent that that is desired. In
particular, programming that allows individuals greater choice in the way in which their lives unfold
also addresses many generational issues. For example, removing artificial policy-based constraints on
work-retirement transitions will almost certainly lead more people to retire later than they do now, and
this in turn may well prevent some intergenerational issues from arising , as concluded by the OECD
(Figure 8).

4.4. Is the enabling society completely consistent with recent thinking?
Chapter 1 summarized the difference between the enabling society and the welfare state as follows:


A new focus on individual citizens.



A shift to evidence-driven programming.



A shift to a lifecourse perspective.



A related shift to asset-based perspectives.



More focus on people facing the greatest obstacles.



An integrated approach to generational and sustainability issues.



Stronger horizontal integration across programs, jurisdictions and disciplines.



Stronger vertical integration within government programming.

The recent thinking about desirable future directions described in this chapter is consistent with the
focus on individuals and on the lifecourse, on asset-based and evidence-driven perspectives and on
generational fairness issues. The next chapter on governance expands further on horizontal and
vertical integration.
There are differences of emphasis however. Notably, the enabling society emphasis on evidence-driven
programming, and the central importance of the ICT revolution and its ‘what works best’ information,
is not present in much of the literature discussed in this chapter. Implicitly, much of the literature, and
much public opinion, assumes a future marked by evolutionary changes in existing instruments of
policy and tools of analysis. There is no sense that a major, transformative change towards the desired
direction is on the near-term time horizon.
For example, the emphasis on the citizen and individual choice in much of the literature seems to be
cast mainly in traditional terms such as putting the needs of citizen first in service delivery, or greater
citizen involvement in the policy process or in co-production, or in making service programming more
flexible in meeting diverse individual needs, or of finding ways of ‘joining-up’ existing programs, or
53

making it easier to communicate with the existing governmental structures by using ‘e-government’. In
other it words, it is mainly about making the existing infrastructure more citizen-friendly.
On the other hand, the enabling society envisioned in this paper foresees a much more radical shift.
The use of existing ICT will allow a transformation of social programming and it’s supporting
governance structures and knowledge base such that informed citizens can actually be at the centre of
social policy in the not too distant future. The transition period will not be simple but it could be
reasonably quick. The transformed system will address the evolving purposes of social policy, as set
out in this chapter, in a much simpler, more direct and effective manner than is implied in much of
literature.
The next chapter uses the perspective of governance to elaborate on this coming shift to a simpler and
more effective social policy.
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5. TRANSFORMED GOVERNANCE IN THE ENABLING
SOCIETY
Governance is used here to refer to the organizational structures and decision-making processes that
are used to formulate and deliver social policies within and without government. The argument of the
chapter is that the radical improvements in ICT technology which are resulting in the transformation
of the instruments of social policy will also result in a transformation of their governance. The new
public administration will be simpler, more accountable and more efficient.
Section 5.1 describes how this optimistic view of the future can be reconciled with today’s public
administration literature which tends to see negative trends and complex futures.
Section 5.2 describes how the present difficulties reflect complex and seeming conflicting trends in
managing horizontal and vertical issues and how the ICT revolution will go a long way in resolving
these problems.
Section 5.3 summarises the changing role of the different players in the social policy world, including
individuals and families, governments and many non-governmental actors.

5.1. Reconciling with the public administration literature
There is a seeming inconsistency between the optimistic view about governance that is found in this
paper and that found in much of the public administration literature. For some readers, that may well
be the elephant in the room that needs to be addressed at the outset.
The public administration literature of the past 50 years has well described the growing chasm between
our expectations for a healthy, responsive public administration and the paralysis that has developed in
so many areas. The literature has also described the many attempts at reform, with success on some
fronts such as service delivery, but often ending in failure. As will be described later, reforms in one
compartment of public administration (for example related to accountability) have often been
inconsistent with directions being taken in other compartments (for example related to outreach,
collaboration or innovation) and, within any one compartment, reform trajectories over the past 50
years have yo-yoed more than shown steady progress.
Figure 11 looks at the two recent books that take very different perspectives in order to give a flavour
of the content of much of the public administration literature.
Most of the individual points made by the authors fit well with the argument made in this paper.
For example, the current dysfunctions listed by Savoie are entirely consistent with this paper’s analysis
of the growing difficulties that are faced when administrative approaches designed for a pre-computer
age attempt to take on current preoccupations and priorities. The bureaucracy has grown greatly in
size, without correspondingly large improvements in the outcomes achieved. Further, expectations for
responsiveness, openness, collaboration and accountability have been rising sharply, expectations that
cannot be met in the area of social policy, given its antiquated governance arrangements.
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Bourgon’s analysis is particularly helpful in understanding the challenges and difficulties that we need
to tackle, e.g., as it relates to experimentation, to learning feed-back loops, to the use of ICT
technologies and to the changing roles of citizens and the public, private, and civil sectors.
Figure 11. Examples of themes in the public administration literature
Two recent, and very different, books Bourgon (2011) and
Savoie (2013) illustrate many strands of the current public
administration literature. Savoie, an academic and
government advisor, takes a pessimistic look at the unhappy
state of the public service and of the supporting literature.
Bourgon, who was once Canada’s top public servant, looks
ahead to a different and complex future.

The Bourgon prescription

The Savoie diagnostic

This is much broader and more complex than the traditional
role where government bodies are seen as acting more or less
on their own – devising and administering a series of more or
less independent programs. In the new world of governance,
everything is intertwined and co-evolving over time: the
public, private, civic spheres; social, economic, environmental
and technical systems. A typical new theme is co-production –
with government and citizens, or governments and civil
society, acting independently but harmoniously.

Savoie examines how and why the public service has become
so dysfunctional. He uses Canadian examples but his
conclusions apply more generally.
The main argument is that public service reforms have failed
because they attempted to make the public sector more like
the private sector. Reforms in this direction (from the ‘let the
managers manage’ reforms of fifty years ago to the more
recent New Public Management reforms), have made things
worse; the values and incentives of the public and private
sector are fundamentally different. Symptoms include:






A huge growth in government overhead functions
compared with those functions that involve directed
delivery of services to citizens.
Elaborate reporting systems and evaluations that exhaust
the time and energy of the public service, that are deeply
flawed conceptually and that are not used: “turning
cranks that are not attached to anything”.
Lines of accountability and responsibility that are blurred
and that foster distrust – including the lines between
politics and bureaucracy, between the very centre (such
as the Prime Minister’s office) and other traditional
central bodies, and between the lower and mid-levels of
the bureaucracy (serving citizens) and a disconnected
senior bureaucracy (servicing the centre and horizontal
functions).

Bourgon reports on the findings of an international network of
practitioners and scholars whose work to date has concluded
that “the role of public institutions and public organizations is
to enhance the collective capacity to achieve results of higher
public value and at a lower cost to society, in all
circumstances, across systems and across generations.”

In order to support the breadth and complexities of this new
kind of governance, four inter-related subsystems or functions
will need to be actively nurtured:


The compliance function is most similar to the existing
arrangements. It provides an organized, accountable way
of setting priorities and making choices. It includes
constitutions, rules and controls.



The emergence function which helps improve the
capacity of government to anticipate emerging issues and
opportunities and reap the benefits of social innovation.



The performance function which helps governments think
across systems and works across boundaries, sectors and
disciplines.



A resilience function that builds the collective capacity for
better results through co-production and the active
participation of citizens, communities and societies.

However, the overall tone of these papers is quite different from that of this paper. Savoie’s argument
is pessimistic and his solution involves a return to past approaches, while the argument of this paper is
optimistic – looking to solutions that make use of new technology. The Bourgon paper is futurelooking but stresses the complexity of future solutions involving multiple functions and subsystems,
while this paper foresees a new era of simplicity and clarity.
My reading is that the difference in tone with the Bourgon perspective is one of time frames, not of
substance. Her analysis, in this view, primarily deals with the transition period in which the old and
new technologies and policy expectations must live together in ways that are inevitably complex and
difficult. The analysis in this paper, on the other hand, attempts to look beyond these transitional
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complexities and to examine governance in the much simpler world that will exist in a mature enabling
society built on contemporary technologies. The Bourgon prescriptions make sense as we go through
the transition to the enabling society, but they will be redundant once we get there. Part 2 of this paper
argues that, if well-handled, the transitional period could be relatively short.
The difference with the Savioe argument relates to the reasons why the new governance reforms failed.
In his reading they are a result of the imposition of private sector approaches in the public sector that
makes things worse, essentially because there is no real outcomes in the public sector that corresponds
to the measurable ‘bottom line’ of the private sector. His prescription is therefore a return to the
golden age of elite public service values and easily-measured input controls that preceded the mature
welfare state. As will be discussed later, this paper agrees that it is a serious mistake to emulate a
private sector bottom line. However, this paper disagrees that appropriate measurement is
unattainable. Later we will demonstrate how appropriate measures can be developed in the public
sector using current ICT technologies. The paper looks ahead to a new, and far better, golden age of
evidence-driven governance in the reasonably-near future.
In either case, the rationale for the optimism of this paper is based on the expectation that new
technology can resolve the central problem of reconciling vertical and horizontal integration within
governments. The next section explores how this can be achieved.

5.2. Reconciling horizontal and vertical decision-making
There is no question that existing governance arrangements are complex and will become more so
until we can escape from the pre-computer structure of today’s programming. This complexity is best
understood by examining horizontal and vertical decision-making and how they are inter-related.
Horizontal management refers to the coordination functions in government that cut across the
borders of existing programs, departments and jurisdictions. Vertical management refers to the
coordination functions that result from the existence of an often complex management and decisionmaking hierarchy within a particular program or department.
The challenges posed in both areas have grown in recent decades, with increasing difficulty in
simultaneously dealing with both. The results have often resulted in bloated and ineffective governance
arrangements – moving in seemingly inconsistent directions.

Horizontal integration
No one program, taken isolation, is sufficient to address the big issues discussed in the last chapter,
such as human development, or equality of opportunity, or fostering human capabilities, or lifecourse
choice. The determinants of both health and social well-being are closely intertwined as are the
determinants of successful learning and labour market outcomes.
In one sense, nothing is new here; everything in the social world has always been understood to be
related to everything else. What are newer are expectations that policies will take these linkages into
account in an operational manner. This expectation has been manifest in countless ways in recent
decades, with calls for joined-up government, shifting from hierarchies to networks, for governments
to steer not row (implying working in partnership), an emphasis on local initiatives that draw on
programming from different departments and jurisdictions in a way that meets locally-determined
priorities, and a stress on horizontal communications across departments. The shift of decision-making
upwards in government to the offices of Prime Ministers and their equivalents represents a shift
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towards a ‘whole of government’ focus, rather than the traditional emphasis on departmental
mandates.
Managing horizontal linkages within the context of current programming and departmental structures
presents deep challenges. We lack both the knowledge and the processes to do it well. The tools for
horizontal management are add-ons to the mainline tools of vertical management. They are clumsy
when dealing with individual horizontal issues. Most important, we lack the knowledge base to
understand which kinds of horizontal action will work best in practice, or to assess their effectiveness,
or to scale up particular joint initiatives so that horizontal actions become the normal way of doing
business.
In consequence, a great deal of effort is directed to horizontal issues (the Savoie book discussed in
Figure 11 points out that deputy ministers in Canada now spend a third of their time on
interdepartmental matters43) but with relatively small payoffs.

Vertical integration
The challenges of vertical management, taken in isolation, arise from a combination of three factors.
First is the growing size and complexity of bureaucratic structures. These often encompass front line
delivery agents, multiple levels of supervision and management, through to high level decision-makers
at the political level – including many staff that provide administrative services or act as policy
advisors, program designers, researchers, evaluators and controllers.
Second are conflicting pressures in the direction of both centralization and decentralization.


On the one hand, pressures related to accountability and probity usually work in the direction of
centralization, including the use of often elaborate systems of reporting and monitoring. These
control system are often fragmented as a result of the increasing specialization of staff functions
(related for example to the management of finances, of human resources, of information, etc.)
and absorb increasing amounts of time and energy to maintain. The specialized functions create
their own, often separate, centralized accountability and reporting streams.



One the other hand, there are equally strong pressure towards meeting the government’s
objectives efficiently, effectively and providing good service to the public. These usually point in
the directions of decentralization, moving decision-making to the front lines, letting the
managers manage and even take risks, as well as reducing overhead and the burden of feeding
diverse internal reporting schemes.

Third is the lack of a common knowledge base to support vertical management in ways that could help
managers resolve these potential conflicts in an integrated, non-bureaucratic manner.

Horizontal and vertical issues in combination
If horizontal and vertical issues are difficult to manage when taken in isolation, they become almost
impossible to manage well when taken in combination, at least in traditional line departments. They
work in potentially contradictory ways.

43

Savoie (2013), p 118.
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For example, at the planning, policy development and assessment stages of the policy process,
increased horizontal coordination works in the direction of centralization, increasing the decisionmaking role of the senior manager of the various components that are being ‘joined up’, as well as that
of central agencies, including those with intergovernmental responsibilities and including a greater role
for the offices of Prime Ministers and Presidents.
On the other hand, at the level of program delivery, horizontal issues typically lead in the direction of
decentralization, for example with front line managers and staff at the local level getting together with
their counterparts in other departments, other levels of government and the private sector in order to
bring various streams of programming and other intervention together in a way that can sensibly meet
local needs. To work well, the local authorities should be flexible in adapting their programs in a way
that works best with that of their partners. However such flexibility will often run counter to the
systems in place to ensure vertical accountability in their home organisations.
If the knowledge base to support integrated vertical management within any one department is lacking,
the problem is far worse when these horizontal factor are taken into account, with each of the
participating agencies having different systems of accountability and ways of measuring results. As
Bourgon has observed, we lack the ‘systems, practices and policies to facilitate the coexistence of
[vertical] hierarchies and [horizontal] networks’44.
The pessimistic Savioe diagnosis of the downward spiral of governance at the federal level in Canada
provides a good, if one-sided45, catalogue of the unhappy consequences of the inability to manage
horizontal and vertical issues in a coherent manner. Even the more optimistic perspective of this paper
would paint a picture of the present state of governance that is not greatly different from that of
Savoie46.

The future looks much better
There will always be challenges associated with integrating the vertical and horizontal dimensions of
governance. The tensions between taking decentralized initiatives and central accountability are real
and inevitable. There is equally an inevitable tension between an organization doing its own directlymandated work efficiently, effectively and accountably and working in partnership with others towards
collective objectives. If not managed well, these tensions can produce bloating and paralysis. If well
managed and based on evidence of what will work best, they can result in new approaches that will be
characterized by a leaner, more productive public services as well as significant gains for society as a
whole.
In other words, the goal is not to eliminate horizontal and vertical tensions. The goal is to manage
them productively. The core problem today is that there is no common information base on which to
base integrated, evidence-driven management in either horizontal or vertical directions, let alone both.
44

Bourgon (2011), p 49.

45

His argument is unbalanced in that it describes only the negatives and ignores positive trends such as success on the
service delivery front, real (if cyclical) progress in cost containment and many small steps in the right direction on the
horizontal management side such as the creation policy research networks and a number of examples of partnerships
on particular initiatives.
46

Or at least that was my assessment on (admittedly) only a few frustrating days, during my brief return to the public
service some seven or eight years ago, when internal bureaucratic exercises (that would obviously fail) sometimes took
up far more of the day than substantive policy work or work directed to supporting staff.
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The argument of this paper is that the use of current ICT technology makes it possible to build the
kind of knowledge base that is needed to allow horizontal and vertical issues to be managed in an
integrated, evidence-driven manner. In the social policy area, this knowledge base, when taken in
conjunction with the shift to the new set of enabling society policy instruments described in Chapter 2,
will allow quite dramatic improvements in governance in the foreseeable future.
Figure 12 uses the example of a training intervention to show why it was not possible to manage either
vertical or horizontal issues in a comprehensive evidence-driven manner given the data that are
available with service interventions based on pre-computer designs. Unfortunately there is a
temptation to make use of the limited data that does exist and this typically makes things worse. The
information base is much stronger with income support programming and these are typically much
better managed vertically, but not necessarily horizontally.
Figure 13 shows why the needed evidence will be available in enabling society where programming is
based on big statistics. Basically what happens is that the tailored-made micro information about what
is expected to work best that was discussed in Chapter 2 is applied internally to policy and program
governance. Both horizontal and vertical management can be supported by the same base of big
statistics. The ideal presented in the figure is not some artificial black box that automatically generates
the best solutions without human intervention. Rather it sets out the quite dramatic improvements that
could result from the use of ‘big statistics’. The figure assumes the use of technology that already exists
and is routinely used in other areas – and requires only the use of raw data that either now exists or
that could be produced without great cost over the next few years.
The ideal information base set out in Figure 13 could not be put in place in one quick step47. However,
it could provide a map of where we wanted to be in the longer term that would guide incremental
change over the coming years. Once in place that data could be the basis of a virtuous cycle of
evidence-driven governance. With the data needed for purposes of internal accountability and control
increasingly coming from the same data base, and being accessible in real time, there will be
increasingly less need for multiple reporting systems and for the deep fragmentation of overhead
functions that now exists. Similarly, functions such as evaluation48, audit and current performance
monitoring will gradually become collapsed as the same data can feed all these functions
simultaneously. The number vertical of layers between the top of an organization and its front line
staff can be reduced, again further reducing internal overhead functions.
Perhaps more fundamentally, the emerging ‘what works best’ information base will support both
internal governance decisions and decisions related to what will work best for the citizens who are
affected by the program. In other words, the same signals and citizen-centred values will reach public
servants at all of levels of the bureaucracy, gradually replacing the inward-looking control values that
47

Big governance reforms related to the enabling society, with its emphasis on hard evidence, should only be
introduced after the information base needed to support them is in place and tested. They should not be associated with
many big public service reforms of the past that were intended to improve to organisational structures, the levels where
decisions were taken or accountability arrangements – but that resulted in only small improvements (and often ones
that were subsequently reversed). Often their main effect was disruption, huge amounts of time devoted to writing new
job descriptions and procedures and to training on the new way of doing business, and still more internal reporting
burden.
48

For example, evaluation results, which today take highly specialized staffs many years to produce because they often
follow individuals for years after a program intervention, will be available automatically and real time as a result of
calculations of expected outcome which were, in turn, based on the rigorous methods developed by those in evaluation
discipline.
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Figure 12. Why evidence-driven governance was not possible with welfare state service programming
An evidence-driven system should provide measures that
support incentives and accountability arrangements which
are related to the real objectives of the various actors in the
system. However these actors have quite different roles to
play, with different, but overlapping objectives. Take the
example of a training program that uses employment
insurance funds to provide unemployed people with skills
that are in shortage:





There are three reasons why, in such a program, a
comprehensive evidence-driven approach could never work
given existing systems and data:







The objective of the government division that provides
the funding is to reduce the future costs of EI benefits.
The objectives of the overall employment department,
which has many programs in addition to this one, might
also include reducing unemployment rates and filling
skills shortages. Still higher order government objectives
might be cast in terms of competitive workforce and
combatting poverty and exclusion.
The individual being trained will have varying objectives
as well: finding a decent job quickly, increasing future job
stability, finding a job with hours that are compatible
with those of his or her spouse, or (for a recent
immigrant) finding a job in an area where people who
speak his or her native language live and work.
Suppose that the training is provided under contract to a
community college. The objectives of the specific teacher
might be cast in terms of the numbers of students who
graduate with the pre-defined skills as a percentage of
the numbers of students that were originally referred to
the trainer. Another would be to provide high quality
training, meeting the expectations of the students. The
college in question would have an immediate objective
of keeping within the costs called for in the contract.
However, it would likely have a higher order goal of
providing training that actually resulted in the new skills
being used in the labour market – in order to achieve its
own goals of making a difference in its community.
The government officials who designed the program
would have several objectives, including correctly
specifying the kind of skills to be received. The officials
who made the contract arrangements would have
overlapping objectives that included choosing the
training provider that would do the best job at least cost.
The employment counsellors or case workers who
referred the individual to the training would have still
other overlapping objectives including, for example, early
savings to employment insurance, satisfying the
expressed needs of the individual being referred and
making sure that all the training openings that had been
paid for were, in fact, filled.

The many employees in staff positions – such as
developing curricula, training the trainers, undertaking
the labour market analysis to determine which skills are
in shortage – will all have their own sets of objectives
and constraints that they must adhere to. Many of these
are system-wide such as ensuring service to the public in
both official languages and gender equity in hiring
practices.

1.

Only a small fraction of the needed information is
available, and that which does exist tends to deal with
inputs and immediate outputs. The available measures
are irrelevant to many actors and, to the extent they are
actually used to assess accountability or to provide
incentives, they distort the system away from its real
objectives and are treated (appropriately) with cynicism.

2.

Measures that relate to higher level outcomes (e.g.,
based on evaluations that examine the subsequent
effects of the intervention in the lives of those who were
trained) are rare and, when they do exist, come too late
to be of any use in assessing current performance.

3.

The measurement systems used by different partners are
not integrated. The example used here of the
government and the college was comparatively simple,
since a contract existed. The problem of measuring
whether objectives are being met is much more difficult
in the case of looser partnerships, where the various
parties are likely to have quite different hierarchies of
outcomes and outputs, ones that happen to overlap in
the particular project in question.

What is needed are highly detailed, but integrated measures
along the many different, but overlapping hierarchies of
inputs-processes-outputs-outcomes – to the point where
combinations of different measures can be tailored-made to
the individual objectives of the many actors involved.
The dominant trend in most welfare state thinking has,
however, been in the perverse direction of choosing a
minimal numbers of aggregate indicators in order to emulate
the profit bottom line that was thought to exist in the private
sector. Doing this ensures irrelevance, since there is no single
comparable bottom line in the training example and all actors
will invariably have multiple objectives. It also results in the
creation of separate, non-integrated reporting systems when
the main line management information system fails to deal
with the inevitable crises that arose or where new priorities
were set – miring the system in red tape and further
distorting incentives away from fundamental objectives.
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Figure 13. Why empirically-based governance will be possible in the enabling society
Figure 12 indicated three reasons why incentive structures
and accountability arrangements were not possible in
welfare state services programming designed in the precomputer age. All three obstacles will be overcome with
enabling society programming based on big statistics:






Comprehensive data will be available to construct
tailor-made sets of detailed input-process-outputoutcome hierarchies. See discussion below.
Data on high-level expected outcomes will be available
at the time decisions are made, with the data based on
systems that are continuously learning from past
experience.
All partners will be able to consistently compare their
own output-outcome hierarchy with those of other
partners since the basic data source used in
measurement will themselves be consistent – based on
the national system of big statistics. See discussion in
Chapter 6.

The ideal system
The horizontal and vertical dimensions of social
programming could be managed in an integrated, evidencebased manner if the following information were available.
First, micro information about those who use the program:
such as their incomes, employment, or skills as well as about
the factors that led to, or are associated with changes in
those characteristics. The data would show how the public
interventions used by the individual interacted with the
events and activities that occurred in the other domains of
life – in work, in the family, in the community, etc.
Second, micro information describing the public interventions
with measurements reflecting the following hierarchy of
inputs, processes, outputs and outcomes:


Inside a program, inputs would be measured (the costs
associated with the administration of the program,
including labour costs of direct delivery and associated
overhead costs) and processes (the techniques used to
transform inputs to outputs) would be described in a
standard way.



Each individual program would have a specific output
that corresponds to its immediate mandate. For
example, the output of a training program might be
cast in terms of numbers of graduates at specified skill
levels and their perceived satisfaction with the training
received.



These outputs could be fitted into one, or multiple,
outcome chains that are associated with policy
objectives along the lines indicated in Figure 12. These

would show how various programs work in combination
to achieve a range of policy objectives.
Third, a data base that integrates the two streams of data
above such that, for example, for each individual there would
be a record of the specific public interventions in which they
participated.
The feasibility of constructing such an information base
Much of longitudinal individual data in point 1 is currently
available or being developed in the statistical system, in tax
files, and in microsimulation models such as LifePaths.
Much of the program information in point 2 currently exists
in government administrative files and is increasingly being
used in calculations of this sort. As noted earlier, the biggest
gap is consistent process information about what happens
inside the black boxes of service interventions. An inputoutput-outcome hierarchy is already used, for example, by
the Government of Canada in its internal coding of
expenditures.
The combination of statistical and administrative data in
point 3 has already been piloted as seen in the example of
the ‘what works best’ information in Figure 1 (on page 18)
and Figure 2 (on page 21). Part 2 of this paper describes how
this ‘what works best’ example can become the normal way
of doing business.
The resulting shift to evidence-driven vertical and horizontal
decision-making
All the information needed for micro level vertical
management can be generated, and accessed, from the
same data base and in real time as decisions are being made
– including monitoring the uses of resources, assessing
efficiency, compliance with rules, quality of service delivery
and expected outcomes. Incentives would be based on real
measures of what is expected, and as would accountability
measures.
As well, consistent comparisons of these relationships can be
made across different programs, including those in different
jurisdictions, allowing performance to be assessed against
benchmarks.
Horizontal issues could be managed based on a detailed
understanding of the characteristics of the interventions that
might be joined-up and an understanding of the expected
success of the joined up activity. Cost and benefits could be
calculated for different options for programs taken in
isolation or in partnership with others – both from the
perspective of society as a whole and from the perspectives
of potential partners taken separately.
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now often govern day to day activities. In the welfare state, internal reform initiatives were typically
carried out independently of the content of the policies or programs that were being administered. The
coming of enabling society offers a wonderful opportunity to simultaneously reform both the content
of the programs and the way in which they are delivered – based on the same underlying measures and
values. There is real potential for a transformative simplification of bureaucracy.
A realignment where internal bureaucratic incentives and values directly reflect higher level policy
objectives – making a difference, building a better society – could eventually have powerful
consequences on the morale and productivity of public servants and, at the same time, could reduce
distrust between citizens and governments. It would be naïve to think that an integrated information
base could, by itself, lead us to a new utopia. Many other factors are obviously at play. Nevertheless,
the changes described in this paper suggest that governance in the enabling society could be much
healthier than that which exists today, in the dying years of the welfare state.

5.3. The changing roles of the main players: a new era of partnership
The last section dealt with governance issues within government. This section describes another
dimension of governance, the changing roles of the different actors within the social policy world,
including governments, citizens and a variety of third parties – and the changing ways in which these
actors communicate with each other.
The section will argue that there has been a rebalancing of the roles of citizen and state, with a larger
role for the citizen, as well as a comparable rebalancing between government and third parties in the
delivery of social policy. These changes signal a deeper transformation that is still to come.

A larger role for citizens
The larger role that citizens are expected to play in decision-making has already been discussed in
Chapters 2 and 3, where particular attention was placed on pensions and retirement decisions. Similar,
if smaller, shifts towards individual choice and responsibility have taken place in many areas of social
policy. For example, Canada has tax assisted savings that are intended to encourage/acknowledge
individual initiatives in a variety of areas. The extension of parental leave provisions and a number of
tax benefits are intended to support caregiving in the family. Matching grants and tax credits encourage
private charity. In long-term care, there has been a major shift towards support for independent living
with a larger role for family caregivers and the individuals themselves – and away from reliance on care
in publicly-supported institutions.
There will, of course, always be a balance between the collective role of society and the role of the
individual in dealing with social issues. The current trend can be seen as a corrective shift, following
the early days of the welfare state where there was a big swing towards the collective side of the
balance (i.e., all tax-payers, taken collectively and acting through government programs funded by
general revenues).
The new emphasis is often cast in fiscal terms and justified by the need to reduce government
spending. However, it also reflects trends in thinking about the whole range of the social policy goals
and values that were discussed in the last chapter. For example, the shift away from the almost
exclusive point-in-time perspective of welfare state programming and towards the asset-building,
lifecourse approaches of the enabling society necessitates a greater recognition of the contribution of
individuals themselves, with the state seen a more supportive role. A capacities approach along the
63

lines proposed by Sen necessarily puts the individual at the centre; personal freedom to develop ones
capacities is seen as an end in its own right – independent of (but largely consistent with) traditional
notions of social or collective well-being49.
The shift in the balance between the individual and state has taken place in most countries, but most
visibly so in the United Kingdom as outlined in Figure 14. The figure illustrates that the shift towards
individual responsibility and co-production was real there, but is still best described as incremental
rather than transformative. As well, it illustrates that what is really happening is not a simple shift from
the public to the private, but rather a blurring of the lines between the two. That blurring also involves
the relationship between governments and third party providers of social services50, as described next.
A more active role of citizens in social policy is often referred to as co-production, where individuals
are seen as active, equal partners in the design and delivery of the social programs in which they
participate. That is, co-production recognises the full range of resources available to people, including
their family and other social networks, their skills and particularly needs and aspirations and places
particular policy-based interventions within that broader context. Bourgon, in the book described in
Figure 11, provides several examples, including a Danish example of care giving for seniors51. In this
example, the seniors were treated as partners in determining their requirements for care. The results
were greater quality of life for the seniors, often involving less care than would be the case in a
traditional program and reduced cost. However, co-production of this sort is still quite rare, and is
difficult to put in place as a normal practice under traditional welfare state programming.
The term ‘co-production’ will likely soon become obsolete. In the enabling society, the terms
‘partnership’ or ‘citizen-centric’ will be more appropriate, for reasons that will be discussed shortly.

The balance between government and third party providers
The rebalancing of the roles of government and the individual that has just been discussed has its
counterpart in a rebalancing of the roles of government and of third parties in the design and delivery
of social interventions. They tend to go hand in hand, as in the UK ‘big society’ initiative referred to in
Figure 14.
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This stress on individual agency, as it is referred to in the literature, also causes headaches for those who wish to
measure social progress. There is no simple way of measuring empowerment, i.e., an individual’s freedom to choose
which capacities to develop. A paper by Alkira and Ibrahim (2007) discusses the conceptual challenges and the best
indicators that are currently available. Ideally, longitudinal data is needed but that does not currently exist. However,
reasonable proxies can be found by looking at different dimensions of empowerment, including subjective measures.
These include: control over personal decisions; the power to make choices (referred to as domain-specific autonomy
and household decision-making); and the ability to change aspects in one's life at the individual and communal levels.
It is unlikely that there will be any mature measurement capacity in this area until the ‘big statistics’ described in in
Part 2 of this paper are developed.
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A fuller treatment of this blurring would require a more extended analysis. For example, Burchardt (2013) points out
that there are three dimensions to the public-private balance: financing (by general taxation and by other means,
including by users and third parties); the provision of services (including directly by government, contracted out by
government, by the voluntary sector and by private provision); and the extent to which governments, individuals or
third parties decide on which provider is to be used and on the amount of services to be provided.
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Bourgon, (2011), pp 114 and 115.
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Governments have always relied on third parties to deliver social programs, including through public
institutions such schools or hospitals, through contracting with third parties in the non-governmental
sectors, or through a variety of grants and contributions to third parties whose activities support the
Figure 14. Evolving public and private roles: the U.K. example and the Child Trust Fund
Changes in public and private roles in social policy in the
United Kingdom have perhaps been the most dramatic and the
most watched in recent years.
In the period of the Conservative government of 1979-1997,
especially the Thatcher years, there was a highly visible effort
to reduce taxation and narrow the boundaries of the welfare
state, including privatization and making individuals
themselves more responsible for their own social well-being.

The short-lived (2003-2010) Child Trust Fund (CTF) is an
example the new breed of programming based on lifecourse
and asset-based concepts that is built around government
support for autonomous decision-making by individuals and
families. It is also an example of the risks of introducing
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dramatic new kinds of programming quickly – before the
needed information on likely outcomes can be developed
through experimental methods.

The Labour government that followed did not pursue the cutback agenda per se, but did introduce many reforms that were
consistent with the lifecourse, asset-building perspectives
which also emphasize the role of individuals both in financing
and in choosing the best mix of supports to meet their
individual and family circumstances. See the CTF example
below.

The CTF was an investment fund created for all children at
birth with the child being able to use the moneys in the fund
once over the age of 17 for any purpose, including further
education. The government contribution to the fund could be
topped up by parents. An important goal was to increase
financial literacy particularly about the importance of
lifecourse savings.

More recently still, in 2010, the current coalition government
in the UK has stressed the Big Society concept. In the ‘big
society’ (as opposed to ‘big government’) people will have
more say over planning decisions and voluntary groups will be
able to run public services. The goal is to ‘create a climate that
empowers local people and communities, building a big society
that will take power away from politicians and give it to
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people .

The CTF is an example of the increasingly blurred lines
between the public and private domains in social policy. An
assessment of program (Burchardt 2013) notes that

The public/private balance has changed significantly as a result
of these UK initiatives, although perhaps not as large as the
rhetoric suggested. Recent analysis (Burchardt 2013) indicates
‘that


In 2007/8, the ‘pure public’ category (i.e., tax-financed,
publicly provided services under public decision-making)
accounted for just under half (48%) of expenditure, which
was only slightly smaller than the corresponding
proportion in 1979/80 (52%).



At the other end of the spectrum, the ‘pure private’ (freemarket) category had grown from 24% of the total to 31%.



In-between, there were significant increases in contracting
out (private provision, public finance and decision) and
slight falls in voucher-type schemes (public finance,
private decision and either public or private provision).’
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The providers of the investment arrangements were all in
the non-public sector, but the largest providers were
mutuals (the UK term for non-profit organizations owned
by their employees or communities, often taking over
activities that were formerly run by government), so
classifying them as ‘private’ providers could be misleading.



The initial voucher that went into the fund when a child
was born was state-financed, but parents could make topups (private finance) which were themselves tax-free
(public finance).



The decision about which provider to use was the parents’
(private decision), but if parents failed to make a choice,
the state allocated the voucher to a particular provider on
their behalf (public decision).



Finally, the decision about how to use the fund was the
child’s (private decision), but when to use it was fixed in
legislation (not sooner than the child’s 18th birthday –
public decision).

The program did not change savings behaviour greatly among
low-income groups and was ended in 2010.

http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/407789/building-big-society.pdf
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The CTF had low take-up, savings and contribution rates among lower-income people, a key target group. It also
was costly and a likely cut in light of fiscal pressures. Prabhakar et al (2010)
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social policy goals of government. The newer trends are towards partnership arrangements and social
finance.
In the past most arrangements with organizations outside government were in the form of contracts,
contribution agreements or grants54. A newer type of arrangement, referred to as social finance,
attempts to mobilize private capital in order to achieve social goals. One approach is to support social
entrepreneurship (i.e., private sector companies that have a social agenda as well as producing goods or
services in the market), to provide various ‘pay for performance’ arrangements and to match private
financing with public funding, or devices with titles such as social impact bonds or social investment
funds55.
As described in the last section, there is currently little evidence to support the successful management
of horizontal activities that cross departments and jurisdictions within government. The evidence is
even weaker for horizontal activities that involve delivery by quasi-independent public bodies such as
colleges or hospitals – and worse still for horizontal arrangements that extend to the private sector
such as social finance or grants56.
It is for this reason that social finance and similar initiatives that require evidence-based horizontal
relationships are at the early stages of development and are treated as pilots or, ideally, as experiments.
For example, a recent social finance initiative by Employment and Social Development Canada
(ESDC) is explicitly being treated as being exploratory.

The enabling society: information flows and partnership
The roles of different actors in the system are considerably shaped by the communication channels
among them and the information that flows along these channels. In recent years, the main reforms by
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The distinctions refer to the extent to which the government funds are a tied to the government’s immediate
objective. For example, a contract might pay a private sector training organization or a college to provide specified
skills training for unemployment clients that were referred to it by, say, a government unemployment office. On the
other hand, a grant might be given to an organization to meet generally agreed goals, but with few strings on how the
funds are actually spent. The more recent trend is towards partnership agreements where the government shares the
cost of an initiative with organizations that have a shared objective. Examples include various local initiatives. A
recently announced Government of Canada job grant program would provide funds to an employer who trained people
in areas of skills shortages, with funding shared by employer in question and the two orders of government.
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The Social Research and Demonstrations Corporation (SRDC 2013) has produced a useful overview of different
types of social finance arrangements including an assessment of their strengths and the challenges they pose. The basic
conclusion is that they have potential for promoting a better alignment of the incentives of employers, providers,
governments and job-seekers. However there are very large challenges that will prevent social finance from becoming
a major part of the system for many years. Among these are regulatory challenges with respect to profit-seeking
activities by charitable organizations.
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Many years of experience with contribution agreements has shown that it is not possible to quantify the success of
social interventions in the absence of serious evaluations. Information from front line staff, external observers and
program participants is useful in assessing topics such as quality of service delivery. However, because they cannot
know what would have happened in the absence of the intervention they cannot assess the effectiveness of the
intervention. This is a particularly serious problem for pay-for-results arrangements since the immediate results, or
outputs, of many social programs often have little relationship with their higher level outcomes such as making a
difference in the subsequent lives of individuals. In the pre-computer world of welfare state programming, evaluation is
costly and its results are available only years after the fact. That is, they cannot be directly used in pay-for-performance
arrangements.

66

government have taken the form of e-Government initiatives where computer technology is used to
improve the flow of information among the main actors in the system.
When compared with original expectations, the results of e-Government initiatives have generally been
disappointing and costly. With only a few exceptions, all that has happened is that electronic tools have
been used to disseminate pre-existing information more broadly and to allow people to use the
internet to apply to pre-existing programs or to complete tax forms. This is useful without question,
but it amounts to doing things that have always been done in a more efficient way. A 2005 OECD
document57 reviewed the state of e-Government at that time. It argued that that future success in egovernment implies far deeper reforms across government than have been seen to date in the mainly
program-by-program approach that has been taken to computerization. A more recent OECD
document on m-Government58, referring to the use of mobile ICT technology, came to similar
conclusions, ones that mirror those of this paper.
The replacement for e-Government and m-Government will be a system that allows all actors in the
system to have access to exactly the same ‘what works best’ evidence that is used to support horizontal
activities within government as set out in Figure 13. That is, big statistics will create a new kind of
partnership relationship among citizens, governments, researchers, companies and a range of voluntary
organizations. All parties contribute information to the big statistics system. That information is
transformed within the system into anonymized new kinds of information. This new information is, in
turn, used by the different parties in real-time to improve the decisions that they are making in the
social and employment domains of life.
It will be a system based around partnerships. For example, in his or her relationship with the world of
social policy, the individual citizen becomes a full partner – not a customer or a client or a beneficiary.
Terms such as ‘co-production’ become obsolete, at least when the phrase is used narrowly to refer to
two-way arrangements that involve an individual and a public body. That is, in the enabling society, the
government’s role will often simply be the maintenance of the system of big statistics which the citizen
uses directly using tools that are as simple as those used in on-line shopping, with no direct ‘co-role’
for active government production in the sense of traditional training or caregiving interventions. In
other cases, the partnership arrangements will extend beyond individual-government relationships to
also include participation by families and non-government bodies.
Part Two of the paper discusses how this transformative system of big statistics can become a reality.
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An OECD study on the challenges of e-Government (OECD 2005c) describes progress that had been made and
analyses what needs to happen next, including basic changes in the governmental ‘back offices’, in ways of service
delivery and in measuring the business case for reform. One of its observations is that the path towards overcoming
internal silos has been inconsistent. Early attempts to provide common services and common business practices were
put off the rails in some cases by New Public Management reforms that worked in the direction of increased
decentralization and autonomy – i.e., fortifying the silos and the way in which they were communicated with the
public.
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OECD (2011c). In terms of policy formulation, this paper argues that the priorities are for governments to become
citizen-centric (which has not yet happened), for government to be restructured (to better with work with other actors)
and to have public services that are participatory, transparent and measurable (providing citizens with the capacity to
measure the outcomes and impacts of those services and to participate in their development.)
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PART 2. SMOOTHING THE TRANSITION
TO THE ENABLING SOCIETY
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6. A PRACTICAL STRATEGY FOR MOVING TO THE
ENABLING SOCIETY
If the argument of the paper is right, the shift to the enabling society is inevitable over the very long
run. The ICT technology on which it is based will be so pervasive and will have so many obvious
advantages that not using it is almost inconceivable. However, the transition has the potential for being
extended and tortuous.
The challenges are large. The ‘what works best’ designs of enabling society programs are radically
different from those in existence today and could not simply be introduced suddenly, without causing
great confusion and alarm – creating worries either that the existing social safety net was being
disbanded or, conversely, that big brother, cradle-to-grave programming was being imposed. A gradual,
experimental implementation strategy is needed, one that does not conflict with main programming
during the implementation period. In governance, existing organizational arrangements and processes
will need to be revamped. Many vested interests could be upset. More generally, the social policy
system currently lacks the consistent language and approaches to measurement that would be needed
to quickly shift a siloed approach into one that reflects empirically-based common interests.
These challenges could never be resolved through top-down big reforms. Especially in a federal
country such as Canada, the programs in questions are spread across different departments in different
jurisdictions. There is simply no body with the authority to impose top-down solutions. Nor could any
government succeed if it tried to impose a common empirically-based language on researchers in
different jurisdictions and disciplines. No government initiative could, or should, change the way in
which economists or sociologists see their worlds or attempt to change the language used to
communicate their findings.

A four-part implementation strategy
What is needed is a gradual implementation strategy that will build on those shared interests that do
exist. That strategy would set out a new narrative about what should happen in the future, a kind of
vision of the enabling society that will gain support and consensus. It would also set out a plan for
gradually moving us towards that vision in a non-threatening, consensus-building manner that resulted
in measurable payoff in the short- as well as longer-term. In Canada, this suggests a strategy based on
the following elements:
1.

Strengthening the system of national social statistics based on ‘big statistics’ principles.

2.

Developing a conceptual document that describes the end state to which the gradual
implementation is directed and that provides a common language to support both narrative and
quantitative communications that can be used in all the silos that comprise the world of social
policy and social analysis.

3.

Funding and evaluating small-scale experimental and demonstration projects.

4.

Building an open system of communication, consultation, and co-ordinated development based
on the elements above.
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Building a system of big social statistics
On the surface, it may seem perverse to propose using the national statistical system as a key tool for
transforming the entire world of social policy. At the best of times, statistics are supposed to support
policy-making, not lead it. Statistical planning is usually far away from the tables where Ministers make
policy decisions. At the worst of times – and some think that is where Canada now is – national social
statistics are seen by governments as costly, lacking relevance, and intrusive. While this diagnosis may
not be accurate, the next chapter will demonstrate that there is indeed a real problem with current
social statistics. However, it is a problem that can be fixed by shifting to a system of big statistics that
can produce the ‘what works best’ information discussed in Part One.
Many factors suggest that a shift to big statistics can, if well managed, accelerate and smooth the entire
transition to the enabling society. The next chapter explains the quite extraordinary benefits that will
occur. Here we simply note that everyone will gain, that there are no obvious sources of opposition or
resistance and that, at least in Canada with its central statistical agency, there is a potential governance
structure in place that can make the needed changes without infringing on the interests and mandates
of other organizations and without infringing on individual rights including the right to privacy.

Broad support for a shift to big statistics
The need for deep changes in the internal structure of national social statistics is well understood
among those within the statistical system. The changes involve replacing today’s pre-computer way of
structuring data according the source of that data (surveys, censuses and administrative files) with a
more flexible, user-oriented data base structure – one that makes far greater use of administrative data.
Background work has been underway for several years, both in Statistics Canada and Employment and
Social Development Canada (ESDC), in preparing for this shift to what this paper refers to as big
statistics.
The new approach to social statistics should also appeal to the governments that fund the collection of
social statistics. The transformed statistical system will be less intrusive and far more cost effective. It
will produce big fiscal savings. It will help in developing new and more innovative policy solutions, as
opposed to simply pointing out the faults of the dying welfare state policies. Governments are also
likely to welcome the fact that the main users of the transformed statistical system will be ordinary
citizens, and not only intermediaries such as researchers and interest groups.
Policy-makers and their advisors would certainly not welcome any suggestion that statistical planners
were implicitly dictating policy directions through their choices of data to collect. However, they would
welcome a system that would allow them to communicate their priorities to the statistical system in a
way that met both present needs and that supported the longer-term evolution of social policy in
agreed directions. The intellectual framework, described below, provides a tool that will make this
possible.
Finally, ordinary citizens and researchers alike will greatly welcome the highly practical ‘what works
best’ information that will be produced and made accessible in real time. Since knowledge is power, the
rights and freedoms of newly empowered individuals will be strengthened.

Gradual implementation
Further the task of shifting to a system of big statistics can be done incrementally. For that to happen
there will need to be a master plan that describes the future end state structure of the new statistical
system. With an agreed end state in place, existing data can be adjusted so that it continues to meet
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existing needs and also fits into its new place in the new system. Similarly, new research initiatives and
the collection of new administrative data can similarly be designed to simultaneously fit into the new
end state structure as well as meeting the immediate research or administrative purpose.

The conceptual framework
The second element of the strategy is the development of a conceptual framework that will fill several
functions. One of these will be to provide the ‘end state’ map of the new system of big statistics that
was just discussed and that simultaneous describes the end state of the policies and programs
themselves – that is, the long-term direction towards which the system is evolving as a result of a large
number of independent initiatives. Both goals can be met since the boundaries of the new system of
big statistics will be very close to the boundaries of the content of social policy itself.
Such a framework can provide a common set of words and numbers that can be used in an integrated
way in policy analysis, in program design, and in all aspects of planning and accountability in the social
policy area. If well designed, it can support analysis and consultations related to both existing welfare
state policy and the new enabling society policies. It would allow policy-makers and analysts to
communicate their priorities to those in the statistical system in a practical, operational manner – and
allow statisticians and analysts to more effectively communicate their quantitative findings to those in
the more narrative worlds of policy-makers and ordinary citizens.
Canada has already taken a lead in developing such a framework. It is known as the Olivia framework
and is described at length in Chapter 8.
It is a ‘behind the scenes’ framework showing how all parts of the social system are inter-related. It
would be of interest to experts but would not necessarily be visible to ordinary citizens or even to
people in the policy community. All that would be seen are a set of consistently defined words and
numbers that they could use in an integrated manner when discussing social policy topics. So, while the
framework itself would not require broad support, its result in the form of a consistent, simple social
policy language would be generally welcomed. Experts would certainly not welcome an attempt to
unilaterally impose a new conceptual framework on their disciplines, but they would welcome a
common language to communicate their statistical needs to the statistical system and their findings to
the policy makers. The Olivia framework has been carefully designed to be consistent with the existing
language used in various academic disciplines and to support, not conflict with, a wide range of social
and economic theories. It is a descriptive framework only, not a replacement for different theoretical
structures.
The implementation strategy calls for the ongoing development of the Olivia framework and for using
it as a way of integrating the three other elements of the strategy.

Experimental and demonstration projects
The third element of the implementation strategy would be a relatively modest initiative to fund and
learn lessons from selected experiments and demonstrations. Its practicality and reasonably quick
results would be a happy complement to the more theoretical and analytic themes of the big statistics
and conceptual framework components of the strategy.
This is an area where Canada has many advantages. The infrastructure to do this well already exists
particularly in the government of Canada and with bodies such as the Social Research and
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Demonstration Corporation59. As well, the existence of programing that involves both federal funding
and provincial and territorial delivery is ideally suited to an experimental approach, allowing learning by
comparing the results of different initiatives in different provinces and territories60. Federal-provincialterritorial labour market agreements are already in place that should facilitate this kind of initiative.
The overall project could consist of funding a number of different kinds of initiatives that were directly
related to the transition to the enabling society, including different approaches to delivering services
and information products, or to exploring different research tools. The payoffs from developing the
‘what works best’ capacity described in Chapter 2 would be particularly high – including both ‘what
works best’ ALMPs and the interactive, real-time provision of information directly to citizens. Further,
the payoffs from these would be visible quite quickly, within a few years61.

The consultation processes
The final element of the strategy calls for making some minor adjustments to a number of consultative
streams that would be taking place in any event. The goal would be to build broad understanding of the
many benefits that would result from a smooth transition to the enabling society and to encourage
cooperative action on multiple fronts. The adjustment in question would simply be to use the
terminology of conceptual framework in each consultation and to explicitly show how the consultation
streams were working in harmony. The result could be a virtuous circle with conceptual thinking,
practical policy-making and statistical planning evolving in a more rational, harmonious way, cutting
across existing silos.
In one of the proposed consultative streams, a federal department with a large, cross-cutting social and
labour mandate such as ESDC would use the language of the conceptual framework in its routine
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The government of Canada has long experience in funding such innovative exercises, and in monitoring their
success. A program called ‘Innovations’, established by the ESDC predecessor in the 1980s, had similar objectives and,
through a series of intermediate steps, was transformed in the Social Research and Demonstration Corporation, a notfor-profit world-leading organization that conducts social experiments. Employment Insurance has often been used as a
means of funding innovative approaches that could shorten the time spent in receipt of employment insurance benefits.
On the research side, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC), the federal granting council, has
taken a lead in, for example, funding networks related to lifecourse research.
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The Government of Canada’s contribution would consist of funding, technical expertise and most of data used in the
‘what works best’ calculations, which comes from federal tax and employment insurance administrative data. The
provincial and territorial governments must necessarily be involved in those initiatives that involve service delivery.
Successful initiatives could have high payoff both to the federal employment insurance program and to
provincial/territorial social assistance programming. There would be no need to impose artificial ‘national standards’ on
these initiatives; a diversity of approaches would be an asset. As well, there would be no need to include provinces and
territories who did not wish the join initially; it would be simpler to start on a smaller scale.
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Several readers of earlier drafts of this paper questioned the almost exclusive emphasis on funding practical projects
with short-term as well as long-term payoffs. For example, the failure to identify additional SSHRS funding for
independent academic research was noted, as was any mention of investment in badly needed longitudinal surveys. The
author is convinced that these are important. However, the priorities for establishing which research and which
longitudinal surveys should arise from the normal process of consultation and decision-making that takes place in these
areas – and the proposed strategy would greatly strengthened these channels of consultation. Moreover, the spirit of the
enabling society is one where decisions are based on evidence. It seems best to start with projects where there would be
clear evidence of payoffs in the medium-term, including net saving to government treasuries. For example, longitudinal
data is obviously critical – but that new question will be how longitudinal surveys will fill gaps left by administrative
data (the main source of longitudinal data in the future) and how such surveys will support the ‘what works best’
information needs of individuals. It will take time to develop thoughtful proposals along these lines.
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consultations related to the various social programs and policies for which it was responsible, in its
collaborative arrangements with its provincial and territorial partners, in its dealings with researchers
outside the department and in its internal plans to use its own administrative data for statistical and
analytic purposes. The framework itself could be invisible in these consultations; it would simply
provide a consistent terminology.
Similarly, the terminology of the framework would be used in consultations related to priorities for the
new experiments and ‘what works best’ pilots described above – and in reporting on the lessons
learned from these initiatives. If the terminology of the framework did not fit well with these
applications, it would be adjusted accordingly. That is, the framework would evolve in line with cutting
edge thinking about better policy instruments.
A third strand would be consultations about priorities for the content of the new system of big social
statistics. These could be supplemented by a parallel stream of more technical consultations dealing
with the mechanics of measurement and the further evolution of the conceptual framework.

Next steps and the need for leadership
A strategy along the lines proposed – better statistics, a conceptual framework, funding pilot work, and
making adjustments to consultations that would be taking place in any event – might be seen as overly
modest, given the large payoffs that will result from a quick transition to the enabling society.
However, all that is really needed, or possible, is a nudge to provide more coordinated and speedier
action in areas where change would eventually take place in any event.
This nudge will, however, require leadership. Someone must be in charge of making sure that the four
elements of the proposed implementation strategy will be maintained over time and will work in
coordination. There needs to be a voice at a senior level advocating a smooth transition to the enabling
society.
The next step is therefore to identify the way in which that leadership can be manifest. An outside
paper such as this cannot make recommendations for detailed work plans or governance arrangements.
However, some possibilities are obvious.
First, the leadership must come from government since three of the elements of the implementation
strategy (big statistics, experiments and consultations) all involve government instruments. A think tank
or academic consortia could help develop the intellectual framework, but the framework would have to
be fully integrated with the other streams. Within government, the federal government has most of the
tools including the responsibility for national statistics. It would have to be heavily involved. However,
a province could make headway on some topics and lead by example. Indeed, a lead by one or two
provinces, with support from the Government of Canada in areas such as data sharing, technological
expertise and the cost sharing of experimental initiatives, would be an almost ideal first step. Labour
market agreement are already in effect and, presumably could be readily adapted to this new purpose.
Joint federal-provincial-territorial leadership would be a theoretical possibility, but in reality a project
that required consensus and active leadership from fourteen separate jurisdictions would make little
sense – although such a body could play an important advisory or steering role.
Within the Government of Canada, the obvious players are Statistics Canada, ESDC and a central
agency. The UK has used the central agency route with some success, with the cabinet office playing a
key role in exercises of this sort. ESDC has a wide social and employment mandate and, in the past,
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has played a leading role in many of the areas discussed in this paper. It also has programming that
could be used to fund the ‘what works best’ pilots. Statistics Canada must necessarily be involved and
could play the lead role in matters related statistical planning and the development of the conceptual
framework – although it might be good strategy for Statistics Canada to play the role of responding to
the demands of other for new kinds of statistics, rather than being the initiator of those demands.
ESDC could take the lead, although it would also be important to have a coordinated transition in
other departments such as those dealing with health, immigration, and public safety. That may suggest
a leadership role in a central agency, but strongly supported by ESDC and by Statistics Canada.
Alternatively, some form of ad hoc arrangement, such a special commission or task force could be
established to provide leadership over the first several years of the transition – to get things rolling.
Again it would be supported by ESDC, Statistics Canada and others. It might have a modest budget in
order to fund the experimental development stream, to further develop the conceptual framework, and
to manage some of the consultation exercises. An ad hoc body such as this might have greater
credibility with the provinces and academic community, as opposed to direct leadership by a federal
department. This would be especially so if there was some form of governing or advisory board that
included provincial/territorial and academic representation. As well, an ad hoc body could avoid
concerns that might arise from the public. As has been noted several times, the enabling society will be
beneficial for those at all points along the values/political spectrum – but, if overly politicized at the
outset, its inherent neutrality could be misconstrued.
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7. BIG STATISTICS: THE TECHNOLOGY OF THE
ENABLING SOCIETY
The strategy for accelerating the transition to the enabling society places heavy weight on the role of
the system of national social statistics as a key agent of change. Such a central role for statistics needs
further explanation since we are allegedly living in an era where research-based evidence is given low
weight in policy-making and where national statistics are under attack.
Section 7.1 examines the strength and weaknesses of the current base of social statistics, with a view to
distinguishing real from perceived weaknesses.
Section 7.2 describes the changes that are already underway to make social statistics more relevant.
Section 7.3 describes the structure of the new system of big social statistics that will eventually emerge.
Section 7.4 concludes by summarizing how the use of big statistics will transform social policy.

7.1. Social statistics today: useful but losing policy relevance
Everyone applauds policies that have been designed based on evidence of what is likely to work best,
and that have proved to work based on evidence of their results. However, at least in Canada, doubts
have been expressed about the extent to which national social statistics can provide that evidence. At
times, policy-makers do not appear to be even interested in the evidence that exists. Cutbacks to both
surveys and censuses and to social research based on those statistics have become a dominant theme.
A number of factors lie behind this seeming paradox. The good news is that existing statistically-based
evidence is, rhetoric notwithstanding, heavily used in policy-making today – although those uses are
not always visible to the public. Further, as will be discussed, the demand for relevant evidence is
strong. The problem is that the existing statistical base was developed for a different era and is
becoming increasingly less relevant to today’s needs.

Statistical evidence is used, but those uses are not always visible
Statistical evidence is used extensively throughout the policy cycle as described in Figure 15. However,
it plays a relatively smaller role at the most visible and crucial stage of the policy cycle, the stage when
politicians make final decisions. This smaller role has been interpreted cynically, namely that decisions
are taken on grounds of political expediency or values, even if the evidence clearly points in another
direction. That has not been the experience of this author. In his understanding, evidence is nearly
always used in decision-making when it is relevant. The problem is that, all too often, relevant statistical
evidence is missing. The Canadian debates about the introduction of early learning and childcare62
shown at bottom of Figure 15 provide an example.
62

The most recent such debates took place in period from 2004 through 2007 and involved dropping a plan for federal
financial support for early learning and childcare that had been negotiated with some provinces in favour of an
allowance directed to mothers and adjustments to federal/provincial/territorial financial arrangements. The government
changed during this period with incoming Conservative government favouring a different approach to both the
substance of child care policy and in dealing with provinces than had the outgoing Liberal government. During most of
this period, the present author was Assistant Deputy Minister of policy of the federal department concerned.
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Figure 15. Uses and limitations of evidence at different stages of the policy cycle
Identifying social issues that may require action
The initial stage of the policy cycle involves examining the
extent to which social problems are becoming more or less
severe. Here a range of social indicators are routinely used and
much effort has gone into their improvement. Most indicators
today are based on cross-sectional readings that are repeated
at regular intervals, such as monthly unemployment rates.
Assessing the effects of possible government interventions
At this stage, an assessment is made of the extent to which
different types of government interventions might make things
better or worse. This stage is also well supported by
quantitative evidence. ‘What if’ modelling is a common tool.
These are cross-sectional models that can predict the costs of a
possible program design and its immediate consequences in
terms of gains to society and numbers of individual winners
and losers. They typically do not take account of the effects of
any longer-term changes in behaviour that may result from the
intervention.
Assessing the support for possible interventions
A parallel assessment of the acceptability of various policy
alternatives in different population groups is often carried out,
using opinion surveys and focus groups – often by the political
side of government.
Choosing among policy and program options
Choosing among the options that are open, and explaining why
that decision was taken, is the most visible stage of the policy
cycle. It also the stage where value judgments typically play a
more critical role than empirical evidence. For example,
analysis at earlier stages of the policy cycle typically finds that
many potential solutions would not be effective or efficient.

Such options are typically taken off the policy agenda. Most of
the alternative actions that do reach the political level for final
decisions are those where the empirical evidence does not
point to only one policy solution and where values and political
judgement must necessarily play important roles in decisionmaking
Designing operational systems
Modelling and benchmarking sometimes provide evidence that
is used in the design of practical service delivery systems.
Behavioural economics, experimentation and feedback loops
are starting to play a role. However, for the most part,
program designs today are simply adaptations of pre-computer
age designs that were put in place a half century ago. The kind
of evidence-driven, self-learning designs discussed in Chapter 2
are still rare.
Monitoring and evaluation
Quantitative analysis is heavily used in monitoring the
operations of programs – as indicated by the mountains of
reports produced, if seldom read.
Empirically-based audits reach a wider audience, although that
may not be immediately welcomed by the government of the
day.
Evaluation of outcomes is based on a strong empirical
methodology and is currently the best way of obtaining ‘what
works best’ information. However the results are usually
produced too late to be useful. Findings are often available
only after the program in question has ended or been
significantly revised. The real payoff will come in the future
when the ‘what works best’ techniques of evaluation are used
to calculate expected outcomes in real time.

Early learning and childcare: an example of the limits of empirical information when key policy choices
are made at the political level
Canadian policy debates about childcare provide an example of
the strengths and weakness of existing empirical evidence.
From the perspective of this paper, this is a particularly
interesting case study since it involves a critical lifecourse issue
that was discussed in Part One. As well, the statistical evidence
in question was based on longitudinal human development
research – exactly the sort of evidence that the paper has
argued will be key to the evolution of the enabling society.
Advocates of high quality child care with universal coverage
used lifecourse evidence to support their case, namely
research which showed that high quality childcare is associated
with positive outcomes, especially for low-income families
where the quality of care is currently low (Japel et al 2005).
Yet the reality was that, in the actual policy discussions at the
national level, none of the proposals on the table were
remotely rich enough to allow the creation of a universal

system of high quality childcare over the medium term.
That is, the research did not directly address the real issue on
the table, namely the balance between high coverage and high
quality over a very extended development period.
Nor was the research relevant to the views of those who saw
expanded childcare not in its role in human development but
rather in its role as a way of providing a form of ‘family
allowance’ aimed at supporting mothers.
In summary, the evidence was useful in the early stages of
examining the possible need for policy action and even in
some aspects of the design of policy alternatives. However, it
was not useful at the later and more important (and public)
stages of choosing among practical alternatives; here decisions
were based, necessarily in the circumstances, on political
judgement.
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Statistical evidence is losing relevance
The argument to this point it that there is a demand for good empirically evidence at all stages of the
policy cycle. Data will be used when it is relevant. The worrying trend is that, when taken as a whole,
national statistics are becoming less relevant. They have not been keeping up with the evolving
expectations for social policies that were described Part One. For example:


Most statistical data today are cross-sectional in character, as opposed to the longitudinal
lifecourse approaches that will be needed in the future.



They deal primarily with transactions and flows, as opposed to an integrated approach that takes
account of both flows and assets, such as financial and human capital.



Most analysis is still based on pre-grouped aggregate data, rather than the micro data needed for
finely-grained analysis and individually-tailored ‘what works best’ data.



Most statistical data are obtained from surveys and censuses and, with a few notable exceptions,
ignores the potential richness of administrative sources of data.



Most statistical information today describes what happened in the past, only a month ago in the
case of employment statistics, but often a year or more in the past – or much longer in the case
of information about the subsequent effects of programs as determined by traditional
experiments and evaluations. What is needed is information in real time that can be used when
decisions are being made.



Most current analysis is directed to examining a limited number of characteristics in a single
domain of life, such as employment. What is needed is analysis that looks at combinations of
characteristics and activities, including those arise in different domains of life such family,
community, employment and school.



Statistical data operate in separate silo from qualitative research which is needed for policy to be
attuned to the richness and diversity of everyday life.



The tools for using statistics are designed for governments and researchers, not citizens.

The data that exist today were designed for use in the decades when the welfare state was being put in
place and fine-tuned. Today, as we are shifting away from welfare state perspectives to enabling society
perspectives, analysis based on existing statistics seems to be embellishing old stories, without much
current relevance apart from justifying positions taken on other grounds.

The statistical system today: a bystander in the information age
Part One explained that welfare state programming was based on pre-computer technology and was
supported by statistical information that was similarly developed before the information age. Social
statistics are losing relevance because they still reflect those origins. The structure of contemporary
statistical systems today remains about the same as it was in the pre-computer age. We do the same old
things, although much faster and in much more detail.
For example, social statistics are still mainly drawn from the same sources: cross-sectional surveys and
censuses. The underlying data are still planned, structured and accessed in the same way: survey by
survey, and census by census. Analysis has become more sophisticated but is still mainly based on precomputer techniques – either based on tabulated, aggregate numbers (often time series of point-in-time
readings such as unemployment rates or the incidence of sickness, crime or poverty) or on regression
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and related analyses that can probe the relationships among these point-in-time readings. Users can
now access rich statistical information quickly over the internet but, for the most part, the data that are
accessed are similar to that which have appeared in print publications for decades.
Even much of the explicit demand for new data is based on pre-computer assumptions. For example,
the recent Drummond report on labour market information in Canada63 which, reflecting the views of
people it consulted, identified a set of data gaps that were about the same as those that were identified
a half century ago64. The very fact that the focus was on filling gaps is telling; the gaps are those that
exist in a system developed in the pre-computer age – and the solutions suggested are, unsurprisingly,
mainly extensions of those pre-computer technologies. There is not even a hint of the kind of solution
that makes use of current information technology such as the ‘what works best’ information discussed
in Chapter 2.

7.2. The system is evolving
The last section provided a snapshot of the current state of social statistics when taken as a whole.
However it was perhaps too pessimistic in that it ignored a number of important steps that have been
taken to move the statistical system into the information age – to produce information that can support
enabling society policies.
The earlier pilot work on ‘what works best’ information has already been discussed. New longitudinal
surveys have been developed to supplement the traditional point-in-time perspective of welfare state
policies, as has a potentially powerful microsimulation capacity, although neither appears to have high
priority in terms of continuing budgets. Statistics Canada and ESDC have started using knowledge
planning approaches that take a cross-vehicle perspective. While Canada lags behind many other
countries, including the United States, in the use of administrative records for statistical purposes,
development work is underway on these fronts as well, but with relatively low visibility65.
The coming years are likely to see even larger changes on three inter-related fronts.
First will be the shift to the ‘what works best’ data described in Part one. Eventually this kind of data
will be the main product of the system of social statistics, with key uses in research and analysis, and at
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Advisory Panel on Labour Market Information (2009)
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The present author has direct experience with these pre-computer discussions. He started his career in the Labour
Division of the then Dominion Bureau of Statistics (now Statistics Canada) in the mid-1960s when punch cards and
mechanical calculators were the dominant technology. The discussions that he participated in some 45 years ago on
ways of filling gaps in labour statistics were eerily similar to those that he hears today when he is occasionally asked to
participate in similar discussions. These include filling gaps related to job vacancies, finely-coded industrially-based
occupational data, job turnover and labour market dynamics, identification of skill shortages and the need to integrate
skill and occupational concepts.
65

For example, tax records have been used for many years within government for statistical purposes. A search of
Statistics Canada’s web site related to record linkage approvals shows a large increase in the use of a wide variety of
administrative files for statistical purposes. For example, a Longitudinal Workers File has been recently constructed to
examine employment dynamics. It is a 10 percent random sample of all Canadian workers, with longitudinal data going
back to 1983 – constructed by integrating data from four sources: the Record of Employment files of ESDC (on worker
separations), the T1 and T4 files of the Canada Revenue Agency, and the Longitudinal Employment Analysis Program
(which in turn is created using administrative data).
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all stages of the policy cycle. Most important, real-time uses of this data directly by citizens will become
the primary audience for social statistics66.
Second, the boundaries of the national social statistics system will expand to encompass most of the
social data that will exist, including data from many administrative sources arising in many jurisdictions
that are currently not used for statistical purposes. There will, of course, always be separate data bases
about programs that are held by the agency responsible for that program and used for internal
administrative and monitoring purposes. However, much of the data in those separate data bases will
also be fed, often in an adjusted form, into the national statistical system67.
Third is the shift to ‘big statistics’ – the new way in which data drawn from both administrative and
survey sources are organized and analysed. This a technical topic, but one that has enormous potential.
Big statistics will result in real improvements in the lives of citizens. They will change the way in which
governments interact with citizens. They will allow the transformative shift to the enabling society
policies described in Part One. The power of big statistics is, however, largely unknown in social policy
circles. Accordingly the next section will provide a kind of laymen’s guide.

7.3. The characteristics of the new system of big social statistics
The phrase ‘big statistics’ is an analogy to the recent growth of analysis based on ‘big data’ that involves
searching enormous data sets – such as all the data found on Facebook or data sets related to genomes
or meteorology – in order to produce new, meaningful information. In 2012, for example, the United
States government launched a $200 million initiative68 to ‘improve the tools and techniques needed to
access, organize, and glean discoveries from huge volumes of digital data [in order to] to help solve
some the Nation’s most pressing challenges.’ New, and increasingly user-friendly, tools for analysing
big data sets are becoming available from companies such as Google.
Big statistics is the next stage of evolution, building on big statistics but moving far beyond big data in
terms of social policy implications and making a transformative difference in people’s lives69.
66

Almost certainly there will be initial resistance to having ‘what works best information’ produced by the same
organization that produces traditional national statistics. On the surface, the two seem to have quite different audiences
and to rely on different data sets. And yet, in the future, exactly the same data will feed both types of uses. The
underlying methodologies used (sampling, data cleaning, modelling, the task of integrating data from different survey
and administrative sources, etc.) are essentially the same. Especially in a federal country such as Canada where data
sources come from different orders of government, the new system will require the privacy protection, professional
competence and perceived political neutrality that can be best provided by an organization such as a national statistical
agency that is separated, at least to some extent, from the day-to-day operations of government. In the longer-term,
some form of organizational integration seems inevitable.
67

An anonymous reviewer of an earlier draft of this paper provided a useful reminder that many academics are
sceptical about the speed with which administrative data are likely to replace survey and census sources as the main
source of national social statistics. Most of the use of administrative data has been taking place within government
where privacy risks can be most effectively managed; academics have struggled to get any access to this kind of data.
Inside government, only moderate priority has been attached to this kind of activity and, at current rates of progress, it
will take some time before the changes described in this section will be implemented. However every sign suggests that
there will be an explosion in the use administrative data over the next decade.
68

White House 2012.

69

Big data (such as searching for key words in internet usage) can supplement big statistics in applications such as
marketing the need for new programs or monitoring awareness of existing initiatives.
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As with big data, big statistics draws its information from many discrete data sets. However, big
statistics are different in the sense that all the data which enter the system are consistently described
with a resulting data base that is highly integrated. This allows extremely rich analysis and the creation
of quite new types of information. This section describes how this integration is achieved and the
resulting payoffs.

The structure of big statistics: the honeycomb analogy
Today, policies and programs are supported by a series of largely independent data sources. Statistical
agencies mainly draw on their own the surveys and censuses. Program administrators use data collected
as part of the operation of their programs. Separate reporting systems are often established to support
accountability initiatives. Some attempt is made to ensure comparability across these various data sets
through use of common concepts and definitions to the extent possible, but most analysis is done
using a single data source or a limited number of comparable sources.
In the enabling society, in contrast, the use of new ICT technology will allow us to plan, store, and
analyze micro data (i.e., data about particular individuals or organizations) drawn from many sources in
an integrated way. While actual systems designs will be more efficient than this, for purposes of
exposition it is simplest to envision a future where there will be a giant warehouse that contains all
available data that are of even potential interest to social policy, regardless of their source. This data
base will be much larger than anything we have today and will be mainly fed from administrative data
sources, although traditional surveys and censuses will continue to play an important, if somewhat
different role.
A beehive analogy is useful in thinking about the structure of the new social data base. The data base
structure consists of a huge number of originally empty honeycomb cells – each cell representing a tiny
bit of potentially useful social data, say the employment status of one specific individual on a specific
day.


Each such cell has a unique identifier, consisting of the concepts and definitions that describe the
variable in question – the labour force survey definitions of employment and unemployment in
this case.



There would be separate cells for all Canadians, for every day of their life70, with many thousands
of variables for each individual each day (including the characteristics of the workplace she
worked in, or the activities in classroom where she attended school, her own demographic and
family characteristics and the characteristics of the dwelling where she lived and of her
neighbourhood).



There would always be enough cells so that they could be accumulated to create every piece of
actual data that might be useful, including the all-important variables that allow the lifecourse
analysis discussed in the next chapter.

70

An hour, rather than a day, might be more appropriate in this example, since time allocation during a 24 period plays
an important role in some social statistics. Note again that the beehive is an analogy only; actual computing systems
would have far more efficient designs than suggested by the analogy. For example, there would likely be separate but
inter-related data bases relating to individuals, to firms and other institutions, and to geographic entities. Nor would
redundant data be recorded. For example, data of birth would only need to be recorded once, not for every day of life.
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Of course, information from actual surveys, censuses and administrative records could fill only a small
fraction of these empty cells with real data – the honey in our analogy. The question is how to fill as
many cells as possible with accurate data in an efficient manner.


Many cells can be filled from administrative sources, increasingly so as administrative data is
cleaned and adjusted for uses in statistical uses applications and as many programs will
themselves make use of ‘what works best’ statistics in their internal operation.



Surveys and censuses will fill many other cells – increasingly to fill gaps in the administrative
sources and increasingly to provide independent control totals and overlaps as discussed below71.



Many more cells can be filled by automatic imputation. For example, if information about a
certain characteristic is available only annually, a daily equivalent can sometimes be automatically
assigned to each day of the year. The characteristics of a neighbourhood can be imputed to all
who live in that neighbourhood and the characteristics of a workplace can be imputed to all who
work there.



In many cases the actual data will be missing or will not meet the exact specification set out in
descriptor of the vacant cell to which it is destined – for reasons of sampling and other errors or
slight difference in the concepts used. In many cases the missing data can be imputed, and
erroneous data cleaned, using sophisticated computerised techniques.



In still other cases, it may be possible to impute data that were not collected in any of the source
material, again as described below.

The cells in the honeycomb or data base will require two kinds of descriptors: a description of the
holding cells and description of the data that are entered into those holding cells.
All cells, whether empty or containing actual data that have been collected, would be described in terms
of the concepts and definitions that should ideally apply to the data in that cell – or that may eventually
be in that cell. A conceptual framework, discussed in the next chapter will show how each cell is
conceptually related to all other cells.
The other set of descriptors would refer to the actual data element that is placed in the cell. It would
include its source and quality, including any imputation techniques that were used.

The miracle created by duplication, overlaps, partial data and control totals
We typically think of duplication in negative terms, a symptom of inefficiency and a source of
unnecessary response burden. That does not apply in the new social data base which will automatically
have many sources of duplicate or overlapping data, and others can be deliberately added. Figure 16
provides examples. Duplication, overlaps and control totals can be used to impute missing data, correct
erroneous data and, in some cases, even create quite new data that did not exist on any one of the
source files – the miracle referred to in the heading.
71

That is, survey data would be increasingly used as a complementary way to supplement administrative data or census
data. For example, data from adult literacy surveys would be imputed onto employment insurance and social assistance
files, or student files, or small area census data -- in order to better understand the supply and demand for generic skills
and how these relate to specific occupational skills in different industries, occupations and localities. Work in this area
is well launched the Canadian company DataAngel (http://www.dataangel.ca/). Also note that the content of survey
data is likely to expand considerably over time as suggested by the lengthy listing of capabilities found in Figure 7.
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… role in quality control
Duplicate or partly duplicating data from different sources act as built-in quality controls and can be
used to create new data. If data coming from different sources are conceptually identical but differ in
reality, then we know that there is a problem with quality of one or both of these sources. Examples
Figure 16. Examples of useful overlaps, duplication and exogenous control totals
Stocks and flows: Separate data holding cells will exist for data
on both stocks and flows. The two are completely
reconcilable, conceptually.


For example, if we take one’s stock of financial assets in
one period of time and add to it net financial flows
(income minus expenditures), the result equals the stock
of financial assets at the next point in time.



Similarly, our human capital (measured in terms of skills)
at one period of time is the same as that at the next
period of time, if one adds the skills acquired in the
intervening period and subtracts the skills lost during that
same period through lack of use.



The stock and flow notions can be built into most aspects
social data – even including data on values and perceived
well-being. This is discussed in the next chapter.

Individuals and institutions: In a fully mature system, there
will be separate data bases for families, firms, associations,
classrooms and other social groups. These will overlap the
database that holds individual data.








That is, while some characteristics of organizations (such
as sales or profits in the case of firms) can only be
described at the level of the institution taken as a whole,
other elements are the simple aggregation of the
characteristics of the individuals that comprise those
groupings (such as its employees) – with the data about
the latter conceptually overlapping the data in the
individual database.
As another example, overlapping data can be collected
from schools and from the students who attend those
schools (or their parents).
As well as a conceptual overlap, there are often
overlapping sources of actual data. For example, data
about various aspects of a person’s job are provided by
the individuals themselves (e.g., from the Census or
Labour Force Survey), and by the employers (e.g., from
the Survey of Employment Payrolls and Hours – and are
also provided to the tax system.
The social data base of the future will have separate dataholding cells for all these overlapping sources – as well as
the means for showing how they can be reconciled.

Overlapping data from individuals and government
programs. In exactly the same way, government programs can
be described, in part, by aggregating up the characteristics of
program beneficiaries and contributors (obtained through
individual information on the administrative records of the
program – or from evaluative surveys). In part, however,
programs can be described only at the level of the program as
a whole (such as measures related to the efficiency of delivery
or the extent to which program objectives were being met).
Overlaps between individual and spatial data. The same
principle applies to spatial analysis, but in an even richer
manner.


The characteristics of a neighbourhood, or city or province
or country can be determined, in part, by adding up the
characteristics of the individuals who live in those spaces.



Still other spatial characteristics can come from
aggregating up the characteristics of the institutions that
comprise those spaces (e.g., economic data from firms,
data on patients from doctors and hospital).



Still others (such as crime rates, pollution, and
accessibility of services) can only be determined at the
level of the geographic area taken as a whole.

National Accounts overlap. As will be seen in Chapter 8, our
proposed social data base will include a way of capturing
economic transactions (and approaches to economic stocks
and flows) that is identical to that used in the national
accounts – enabling full linkages to the double entry
bookkeeping tools of reconciliation and analysis that are the
strength of the modern accounts.
Time-based accounting: An even more powerful tool of
reconciliation and analysis is time-based accounting where
activities must add to the 24 hours a day. The framework
discussed in Chapter 8 captures all of the benefits of 24-hour
accounting – and adds to them by also incorporating lifecourse
analysis where the total of all life trajectories must add up to
an individual’s life span.
Instrument-based overlaps: often arise as a result of the
design of data collection instruments, where it is often
necessary or efficient to collect identical or overlapping
information. For example, basic demographic information is
collected in the census, in many surveys and in many
administrative files. The social data base of the future will
have holding cells for all of these.
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can be found in Figure 16. Resolving those quality problems can result in adjustments to the data that
make them much more consistent and accurate. For missing data resulting from non-response or
obvious errors in answering questions, it has always been possible to use imputation techniques to fill
many of the gaps. In recent decades, there has been an explosion of new data created by applying new
technologies to clean up messy administrative data sources. In the new social data base, the possibilities
for imputing missing data increase by many orders of magnitude; there are many more sources of
related and overlapping data on which to create the missing data.
.… and creating new information
Of even greater importance is the use of new computing power to examine the inter-relationships
among similar or overlapping data sets in order to create new data that were not there in any of the
original collection instruments. The change is comparable in scope to the introduction of sampling into
official statistics in the post-war period which similarly allowed new information about a whole to be
created by gathering information from only some of the members of the group in question. As with the
introduction of sampling, this new approach will likely be introduced slowly at first and will be greeted
with much resistance reflecting paternalistic concerns about the high risk of misuse of this new tool.
Following are some current examples of new data that have been created. These are major
breakthroughs, but still only hint at the potential power of this new way of doing business.


In recent years, Geographic Information Systems have provided vastly richer data bases of local
area data, using new computing techniques that can draw on different data sources.



In Canada, data on from the Adult Literacy sample survey have recently been imputed onto
individual census records to provide a rich source of completely new data on skills by industry,
occupation and geographic areas. It has even been possible to impute mismatches in the supply
and demand for skills by developing data on employers’ demand for skills (using the fine
occupational coding on the census micro-records along with exogenous essential skills profiles
developed by ESDC).



Microsimulation tools, particular the LifePath model, have perhaps gone furthest in creating
highly detailed life histories of (synthetic) Canadians, again drawing on inter-related data from
multiple data sources.

7.4. Using big statistics
To this point, the chapter has discussed the internal structure of big statistics. Earlier chapters have
provided examples of how these big statistics will be used in practice. Here we simply note that the
system will support both highly complex research and also the needs of lay people. Experts will be able
to play with the anonymized raw data directly, without the constraints of pre-existing ways of
aggregating that data. Everyday users will have access to simple intuitive programs that provide
information that is tailor-made to their needs and available when decisions are being made. These will
be no more complicated to use than Facebook or Amazon.
The national system of big statistics will be a co-evolving system based on that new partnership. It
starts by making a crude representation of real life by using information that already exists and steadily
improves that over time as increasing amounts of data are added. That is, the system incorporates ever
more lessons that have been learned by following the lifecourses of people and institutions, and
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becomes an increasingly real representation of what actually happens in society. The more it is used the
better it becomes. And all the partners using the system contribute, automatically, to its development.
This chapter has attempted to describe the structure of big statistics and explain its power in an
understandable manner. It has done this by using analogies, simplifying descriptions and casting the
argument at a high level of generality. The devil however is always in the detail. The next chapter will
take a more microscopic look at how the system of big social statistics will mirror the structure of real
life.
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8. OLIVIA: AN INTEGRATING FRAMEWORK FOR THE
ENABLING SOCIETY
The strategy for expediting the transition to the enabling society that was set out in Chapter 6 called for
the development of conceptual framework that would act as a map to the new, and greatly expanded,
system of social statistics and that would also be the basis of a consistent language of words and
numbers that could support consistent, productive communications throughout the entire social policy
world, including in its governance.
The System of National Accounts now provides such a framework for economic statistics and analysis,
but there is currently no counterpart on the social side. Section 8.1 describes social accounting, an
earlier attempt to develop a comparable framework to support social analysis.
Section 8.2 discusses the origin of a new conceptual framework, the Olivia framework, which can
support the evolution of the enabling society.
Section 8.3 provides an overview of the contents of the Olivia framework.
Section 8.4 provides examples of how the framework supports virtually all types of social analysis.

8.1. Looking back: an integrating framework for welfare state social
policies
The System of National Accounts has been a powerful force for integration on the economic side of
policy-making. Why has no counterpart emerged on the social side? This introductory section suggests
that an explicit framework is most needed during a period of major change in policy, with less need
during subsequent periods of fine-tuning and consolidation.
From an historical perspective, the latest big change in social policy was the introduction of the mature
welfare state in the 1960s and 70s. And indeed, at about that time, much work was carried out in
developing conceptual frameworks to provide the new kinds of social analysis that was felt to be
needed. The most thoughtful of these, and the one that is most relevant to the situation today, was
known as social accounting72. The main themes of social accounting are set out in Figure 17.
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The main themes of this golden age of social accounting are captured in a book (Juster and Land eds. 1981)
reporting on a 1980 workshop which included papers from the main players involved and overall assessments by key
figures. The content of Figure 17 draws heavily from the concluding assessment by Richard Ruggles, even
paraphrasing his words in places. The present author was, in his early days in social analysis, a great admirer of the
social accounting school of thought as laid in this document and remains so today. It influenced the development of the
Olivia framework in many direct and indirect ways.
Social accounting was not the only framework under consideration. Another stream of thought was to base a framework
around a systematic approach to social indicators, an approach that was destined to fail for reasons described in Figure
17. Another was to use health as an overarching theme and to treat social and economic characteristics in the context of
their role as health determinants (a movement sometimes referred to as ‘healthy public policy’). It provided useful
insights but the implied policy dominance of health consideration over all social and economic factors did not gain
wide acceptance in the context of developing a comprehensive framework. The operational data to support a healthoriented government agenda simply did not exist at that time.
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Figure 17. Social accounting: an unrealized framework developed for welfare state policies
Social accounting emerged at outset of the mature welfare
state and flourished during the relatively short period from the
late 1960s until the late 1970s, mainly in the United States.

micro (individual level) data. It provides an integrated
approach to subjective and objective measures of wellbeing. Time is allocated to both market production and
non-market activities. These activities produce a range of
outputs (earnings which can provide goods and services, a
clean house, improved health, etc.). The activities add up
to the 24 hours that are available in a day, providing a
powerful accounting tool. The satisfaction obtained from
the outputs can be measured – as can sustainability (the
capacity to continue on in life). There are three levels of
accounts: a household output account, a capital account
and social output account. The capital account provides
the link to economic statistics and the SNA, while the
social production account deals with matters related to
social well-being.

It addressed two problems that were then seen:


Existing cross-sectional statistics were descriptive, rather
than dynamic and analytical. They were weak in helping
understand cause and effect.



Existing statistics were not easily integrated. There was
little ability to see how changes in different aspects of
society related to each other. For example, there were
data on both subjective well-being and on objective
characteristics, but they could not be used together to get
an integrated understanding of the sources of well-being.

The goal was to develop a framework or accounting system
that would:

Time-based accounts were generally preferred:



Show how social data were related to each other and with
economic data.





Would be based on flows, which would enable a better
understanding of inter-relationships and which would
provide a better handle on understanding cause and
effect.

Demographic accounts were not based on micro data and,
consequently, were far less flexible, especially in analyzing
many variables at the same time. Their reliance on large
matrices meant that far more data would need to be
collected than was required for substantive analysis.



The micro time-based accounts were more efficient and
allowed far more integration (e.g., between objective and
subjective data). As well, the micro approach could readily
take account of macro data.



The time-based micro system could work with whatever
data were available; it did not require full-scale
implementation to be analytically useful.



Would be descriptive and neutral and, in particular, would
not include social indicators in the social accounts per se,
but rather see them as outputs of the statistical system.
(Before the 1980s, discussions of social accounts and
social indicators had often been muddled together in an
unhelpful manner.)

The main focus was on two types of accounting systems:
demographic accounts and time-based accounts.




Demographic-based accounts are based on national
accounting principles. The basic idea is that one can
examine tables (matrices) that show flows (or states and
flows) among different population groups (i.e., not
individuals) with different characteristics at different
points in time. This allows an integrated approach to
examining changes in status including many social
dimensions – education, health, marital status, income,
wealth or even subjective well-being status. The
demographic dimension of the accounts allows life
expectancies to be divided up into expected time in a
whole series of states. Economic links enable costs or
benefits to be associated with the relevant states.
Time-based accounts use two types of accounting
principles: one based on national accounting principles
and the other on time use. This approach is based on

Principles for future development
A 1980 symposium (Juster and Land 1981) on social accounts
identified the following characteristics that should guide future
work on social accounts:


The system should be general purpose in nature – serving
a broad spectrum of demographic, social and economic
research, and creating a comprehensive common data
base.



It should integrate micro and macro data in the sense that
the macro accounts should be conceptually derivable from
aggregations of micro accounts.



The system should not require the estimation or recording
of trivia that arise purely because of accounting design.



The system should be open-ended, so that analysts
interested in specific problems or particular kinds of data
can build on the existing system without having to begin
anew.
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The social accounts movement was an explicit attempt to further extend national accounting principles
on the social side – or, in other cases, it was an attempt to emulate national accounting principles using
other means.
The further work described in Figure 17 was not followed up under the heading of ‘social accounting’
per se, which fell out of favour shortly after the workshop73. Even the term ‘social accounting’ in the
sense used in this paper has largely disappeared74. This disappearance was not the result of any
particular decision or the discovery of any large weakness in social accounting. Rather people just lost
interest as a new, more ad hoc agenda made more practical sense.
Attention in the years since 1980 shifted away from big conceptual frameworks in many areas.
Economic times became tougher and there was less optimism on the social front. Expectations created
about the benefits of a rational, systematic approach to planning were far higher than could be realized.
Most important, there was little appetite for innovative thinking about new directions in social policy,
let alone its theoretical structure. The great majority of the welfare state programs had been introduced
and the main tasks were ones of fine-tuning and cost control.
Moreover, practical, operational systems did not exist for the micro-level data collection and analysis
that had been contemplated by the social accountants in this period. Social accounting was technically
feasible for relatively small scale analytic and research applications. It is only recently that the needed
computing power has become available to allow the introduction of micro-analytic systems on a widespread basis and at reasonable cost.
What the new computing power of the 80s and 90s could do very well was to allow the efficient
collection and analysis of a lot more survey data. Accordingly, starting in the 70s, there was rapid
growth in the numbers of cross-sectional sample surveys covering many domains of social life. In the
more recent period, there has been significant growth in the area of longitudinal surveys and increasing,
if still modest, statistical exploitation of administrative records.
The argument of this paper is that transformative policy change is again on the near time horizon and
that, accordingly, now is the time to begin thinking about new framework, or common social policy
language. The needed technology is already available and has been successfully used in other domains.

73

As far as this author is aware, time-based accounting has almost completely disappeared as a separate area of
investigation. However, there has been much progress in collecting time use data where survey respondents account for
their allocation of their time, typically over the course of a 24 hour day – and in policy-related analysis of that data.
(The new Olivia framework described below encompasses time-based accounting, but not as a sole focus.)
Demographic-based accounting has survived in a form now known as Social Accounting Matrices. These are useful
tools in some circumstances but, as they suffer the problems identified in the golden age dialogues, applications are
quite limited; they are barely known in social policy world. A Canadian version of such a matrix can be found in
Siddiqi and Salem (2006).
74

‘Social accounting’ has a completely different meaning in current usage. It now refers to the process of reporting on
the environmental and social effects of economic actions.
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8.2. The origins of the Olivia framework
In 2004, the Policy Research Initiative75, a central policy think tank within the Government of Canada
developed a descriptive framework, known as the Olivia framework to support policy-relevant social
analysis and statistical planning. The framework developed in several waves and its evolution continues.
Subsequent versions developed in Social Development Canada, in ESDC and by the present author
increased the scope of the framework76.
The Olivia framework is today’s version of social accounting. It has the potential to become the
conceptual framework to support analysis in the enabling society. It integrates social analysis by
providing a map of the holding cells in the ‘honeycomb’ of big statistics described in Chapter 7. It
provides the conceptual framework to move from a world of unstructured ‘big data’ to the vastly more
powerful world of ‘big statistics’.
It supports integrated quantitative and qualitative analysis by providing concepts and definitions for
those cells in the honeycomb that are filled with actual statistical data and also for those that may never
contain statistical information but that are useful in case studies and other qualitative applications77.
In its present version it provides a set of integrated concepts that encompass lifecourse, asset-based,
network, time use and place-based perspectives, while still building on traditional economic
perspectives based on point-in-time transactions. It has the potential to encompass subjective data
about values, perceived well-being and opinions that parallels and re-enforces the usual objective
statistics.

8.3. Overview of its current contents
The framework starts with specific individuals and specific institutions (institutions are defined broadly
and include, for example, firms, schools, voluntary organizations, government programs and informal
social networks). The emphasis is on the individual with the individual being situated in his or her
social and economic context through the use of the flows of resources78 that take place among
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PRI (2004). The PRI is now known as Policy Horizons. The first version of the Olivia framework was imperfect. See
Marshall and McMullin (2010) for a criticisms. Nevertheless its basic structure and concepts proved highly flexible
during subsequent development, requiring small adjustments only.
76

The most recent versions are Hicks (2008a) and Hicks (2012b).
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Earlier versions of the Olivia framework were not sufficiently clear on this point, namely that everything covered by
the framework is potentially quantifiable, but that not all the concepts are intended to be quantified in the system of
national social statistics. For example, concerns were expressed that the system seemed to require detailed time use data
covering the 24 hours a day for all Canadians, during all periods of time. This would never be possible in practice.
While time use data are highly important both for qualitative and quantitative analysis, the fact that it is only collected
periodically in sample surveys does not pose any problem for the framework.
78

The resource flow approach is similar to, and can be easily converted to, the activity approach used in the time-based
social accounts. In both cases, activities (non-monetary flows) have durations that add up to 24 hours a day. There are
excellent reasons for thinking in terms of resource flows, rather than activities. For example, the resource flow model
defines individuals in terms of their social context and in their dealings with others. It also embeds the fundamental
notion that flows are two-way, that things are always done for a purpose or have a consequence (a return flow) – but
that this return flow might be of different kind and might be at a later time. This sets up analysis of both flows and
stocks – of investments, of mutual obligations, of social capital. It invites comparative analysis of monetary
transactions and non-monetary interactions. It reconciles two types of dynamic analysis: stock and flow analysis, and
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individuals and between individuals and institutions. These flows include monetary transactions (the
purchase of goods and services or the receipt of a salary for time spent working) and non-monetary
interactions (often involving the flow of information). This technique allows a network of flows to be
created among individuals and institutions, with the network in effect describing the relationships
among all the nodes in the system.
Figure 18 shows the basic cross-sectional model that underlies the entire conceptual framework.
Everything else – longitudinal analysis, values analysis, links to macro analysis – is based on these
building blocks of individuals, institutions and resource flows.
Figure 18. Model of cross-sectional resource flows
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The resource flows are shown using double-headed arrows to suggest that flows go in both directions.
For example, a flow of money is usually accompanied by a return flow of goods, services or
information. We buy a loaf of bread for a dollar. Information flows, say between two neighbours,
represent exchanges of gossip and news that, by definition, are of equal duration for both parties79.

transitions/trajectories analysis – which in turn allows analysis of latency, cumulative, and pathway effects that are used
in some human development analysis.
In a few areas, however, the activity approach is closer to everyday language. For example, in the Olivia system, it is
necessary to include a number of passive activities, such as sleep whose function is internal to the individual, as
‘resource flows’ – even though nothing obvious is flowing. This is needed because such activities are significant
(personal biological maintenance in this case) and to ensure that the total of all non-monetary resource flows adds up to
24 hours a day. However, these problems are minor compared with the powerful strengths of the resource flow concept.
79

In practice, a number of coding conventions will need to be developed to deal with cases of, for example, information
flows via text messages. They might be coded as having a duration of 0 seconds or perhaps 1 second. Many such
conventions will be needed as the Olivia framework’s concepts are developed into a set of operational definitions.

89

However the flows need not be equal at any one time period. Unequal flows create debts, savings and
gifts and obligations – the basis of asset-based analysis.
As is the case with any data base of this sort, there are standard ways of categorizing individuals and
institutions. In the case of the Olivia framework, these descriptors largely follow standard practices
used by national statistical agencies such as Statistics Canada. Figure 19 gives examples.
More innovative is the standard way of describing the flows that take place among individuals and
institutions. Four basic types of flows are identified: money, information, goods and services80. These
are categorized as:


Transactions, which are the market flows that are usually monetary in character – buying and
selling of goods and services, labour market and capital market transactions. Transactions provide
the linkage to the traditional cross-sectional, micro-economic techniques that currently dominate
social policy analysis.



Non-monetary interactions that take place in the family, with colleagues in the workplace, in
community groups and social networks. These are almost always flows of services and
information, but can also include goods that are made at home and given as gifts. These
interactions provide linkage with a wide range of social analysis, including time use and qualitative
analysis.



Events81 are large transactions or non-monetary interactions that change basic relationships among
individuals and institutions – e.g., getting married or divorced, going to a new school or
graduating, having a baby, changing houses, having a spouse die, obtaining a job, being fired or
retired, etc. Events are assumed to have no duration. Events provide the linkage to lifecourse
analysis and, as explained in the footnote, allow concepts of risk and insurance to be integrated
into the framework.

Each of these categories of flow has a standard set of descriptors including, obviously, the time and
location of the flow, the parties involved, volumes (e.g., the dollar value of transactions), and the type
of good or service that is flowing. Of particular interest are the following descriptors which allow the
cross-sectional framework to be extended to the full range of analytic applications:


The characteristics of the relationship-changing events – as just mentioned.

80

Information can be logically thought of as a subset of services. However, it is simpler and more consistent with
ordinary usage to keep them separate. For example, we usually do not see chatting with neighbours or dinner-time
discussion with one’s children as ‘services’. Publishing a book is a service, but reading a book is not usually thought of
as consuming a service. In the original version of the framework, time was also considered as a flow. However this
proved confusing in subsequent analysis, where it was more satisfactory to simply treat time as being the duration of
another flow.
81

Events are not necessarily ‘resource’ flows in the ordinary meaning of flow, although they typically involve a change
in the magnitude or direction of a transaction or non-monetary flow. An event changes the nature of a former flow, or
creates a new flow – say to a different institution (changing jobs) or different individual (getting married, having
children). As the Olivia framework is further refined, there will almost certainly be further development work on
‘chance events’ – the unpredictable things that add risk to life and the alter the future course of life, such as accidents or
death or winning lotteries. This analysis will provide a further way of integrating concepts of risk and social insurance
into the framework.
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Figure 19. Standard typologies and descriptors, individuals and institutions
Standard descriptors of individuals
There would be standard descriptors for each of the 35
million individuals in Canada:


Characteristics they were born with, or that arose out of
their environment when they were born, including place
and date of birth, the socio-economic and other
characteristics of their parents, health status at birth,
etc.



Current characteristics that people acquire during one
stage of life that stay with them during subsequent
stages. Examples include educational attainment and
some aspects of disability and occupation.



Characteristics related to current resource flows, i.e., the
flows shown on the graph above, for a particular current
period such as yesterday.



Characteristics to the individual’s current assets, i.e.,
those that result from the accumulation of previous
resource flows (human capital in the form of skills and
health, housing, financial capital, social capital).



Characteristics related to space and time. The basic unit
is the dwelling or the institutional workplace in which
activities take place. (This allows adding up in a flexible
way to neighbourhoods, cities, local labour markets,
national economies, etc. – enabling historic and macrolevel data to be linked to specific individuals.)



Descriptors of individual well-being, including
expectations, values, stress and perceptions of wellbeing or happiness – including a person’s expressed
satisfaction with the variables described in the preceding
bullets, especially their assets. Subjective indicators such
as these are dealt with on a highly detailed micro basis,
comparably to ‘objective’ data.

Standard typology and descriptors of institutions
Institutions are assigned to various categories according to a
standard typology that codes institutions to grouping such as
firms, non-for-profit organizations, extended and blended
families, formal social networks such as Facebook, informal
networks such neighborhood friends.
Institutions in the public sector are coded in two different
ways. First they are treated as employers (where
government departments per se are distinguished from
arm’s length bodies such as schools and hospitals). Second,
they are also treated as aggregations of the various programs
they administer using a standard typology of different types
of programs.
Information about institutions comes from two sources: a
summation of data from the individuals that comprise those
organizations (e.g., in the case of a firm, it could be the
number of employees and their educational attainment) and
information collected at the level of the institution as whole
(e.g., number of paid employees, their current occupation,
hours paid for, fringe benefits, etc.).
Often these sources will provide duplicate of overlapping
data (number of employees in this example), a great strength
of this kind of data base as discussed in the last chapter.
Each of these categories of institutions has its own set of
standard descriptors. In the case of firms, for example, they
include ownership, industry type, types or products or
services, financial data, number of employee and geographic
location.
Government programs are also categorized in additional
ways, including by instrument type (along the lines of the
typology found in Chapter 2) and by a hierarchy of inputs,
processes, outputs and outcomes.
Networks are coded by size, purpose, density and intensity
(including support for analysis of weak ties, embeddedness
tipping points and social capital).



The duration of non-monetary interactions and information about the timing and sequencing of
interactions, as well as their durations, in order to distinguish resource flows that overlap each
other in time (such as simultaneously listening to the radio, cooking dinner and helping children
with homework – or business lunches where the parties both eat and make deals). This
information is useful in its own right, particularly for qualitative analysis and is also needed to
enable time-based social accounting.



The intensity of resource flows. The standard classifications have not yet been developed, but
they will be crucial to the extension of the framework to cover assets – both human capital and
social capital as discussed below.
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The purposes of resources flows and expressed satistifaction with those flows – which links to
the values analysis, again as discussed below.

The current content of the framework is organized in four modules. Each module uses the consistent,
measurable concepts above to describe individuals and organizations from a different perspective. The
content of the modules is summarized in Figure 20.
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Figure 20. The current content of the Olivia framework
Module One: resources flows
Module One provides a consistent terminology for
describing resource flows. It is a simple extension of the
traditional, point-in-time micro-economic analysis that is
the basis of much of today’s social policy analysis. It sets
out consistent concepts for describing the interactions or
transactions that take place among individuals and
institutions. (An institution is defined very broadly to
include government programs and informal social
networks, as well as formal organisations such as firms,
schools and non-governmental bodies.)
These concepts encompass the monetary flows that are
the basis of the economy, as well as non-monetary flows
of goods, services and information.
As well, Module One provides standard ways of
describing the characteristics of individuals, institutions
and resource flows. It is our starting point. For example,
there is provision for coding resource flows by their
duration, by their skills/learning intensity and healthiness
intensity (which allows analysis of the human capital and
human development as set out in Module Two), by their
networking intensity (which, when more fully developed,
appears to be a good basis for calculations of social
capital and the role of communities), and by perceived
satisfaction (which is one of measures of purpose in
Module 4).
Module 2: lifecourses and stocks and flows
Module Two starts with the point-in-time resource flows
and transactions of Module One, but uses them as the
basis for a consistent approach for describing how people
and social institutions change and develop over time. The
module provides three quite different, but
complementary, lenses by which we can describe social
change and development in statistical terms.
First is a narrowly-defined lifecourse approach based on
transitions (events) in the main trajectories of life. Events
are large changes or discontinuities in the resource flows
of Module One. Such analysis allows us to describe the
main compartments and changes of life.
Second is stock and flow analysis that looks at, for
example, financial capital, housing, human and social
capital – and how these also result from the point-in flows
in Module One. We build up assets from flows at one
stage of life, and convert them back into other flows at
subsequent stages of life. This analysis allows us to

describe the continuities that cross the various transitions
and stages in the lives of people and institutions.
Third is combinaton of the above that allows path
dependency analysis involving latency, cumulative and
pathway effects.
Module Three: meta and macro linkages
Module Three provides a set of concepts for describing
the physical settings where individuals and social
institutions are situated – neighbourhoods, cities, labour
markets, provinces/states, the country as a whole, and
international groupings such as OECD countries. These
contain data that are built up from the characteristics of
those who live in those locations and also exogenous data
about those locations derived from other sources. This
allows us to anchor people in real space and in real
history. Similar techniques can be carried out for other
higher level, non-geographic groupings such as
occupations or ethnic or language groups, often referred
to as meta-level analysis.
Module 3 allows us to use the micro-analysis of Modules
One and Two in conjunction with macro- and meta-level
analysis by attributing the following kind of information to
individuals:


The business cycles, wars, and climate changes that
took place at different stages in the lifecourse of an
individual.



Workplace quality in the case of the firms in which
they were employed.



Social infrastructure, unemployment rates and crime
in the case of the communities in which they lived.

Module Four: measuring purposes and well-being
Module Four provides a consistent set of systems-based
concepts that can be used to describe the purposes or
goals of individuals, institutions and societies.
For institutions, we use the familiar input-process-outputoutcome model to describe purposes.
For individuals, the purpose is well-being. We approach
this through concepts related to values, satisfactions and
expectations – with these concepts rooted in the finelygrained descriptions of the first three modules, including
both stocks and flows.
For societies, purpose is shown through social indicators,
with the framework explicitly supporting a range of
different approaches to social indicator development.
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8.4. How the Olivia framework supports all forms of social analysis
The following pages take a closer look at how the frameworks provides concepts and terminology that
can support a full range of analytic tool, including:


Traditional cross-sectional, micro-economic analysis.



Stock and flow analysis, including human and social capital.



Lifecourse analysis.



Analysis of purposes.



A variety of other types of social policy analysis, some of which would be quite innovative.

Cross-sectional and traditional micro-economic analysis
Since the starting point for the model is a description of flows at a point in time, it, it is not hard to see
how it continues to support cross-sectional micro-economic analysis. Figure 21 makes this clearer by
expanding the basic flow model so that it explicitly shows the economic transactions that lie at the
heart of much of traditional social analysis.
Figure 21 puts a single individual, Olivia in this case, at the centre of the system of flows. However the
Olivia framework is not only centred on individuals. Similar charts could be constucted for any
groupings of individuals or institutions. For example, the central box might be contain the aggregation
of a number of individuals – such as all unemployed women living in Ontario, or post-secondary
graduates working in the mining industy, or the Canadian population aged 65 and over. Or could all the
firms in a particular industry, or all people employed in a particular occupation. Program beneficiaries
and contributors can be added up to program groupings such as the Canada Pension Plan or the
federal income tax system.
For example, data about the volumes of specific flows (and the attributes of flows such their duration)
can be used to measure:


Monetary transactions between specific groupings of individuals and institutions – in order to
calculate Employment Insurance payouts to people under the age of 25 in Halifax; to compare
the income taxes paid by people in different income groups; to calculate the cost of dental visits
in Regina, to explore changes in the size of intergovernmental fiscal transfers, or to compare the
wage costs in different industries and localities.



The duration of selected flows among groups of individuals – in order to compare the amount of
time that mothers and fathers devote to child care, or elder care; or to calculate the hourly
earnings of different occupational groups.

In other words, the framework supports the full range of existing micro-economic and other crosssectional analysis – and extends it greatly to also encompass non-monetary flows.
As a consequence, the Olivia framework also supports macroeconomic analysis to the extent the macro
concepts are built up from, or are consistent with, micro foundations. This is typically the case, since
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Figure 21. An expanded view of resource flows
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NOTE: The two headed arrows in these charts suggest that there can be two-way flows in any of the resources:
money, information, goods, etc. It is not meant to suggest that there are equal flows at any particular point in time for
any one resource. For example, often money is exchanged for goods and services. Or, in any period of time, money
inflows can exceed money outflows.
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the System of National Accounts ensures consistency between micro and macro analysis in the
economic data82.

Analysis of changes over time: assets and lifecourse analysis
Cross-sectional flows can be used to create four ways of analyzing changes over time. Firstly, and
obviously, social indicators and other forms of time series analysis continue to be supported based on
the cross-sectional readings that have just been described. Second is asset-based analysis. Third is
lifecourse analysis. Fourth is human development analysis based on notions of pathways and
accumulated advantage and disadvantage.

Analysis of assets and capital
Over time, resource flows create stocks or assets83. Flows of money create savings or debts. Flows of
learning-intensive activities create human capital. Flows with others in a network create social capital84.
These assets can then be drawn down at a later time to create new resource flows – ideally at a time in
life when they are most needed.
Figure 22 shows how the framework supports asset-based analysis.
Earlier versions of the Olivia framework provided an illustration of the role of assets in the life of
Olivia. It showed a graph of how her financial assets, physical assets (e.g., housing, car), human capital
and social capital changed over the course of her life. In her case, financial capital was U-shaped over
life, if one counts her share of her parents wealth when she was a child living at home. If one looks
only at the assets she held in her own name, both physical and financial assets increased grew later in
life, particularly after the age of 50. Major changes in her financial and physical capital were related to
her changes in family relationships, particularly her late second marriage.
In this illustration, Olivia’s human capital also grew over life, until near the end of life when she
withdrew from voluntary activities and began losing skills, and when her health began deteriorating.
Her social capital on the other hand was highest when she was young (strong family bonds and school
friendships) and when she was in her 50s (active in both work and voluteering) and lowest when in her
82

There are some minor inconsistencies between the survey data typically used in social statistics and the concepts of
the System of National Accounts. For example, they use somewhat different concepts in areas such a home ownership
and employer contributions to pension plans. Also, there are important economic transactions taking place that affect
the individual but without the individual’s direct participation – such as the rise or fall in the value of stocks that are
held. The conventions to be used in these cases were discussed in documents associated with the golden age of social
accounting. A Canadian paper (Siddiqi and Salem 2006) made many of the needed adjustments in the context of
developing a Canadian Social Accounting Matrix.
83

In addition to financial, human and social capital, some of the literature identifies neighbourhood or cultural capital –
often defined in terms of the community resources available such as schools, community centres, parks and convenient
shopping. This kind of analysis is fully supported by the Olivia framework in the Module 4 which deals with the spatial
dimensions. It can be fully integrated with the analysis of human, social and financial capital that arise directly from
individual resources flows.
84

The Policy Research Initiative, the Social Research and Demonstration Corporation and ESDC (in its various past
manifestations) have played important roles in exploring the uses of social capital concepts and data in policy
applications. In the academic world, Barry Wellman at the University of Toronto has played a key role in areas such as
network analysis including the roles of the internet, social relations and social structures. An anonymous critic of an
earlier draft of this paper usefully pointed out the fruitful intersection of human capital and social capital approaches in
a number of topics of policy interest, including ways in which new immigrants integrate into Canadian society.
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Figure 22. From flows to stocks: measuring financial, human and social capital
Stocks of assets – financial, human and social capital – can
be directly measured by asking individuals and institutions to
provide information about their current asset holdings. As
well, estimates of assets can be built up from the earlier
resource flows that were illustrated in Figure 21.
Financial capital
In the case of financial capital and durables (e.g., bank
accounts and house ownership), the way in which stocks are
built up is straight-forward. If money flowing in at a point in
time does not equal money flowing out, the result will be the
creation, over time, of savings and debts, home ownership
and mortgages.

Health. Health refers to analysis based on the WHO positive
definition of health – including the determinants of good
health and how health status helps or constrains subsequent
resource flows later in life.
In the Olivia framework, stock measures of health are based
on current descriptors of health status, including obstacles
to the conduct of those activities that comprise normal daily
living.
Flow measures have yet to be developed but, as with skills,
the likely approach is likely to including coding of resource
flows by health intensity:


The extent to which those flows were constrained by
limitations on the individual’s capacity to perform
Activities of Daily Living, based on the considerable
existing classification work that now exists in this area.



The extent to which those flows have the potential to
improve or weaken health, including dietary practices,
physical exercise, stress, environmental factors, etc.

Human capital
Human capital is a main subject of social analysis. It deals
with investments in developing skills and good health, and
the subsequent returns from those skills and from that good
health.
Skills. ‘Skills’ is shorthand for analysis of the full range of
peoples’ skills, knowledge, aptitudes and abilities. It includes
how these were acquired both through experience and in
more formal learning settings – and how they are lost
through lack of use or a deterioration of one’s mental and
physical health. It also includes how they were used, with
most analysis concentrating on labour market uses (i.e.,
providing services to employers in return for wages).
In the Olivia framework, stock measures of skills are
captured directly by individual descriptors related to
educational experience, current literacy levels, occupation,
experience, etc.
The measures of the flows that created this stock of skills
have yet to be fully developed but the proposal is to base
them on standard descriptors of learning/skills intensity.
These descriptors will classify the extent to which different
resource flows require the use of skills and, as well, the
potential for learning associated with those flows. For
example


In challenging jobs or difficult academic courses, for
example, we might expect that there is both a high level
of skills being applied and a high level of skills being
learned.



In more passive learning (say, in watching a TV
documentary or reading a business report), there might
be only a moderate application of skills but considerable
potential for acquisition – learning new things.

Social capital
Social capital has received much attention in the academic
literature in recent years, particularly in the field of
sociology, with Canadians playing an important international
role. However it is less developed in the area of official
statistics, with no fully developed consensus on either its
role in official government statistics or on best approaches
to practical, routine measurement.
Social capital deals with interactions within networks and
with the subsequent benefits that are realised from
investments in those networks. These investments are
usually in the form of flows of information (whether informal
chatting with neighbours, on-line social networks, or more
formal ‘what worked best for me’ discussions among people
with similar interests and problems). However they could
also include services (e.g., shovelling snow for a sick
neighbour or more formal volunteering) or money (e.g.,
charitable donations).
The Olivia framework, which is based on networks of
resource flows, including informal networks, is ideally suited
to supporting developmental work leading to standard
measure of social capital. The approach, as with the
measures of skills intensity and health intensity, would be to
develop standards for measuring the networking intensity of
interactions with other people and institutions. Existing
typologies of networks (e.g., bridging, bonding,) may provide
a starting point.
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middle years when her financial assets were also low (divorce, spells of unemployment, moving to a
different city). Social capital also fell rapidly in the later years of life, especially after the death of her
husband.
This example was, of course, an illustration of qualitative analysis – showing showing the factors that
led to the creation of capital, and how the various forms of capital work in combination, over the life
of particular individual. However, once the data are available in the system of big statistics, quantitative
analysis can be carried for different population groups. And that in turn will add huge power to future
qualitative analysis since the narratives of people’s lives can be situated in the context of actual statistics
about the characteristics of the different groups to which they are a part.
When analysis based on stocks is combined with analysis based on the lifecourse concepts discussed
below, it become possible to undertake analysis of human development based on concepts of
accumulated advantage and disadvantage – how experience in early life shapes the way in which life
unfolds in different conditioned pathways over time.

Lifecourse analysis
It would be hard to underestimate the importance of lifecourse perspectives in understanding the
changes that are taking place in social and employment policy. Both the human development and
vulnerability goals of social policy are now being cast in lifecourse terms, as are resulting policy
responses – making an actual, measureable difference in what happens over the course of people’s
lives. From the perspective of devising conceptual frameworks, it has particular advantages. First it is
broad perspective and helps integrate many dimensions of social and labour market policy and analysis.
Second it is a perspective only, not a rigid theory. That is, it complements, not excludes, other theories
and perspectives. Readers interested in more background will find a short, accessible paper85 by Victor
Marshall to be an invaluable review of the evolution of lifecourse thinking, including a discussion of
main issues and how lifecourse perspectives relate to policy.
Lifecourse analysis can be defined broadly or narrowly. A recent formulation86 identifies a broad
approach based on four principles: (1) that our daily experiences form a trajectory that begins at birth
and stretches to death; (2) that lifecourse patterns unfold in a multiplicity of interconnected realms; (3)
that social bonds form throughout our own lifecourse and that of others; and (4) that a variety of local
and national contexts shape lifecourses and are shaped by them.
Some of these dimensions are shared with other analytic perspectives and are built into the various
modules of the Olivia framework87. For example, Module 1 places individuals in their social contexts.
Module 2 on assets and flows deals with social bonds and the building of social capital. Module 3 on
spatial dimensions places people in their local and national contexts. What is missing from these other
85

Marshall 2011. The paper in question was the inaugural presentation at the inauguration ceremony of the Swiss
National Center of Competence in Research, LIVES, on March 2011. The paper summarizes more detailed analysis of
the way in which the lifecourse perspective is useful in policy thinking found in Marshall (2009). This latter paper also
critiques the original PRI lifecourse work, of which Olivia was one element.
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McDaniel and Bernard 2011.
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The Olivia framework had its origins in lifecourse thinking, one of defining characteristics of new enabling society
policies. Indeed the first report on the framework’s development (PRI 2004) was titled ‘A Lifecourse Approach to
Social Policy Analysis: A Proposed Framework’. The very earliest internal draft by Stéphanie Gaudet (currently with
the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at the University of Ottawa) was intended to introduce the lifecourse
concepts of transitions and trajectories to her economist colleagues.
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perspectives is the narrow lifecourse perspective that, throughout life, lifecourse patterns unfold in a
multiplicity of interconnected realms.
Module 2 therefore sets out lifecourse concepts which describe how people’s lives unfold through
transitions, events and states in a variety of trajectories in different domains of life, with attention
placed on the importance of the sequences and durations of transitions and states.
Basically, the framework divides an individual’s life into various domains such as life in school, life in
the family, and life at work. These are referred to as trajectories. A trajectory consists of transitions and
intervening states. For example:


A state (or stage of life) might consist of holding a particular job or being married to a particular
person, or going to elementary school.



A transition might be losing that job, becoming retired, getting a divorce, or moving on to
secondary school. In the Olivia framework, transitions are defined as events, the large changes in
flows (both transactions and non-monetary flows) of Module One.



A trajectory consists of sequences of transitions and states in the main domains of life. As an
example, a work trajectory would include a person’s lifetime experience in the labour market,
including various transitions (losing, finding, changing jobs) and states (holding jobs of different
tenures, various periods of job search or training to find new jobs). Some lifecourse researchers
prefer the terms ‘career’ or ‘status passage’ rather than ‘trajectory’, but the underlying concept is
about the same.

The Olivia framework, being based on microdata concepts, allows users to construct both trajectories
and events in any manner they wish, given the research or analytic objectives at hand. However, in
order to facilitate consistent analysis, it also provides standard coding that will cover the great majority
of uses:


The set of pre-coded events will be built up over time, starting with the many thousands of
variables that are currently used in national statistics such as birth, becoming unemployed,
graduating from school, etc.



The pre-coded trajectories will again start with commonly used domains where good statistics are
now available such as life in the labour market, in schools, in the extended family, in households,
etc. These could be supplemented by additional standard trajectories when there is a sufficient
consensus on how these should be defined. Examples might be a community participation
trajectory or a caregiving trajectory.



Pre-coded events/trajectories need not be mutually exclusive. For example, one type of
household trajectory could concentrate on the physical characteristics of the household, its size,
its location, its safety, etc. Another type of household trajectory could concentrate on family size
and generation, such as living alone, living in a household with one, two or three generations
present.

Figure 23 provides an example of the labour force trajectory of Olivia.
In earlier versions of the Olivia framework, similar graphs were also drawn for the household and
learning trajectories in order to illustrate the interplay among three of the most common domains of
life – at home, at school and at work.
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Figure 23. Labour force trajectory of Olivia
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One of these illustrations, again a qualitative example, looked at one resource flow only, the flow of
money, and showed Olivia’s incomes and expenses and savings at different stages of life overlaid
against the events and stages of her life in the three trajectories. This showed, for example, how the
pooling of her earnings with those of her husband played a large role in her expenditures and living
standards over life, the effect of divorce and raising children on expenditures and savings, and how her
husband’s death affected her savings. Such charts present an integrated picture of intra-family flows of
money and household expenditures at different stages of life. Another application would be an
examination of the effects of unemployment or parental leave on an individual’s work and household
trajectories.
Another qualitative illustration from earlier versions of the framework showed how events and
activities within the various trajectories of life worked together to create stress and time-crunches over
the course of Olivia’s life. Once again, these are qualitative examples but they also illustrate the kind of
quantitative analysis that will be possible be possible in a system of big statistics.

Analysis of purposes and values
Module Four sets out standard concepts to describe the purposes of individuals, institutions and
societies – and the extent to which those purposes have been achieved.
The purposes and objectives of institutions relate to outputs and outcomes. The Olivia framework uses
the hierarchy of inputs, processes, outputs and outcomes described in Figure 13.
The framework does not propose any single measure of the purposes of people as they relate to social
and human resources development. Nor does it include any elegant combination of measures of an
individual’s success in meeting those purposes, such as an index of perceived well-being or happiness.
Rather the framework sets out a multitude of micro measures that analysts can use to create these
overall measures or undertake any type of analysis related to values or subjective well-being. These are
all related to the foundational concepts of resources flows, assets and lifecourse trajectories. For
example:


The volume of resource flows such as goods and services that the individual receives and the
volume of his or assets – in order to support traditional material indicators of well-being.



Satisfaction with time spent in various activities.



Stresses and time crunches related to events and transactions.



Constraints on participating in different activities, including disability, temporary sickness, lack of
facilities (the wanted institutions and networks do not exist), or lack of geographic access.



Satisfaction with respect to the substance and delivery of the resource flows to and from social
institutions and networks – including government programs.



Satisfaction with one’s human and social capital.

The system would also provide a home for all micro level data related to values or well-being that
researchers have collected by surveying individuals, such as measures of trust and perceived overall
well-being. These are simply treated as individual descriptors.
In terms of society-level measures, all the standard social indicators used today would, of course, be
supported by the framework – income levels, educational attainment, leisure time, longevity, and the
extent of poverty and inequality. The framework also opens some interesting new possibilities that
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could be explored. For example, it would be possible to construct a new generation of time-based
social indicators such as expected lifetime hours spent in work, in school, in family unions or alone, in
sickness, in low income, etc. Also it might be possible to develop a set of indicators based on assets as
well as flows.

Other forms of analysis
Many other kinds of analysis are supported. Indeed, because of its micro foundations, the framework
can be adapted to virtually any kind of analysis and to cover any type of social topic.
For example, as already described, the framework is particularly rich in supporting various kinds of
qualitative analysis and allowing a much stronger linkage of qualitative and quantitative analysis.
Being based on resource flow networks, it should provide much opportunity for researchers using
newer forms of network analysis. Demographic analysis, including studies of generations and cohorts,
is fully supported. Time use analysis is, of course, strongly supported.
Lifespan psychology overlaps with the more sociological approaches to the lifecourse used in the
framework88 and a start has been made in exploring the use of the framework in other applications in
psychological analysis89.
The spatial dimension of the framework (Module 3) is particular useful in integrating many kinds of
analyses. As already noted, this includes macro-level economic analysis, geographic analysis, historical
analysis and environmental analysis. For example, the framework provides a way of integrating various
approaches to sustainable development including both generational and environmental perspectives.
Another area of interest is the potential for integrating analysis of regulatory instruments, including
broader human rights issues, together with analysis of spending /information instruments.
Regulatory/rights analysis currently takes place in a separate silo from the analysis of spending
instruments where economic and sociological perspectives prevail. The trajectories of the Olivia
framework can be defined in terms of the rules that govern behaviour in those trajectories – family law,
labour market regulation, etc. These trajectories provide the link between the analysis of regulatory
instruments and the analysis of spending instruments. Matters related to crime and victimization might,
for example, find their place in the framework through a safety and justice trajectory – although this
would require further exploration.
Another application discussed in Part One relates to the governance of social policy. The framework
encompasses all the evidence identified in Figure 13 that allows an integrated approach to managing
horizontal and vertical issues and that will allow the whole system to act on the basis of empiricallydriven partnerships.
In terms of policy areas, the framework now covers the social and employment topics that are the
focus of this paper. Possible extensions as part of the implementation strategy include adapting the
framework to explicitly include concepts related to health policy (including mental illness, disability,
chronic conditions and addictive behaviours), public safety and justice as noted above, and housing.
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Mayer, 2002
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Little and Phillips, 2006. The paper uses the case of ‘Oliver’ to explore the use of the framework in conjunction with
personal projects.
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The extension to the health area would be particularly useful. Health is treated in the framework as one
dimension of human capital. All the usual information related to population health and the operations
of the health care system appear to be quite compatible with this perspective. Lifecourse influences on
subsequent health (known as latency, cumulative and pathway effects) should be able to be
incorporated into the framework’s concepts without difficulty. With the inclusion of health data, the
framework and its big statistics would result in particularly powerful analysis of the determinants of
health and analysis of the obstacles to daily living. Clinical trial data would support powerful ‘what
works best’ applications and current initiatives to computerize doctors medical records would provide,
when taken in conjunction with existing hospital data, very rich institutional data.
The education field, particularly postsecondary education, would be another case where much of the
data exists to allow an early transformation to ‘what works best’ technology. One could examine the
subsequent careers of graduates from different fields of study and different colleges at a fine level of
occupational, industrial and geographic detail. This would provide individual students with a much
stronger basis of evidence of expected outcomes when they chose their educational paths – and it
would result in a vast improvement in economy-wide information about labour supply and demand
and on specific skill shortages and surpluses. Similar gains could be made for workers at all educational
levels, particularly when done in conjunction with standards assessments of individuals’ skill levels,
including generic skills.
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